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Resumen 
          Después de la desintegración de la URSS, tras varios años de guerra civil y con una 
situación económica muy debilitada, Tajikistán inicia un proceso de integración regional 
en la segunda mitad de los 90, firmando varios acuerdos de integración económica tanto 
con países exsoviéticos como con otros países vecinos y con organismos e instituciones 
internacionales.  El acuerdo más relevante de este tipo en el que participa el país, y el que 
parece tener mejores perspectivas de futuro, es la Comunidad Económica Euroasiática 
(EurAsEC), formada en el año 2000. El análisis de las opciones de integración seguidas 
por Tajikistan se realiza en el capítulo dos. 
        En este contexto, el objetivo último de la tesis es analizar los efectos de este acuerdo 
de integración para la economía de Tajikistán y, en particular, para el comercio exterior de 
este país. Antes de abordar el análisis empírico, el capítulo uno revisa la literatura sobre 
integración económica, centrándose en los potenciales efectos que la teoría de la 
integración atribuye a un acuerdo preferencial, tanto los efectos estáticos contemplados por 
las teorías tradicionales como los efectos dinámicos en los que se centra la nueva teoría de 
la integración económica, en particular para los países en desarrollo.  
         Tras la fundamentación teórica, se dedican dos capítulos al análisis de los efectos de 
EurAsEC para Tajikistán. En primer lugar, en el capítulo tres,  estimando un modelo 
gravitacional aumentado, usando datos de panel, para el periodo 1995-2013, se analizan los 
efectos estáticos de creación y desvío de comercio generados por EurAsEC, tanto para el 
área como para  Tajikistán. El capítulo cuatro estudia los efectos dinámicos generados por 
EurAsEc en Tajikistan, analizando los efectos para el crecimiento económico, y presenta 
evidencia sobre varios determinantes del interés por participar en procesos de integración 
en el caso de países en desarrollo (objetivo de desarrollo económico, factores relacionados 




        Since URSS was disintegrated, after several years of civil war and with a seriously 
weakened economy, Tajikistán begins a process of regional integration in the second part 
of the 1990's, by signing several economic integration agreements with ex-soviet countries 
and with other neighborhood countries and with international institutions and organizations 
. The most significant agreement of this type involving this country, having better 
prospects for the future, is the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), formed in 
2000. The analysis of the different integration options followed by Tajikistan is undertaken 
in chapter two.  
         In this context, the ultimate goal of the research is to analyze the effects of this 
integration agreement for Tajikistán's economy and, in particular, for the foreign trade in 
this country. 
          Before turning to the empirical analysis, chapter one review the economic and 
empirical literature on economic integration, focusing on the potential effects which the 
theory of economic integration attributes to a preferential agreement, both the static effects 
covered by traditional theories and the dynamic effects in which the new economic 
integration theory is focused, in particular for developing countries.  
         Once the theoretical part is addressed, two chapters are devoted to the analysis of the 
effects of EurAsEC for Tajikistán. First, in chapter three, by estimating an augmented 
gravity model using panel data for the period 1995-2013, we analyze static trade creation 
and trade diversion effects of EurAsEc on the area as a whole and on Tajikistán. Chapter 
four study the dynamic effects of EurAsEc in Tajikistan, by analyzing its effects on 
economic growth, and shows evidence on several integration factors influencing the 
desirability of developing countries to participate in regional integration agreements (such 
as economic development objective, market-related and trade-related determinant).   

Resumo 
        Despois da desintegración da URSS, tras varios anos de guerra civil e cunha situación 
económica moi debilitada, Tajikistán inicia un proceso de integración rexional na segunda 
metade dos 90, asinando varios acordos de integración económica tanto con países ex-
soviéticos como con outros países veciños e con organismos e institucións internacionais. 
O acordo máis relevante deste tipo no que participa o país, e que parece ter mellores 
perspectivas de futuro, é a Comunidade Económica Eurasiática (EurAsEC), formada no 
ano 2000. A análise das opcións de integración seguidas por Tajikistan realízase no 
capítulo dous. 
    Neste contexto, o obxectivo último da tese é analizar os efectos deste acordo de 
integración para a economía de Tajikistán e,  en particular, para o comercio exterior deste 
país.  
        Antes de abordar a análise empírica, o capítulo un revisa a literatura sobre integración 
económica,  centrándose nos potenciais efectos que a teoría da integración atribúe a un 
acordo preferencial, tanto os efectos estáticos contemplados polas teorías tradicionais  
coma os efectos dinámicos nos que se centra a nova teoría da integración económica, en 
particular para os países en desenvolvemento.  
            Tras a fundamentación teórica, dedícanse dous capítulos á análise dos efectos de 
EurAsEC para Tajikistán. En primeiro lugar, no capítulo tres,  estimando un modelo 
gravitacional aumentado, usando datos de panel, para o período 1995-2013, analízanse os 
efectos de creación e desvío de comercio xerados por EurAsEC, tanto para a área en 
conxunto como para Tajikistán. O capítulo catro estuda os efectos dinámicos provocados 
por EurAsEc, analizando os efectos para o crecemento económico, e presenta evidencia 
sobre varios determinantes do interese por participar en procesos de integración no caso de 
países en desenvolvemento (obxectivo de desenvolvemento económico, factores 
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From very broad terms, globalization and regional integration as main features of 
today's world economy have deep roots since centuries ago, when the idea that cooperation 
among countries, especially among those who share a common continental territory, 
spreads. Then, in the last five decades of the XX century, the phenomenon of integration 
has become more common. Under current world characteristics, such as the increase of 
globalization -especially in the 90s- accompanied by the predominance of a free-market 
economic model, which thrives on the exchange between nation-states, integration has 
become common practice as a measure to improve exchanges between countries and their 
negotiating position facing other countries. The latter has been achieved through regional 
integration processes which allow countries to negotiate as a bloc in the global context.  
This phenomenon still remains as an important economic and political key strategy, 
allowing the countries accelerate the unification of their “small” national economies, 
expand their markets, widen the region’s economic space, and take advantage of the 
benefits of economies of scale for production and trade, as well as stably maintain their 
political position, and thereby, maximizing the welfare of their nations. In a deeper 
context, the integration process increases competition in the global trade and strengthens 
access to investment, innovation, foreign technology, higher productivity and, eventually, 
to economic growth. 
Looking back at the turn of this century, characterized by turbulent and extreme 
uncertainty, some mega trends can be observed. One of them is the invasive nature of 
technology. Another trend is the substantial change in the system of relations between 
states and societies, from an international to a global configuration setting. At this regard, 
the analysis of the two concepts related to these changes, integration and globalization, is 
particularly important. Although we know that the terms integration and globalization are 
different in contemporary discourse, they are both used either interchangeably or in very 
close sense, implying that the integration process would lead to the globalization. 
Ever since the Second World War, there were several integration initiatives 
involving countries from the developed regions of the world, but in recent years this 
process reached nearly all continents (EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN) including not 
just developed but also developing countries (UEMOA, ECOWAS, SADC, EurAsEC). 
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Regionalism, that is the tendency of the states to form regional groups, has attracted 
considerable attention as a major force for global change. The proliferation and diversity of 
the regional integration regimes across the world have generated major debates, focusing 
on the various designs, motives and modalities of participation and varying rates of 
integration. The ‘new regionalism’, mainly involving non-Western and often 
nondemocratic states at various levels of economic development, has greatly  enriched the 
knowledge of regional integration becoming the focus of the so-called ‘second wave’ of 
literature on regionalism (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013). 
One of the most compelling arguments for today's wave of economic integration is 
its shifting paradigm, as the underlying motives for economic integration in the 1950s and 
1960s were very different from those today. Bhalla and Bhalla, (1997) properly have 
claimed that current initiatives involving developing countries are part of a strategy to 
liberalize and open their economies to implement export and foreign investment-led 
policies rather than to promote import substitution. 
In a thorough book of Schiff and Winters (2003) about “Regional Integration and 
Development” it was mentioned that in today’s new integration wave, or countless 
integration arrangements, participation of developing countries merit special attention. 
They have stressed that a new analysis of regional integration agreements with a focus on 
developing countries have two reasons. First, developing countries are turning to 
regionalism as a tool for development, and the effectiveness of this tool needs to be 
assessed. Second, regionalism is part of the global economic environment, and its effects 
on developing countries need to be better understood. It also seemed desirable to ground 
the new analysis more firmly in empirical results than had been done previously. 
Statement of the Problem. Since the economic integration has attracted considerable 
attention as a major force for economy growth in developing countries, the relevance of the 
economic integration has become a controversial topic for academics as well as for 
politicians of these countries.  
           Although the question of Tajikistan’s integration has been the concern of the 
country's government since the early years of independence primarily due to the existing 
political and economic backwardness, the relevance of potential effects from integration on 
Tajikistan became a more decisive issue currently on the eve of the country's accession to 
the EurAsEC-Customs Union. In this way, together with other less developed countries, 
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this process was viewed in Tajikistan first of all as a tool for promoting sustainable 
economic growth improving the living standards of the Tajik people. 
Currently, Tajikistan is increasingly focusing on regional integration. Sustaining 
this process at a successful stage is vital, not only due to the economic backwardness but 
also due to policy measures required by a country that together with its neighbors has 
transboundary nature issues (water and energy, transport and the potential of Islamic 
Resistance) which inevitably requires integration. So, in Tajikistan regional integration is 
expected to help in solving development issues along with tariff issues, enhancing the 
development objectives through the implementation of common projects.  
All these important milestones of economic development in less developed 
countries reveal and require the comprehensive work not only in Tajikistan but in all 
Central Asian states, in confronting with current regional, transboundary and global 
challenges. For the purpose of this research, the specific case of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (hereafter, EurAsEC), signed in 2000, will be taken into account, considering 
it as the most successful integration process that has taken place since the ending of the 
disintegration period in the post-Soviet space (Pomfret, 2004; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 
2012; Kuzmina, 2012; Libman and Vinokurov, 2010; Cooper, 2013; Kembayev, 2014; 
Galiakberov and Abdullin, 2014; Yesdauletova, 2014). Since EurAsEc includes developing 
countries, the analysis of the potential effects of this regional agreement requires an 
analysis that goes beyond the "old" and "new" regionalism theories. 
Research objectives. Our main research interest lies in an evaluation of Tajikistan's 
integration process, shedding light on the integration path followed by Tajikistan after 
independence and the expected effects of integration for Tajikistan in the context of the 
rationality in joining EurAsEC. In achieving this main objective, we set several specific 
objectives. 
        The first specific objective is addressed to reviewing the literature of economic 
integration, putting special emphasis on the effects for less developed countries, for 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of "traditional and new theories of economic 
integration", basically arguing the reason why the so-called static effects are not relevant 
for integration decisions in developing countries and the dynamic effects analysis has to be 
carried out carefully. In addition, other integration determinants in developing countries 
that go beyond both concepts would be clearly identified. 
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            In an attempt to understand the rationality of the integration decisions of Tajikistan 
in terms of the potential integration effects on welfare, the second specific objective is to 
improve significantly understanding of the several integration options followed by 
Tajikistan after independence trying to insert itself into the global economy. 
        Concerning the third specific objective, our interest will turn to the empirical 
identification of economic integration effects, with the ultimate objective of assessing the 
static trade effects of the EurAsEC agreement, particularly for Tajikistan. By estimating a 
Gravity Model with panel data, we analyze the impact of EurAsEC on member trade flows 
focusing on trade creation and trade diversion effects.  
Finally, based on the role of economic integration and the main motivations of the 
integration groups in the less developed countries, our last objective is to carry out 
assessment on the welfare impact of economic integration and the main integration 
determinants in Tajikistan through dynamic effects and the implementation of other 
common projects aimed at poverty alleviation, improving the standard and quality of life 
by promoting health and education issues, productive employment, services and 
coordination of foreign policy aiming at peace and security within and between the 
regions. 
Research outline. The present study is divided into four chapters providing both 
theoretical and empirical approaches. The first chapter reviews the literature about 
economic integration by focusing on three questions, namely, what integrations means, 
how integration takes place and, what is the most important one, why countries participate 
in integration agreements.  
The word “Integration” comes from the Latin term “integration”, which means 
merging, combining parts into a whole. In some way, an economic integration emerges 
from eliminating barriers between countries in a combining process. However, in the 
economic literature, the term “integration” does not have a clear-cut meaning. At one 
extreme, the mere existence of trade relations between independent national economies is 
considered as a form of economic integration; at the other side, it refers to the complete 
unification of national economies. The economic integration is a “process” and “state of 
affairs” (Balassa, 1961). 
Bearing in mind that integration is a process, which passes through various stages 
gradually and progressively, integration takes place by removing barriers between 
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countries (the negative way to integration); but, as stated by Timberger (1954), integration 
also requires common institutions and coordinated policies (the positive way to 
integration). Making progress in the integration process (positively and negatively) the five 
integration degrees in the Balassa’s classification (Balassa, 1961), are reached.  
The potential effects of integration on welfare, which explain the interest in join 
an integration agreement, are analyzed by the “Traditional economic integration theory” 
in terms of trade creation and trade diversion, the so called static effects of integration 
(Viner, 1950; Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 1957). A “new regionalism approach” is undertaken 
by the “New Economic Integration Theory” with a particular accent on the dynamic 
effects of integration including investing, innovation, and technological progress which 
firstly was led by Balassa, (1961); Hansson, (1962) and Cooper and Massell, (1965a). 
As mentioned before, the integration agreements in developing countries show 
other features which characterize today's “new regionalism” for which neither the 
traditional theory nor the new theory are fully applicable (Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; 
Cooper and Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al, 1969; Robson, 1980; Mackay, 1984; Marinov, 
2014; De Melo, 2011; Hosny, 2013). Therefore, our first chapter was theoretically enriched 
from integration determinants in developing countries, aimed to achieving the most 
appropriate approach in analyzing the integration effects in the case of Tajikistan. 
One of the essential arguments of the current position of integration process in 
Tajikistan is its changeable directions. That means: Before 1991, only the Soviet Union 
had an important place within the integration ambit of Tajikistan, but after gaining 
independence and politic imbalance, Tajik integration initiatives involved other options 
with the same importance. It is noteworthy that although in terms of market economy the 
regional integration in Tajikistan does not have a long history, in terms of planned 
economy it is not a recent phenomenon, as the country was integrated with the great Soviet 
Union1.  
The second chapter provides a description and an analysis of the integration 
options or strategies followed by Tajikistan. Immediately after the dissolution of the 
                                                          
1 
It is interesting that in integration literature one can find very rarely about Soviet Union integration, 
mainly in some thorough books like "Regional Integration and Development" by Schiff and Winters 
(2003), where they discussed history of Regional Integration agreements with examples of the customs 
union of the provinces of France in 1664 or Germany (the Zollverein), but concerning the great Soviet 
integration, nothing.   
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USSR, the Tajik integration movement was winning favor not only with the Post-Soviet 
Republics in the frame of (CIS) or Central Asia region (CACO) but also join countries 
outside the Former-Soviet Union such as China (in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, SCO), Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (Economic Cooperation Organization, 
ECO), as well as with the global market organizations and international institutions like the 
UN, IMF or WTO. Since 2000, Tajikistan has been taking part in the Eurasian economic 
Community (EurAsEC). 
Considering the integration initiatives followed by Tajikistan, we can suggest three 
different options or ways. First of all, an ambit of the integration process of Tajikistan has 
introduced the post-Soviet initiative, whose engine is Russia. There was also a Central 
Asian initiative, but it is not really possible to separate the Central Asian from the post-
Soviet integration; therefore it can be proper taking the two sub-strategies  in this option. In 
the line of the whole former-Soviet area, the first option involves agreements like the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, (CIS), and the Eurasian Economic Community, 
(EurAsEC). The other sub-strategy of this option includes the Central Asian regional 
agreements like the Central Asian Economic Community, (CAEC) and the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization, (CACO). 
Within the country's integration process, the role of the global market integration 
has been considerable, as it had fulfilled its primary objectives by providing a nationhood 
signal and proper financial assistance for this small less developed country. Therefore, at 
the multilateral level, the integration with the world economy or international financial 
institutions can be seen as a second option in the context of Tajik integration strategies.  
Among the different integration initiatives followed by Tajikistan a especial 
mention should be given to the integration with outsiders of the post-Soviet Orbit, mainly 
China and the Southern neighbors which are considered the agents that changed 
dramatically the geopolitical and economic position in Central Asia. In fact, China has 
quickly become a key player in the regional scene with its prominent Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). From this point of view, nowadays, the Central Asian 
region is recognized as the driving force ensuring a so-called "peaceful rise of China" 
(Goldstein, 2005). 
Eventually, it is quite obvious that since Islam is the prevalent religion and given 
the geostrategic position of the country, Tajikistan is trying to strengthen its status in the 
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Islamic world. Hence, the participation of the country into a number of key institutions 
whose membership is based on the full or partial identification with Islam, like the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO) is not excluded. From this stance, integration with outsiders of the post-Soviet 
Orbit, supported by China and the Southern neighbors are considered as a third option 
within the ambit of the integration strategy. 
In short, the Tajik government has been everywhere in searching a successful 
integration project which includes both economic and political issues. After Soviet 
disintegration, Tajikistan together with other Central Asian countries faced a quite complex 
situation in the choice between several options (Pomfret, 2004; Tai and Lee, 2009; 
Kassenova, 2013). The country increasingly opened its economy and has developed 
different integration options in parallel, whether via agreements with traditional post-
Soviet partners or within the international area or with the Southern neighbors like China 
and Islamic World. But, it seems that the agreement prioritized by Tajikistan in recent 
years is EurAsEC.  
Along with a theoretical review of the economic integration processes and an 
evaluation of the particular integration process undertaken by Tajikistan, once we conclude 
that the agreement considered as more successful is EurAsEC, we carried out an empirical 
analysis of the effects of EurAsEC on Tajikistan. We confine our attention to the static 
effects of the integration process in chapter three, leaving the dynamic effects and other 
integration determinants, which are relevant for developing countries, for chapter four. 
It is noteworthy that despite the relevance of dynamic effects, which influence the 
economic growth rate in medium and long terms, static trade effects (in terms of the theory 
of Viner-Meade-Lipsey) remain crucial determinants in the formation of integration 
agreements. In spite of the economic integration agreements increasingly cover a range of 
other issues like services, investment (FDI), joint industrial development and growing level 
of technology, the effects on the share of intra-regional trade and total regional trade 
remain important in determining the success of an integration agreement (Dee and Galli, 
2003). 
The third chapter firstly provides a review of the empirical analysis of the effects 
of regional integration, taking into account the different approaches with a special attention 
to Gravity Model. The empirical literature has shown that bilateral trade patterns are well 
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described by the so-called Gravity model drawing upon analogy to Newton’s Law of 
Gravitation. This relates trade between two countries positively to both of their incomes 
and negatively to the distance between them. Moreover, historical, cultural and linguistic 
variables and a set of other dummy variables that measure the effects of preferential 
agreements will also be used in the present work.  
In recent years, there are plenty of empirical studies regarding the effects of 
regional economic integration on trade flows. The approaches most commonly used in the 
empirical literature, especially in the most recent works, are the ex-ante studies that used 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE), (Deardorff and Alan, 1998; Brown et al, 2003; 
Robinson and Thierfelder, 2002, Piermartini and Teh, 2005; Hertel, 1997, 2006; Baldwin 
and Venables, 1995) and ex-post Gravity models (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; 
Deardorff, 1998; Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Rose and van Wincoop (2001); Glick and 
Rose (2001); Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Dee and Gali, 2003 Bergstrand and Baier, 
2007; Yang and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013). These two widespread approaches for the 
analysis of the effects on trade into the context of RTAs will be discussed in the third 
chapter of this work.  
After the review of the empirical literature, in this chapter we do an ex-post 
estimation using a Gravity model, the key ex-post econometric technique according to Dee 
and Galli (2003). Regarding to the econometric method, while the early works used cross-
section techniques for analyzing gravity models (Aitkin, 1973 and Berstrand, 1985), most 
recent studies used panel data (Matyas, 1997; Wall, 2000; and Glick and Rose, 2001). 
Despite a number of empirical contributions in recent years, the effects of regional 
economic integration on trade in Tajikistan using the Gravity model under the panel data 
have not been investigated. Although we found a very thorough research by Vinokurov et 
al (2013) on the effects of regional economic integration on trade in Tajikistan under the 
country's accession into the Eurasian Customs Union, a gravity model approach was not 
used. This void motivates our study, which focuses on the trade effects of EurAsEC 
agreement for the area as a whole and in the case of Tajikistan in particular. To assess 
these effects, we estimate an augmented gravity model, including regional dummy 
variables, with panel data and fixed effect estimator techniques. 
        In a nutshell, our aim is econometrically test whether the agreement between 
EurAsEC countries increased trade flows between them and whether the agreement allows 
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for an increase in Tajikistan trade. In order to answer this question, by testing the model for 
a sample of 26 countries over the period 1995-2013, we analyze two determinants of static 
effects: trade creation and trade diversion. 
We start chapter four showing a general overview of the Republic of Tajikistan.   
As previously mentioned, the "new integration theory” emphasizes that, in general, but 
especially in the case of developing countries the static effects are not sufficient or not 
relevant in determining the welfare effects of economic integration; then dynamic effects 
should be considered. Moreover, in the case of developing countries, there are other 
integration determinants, several factors determining the desirability of participating in 
an integration agreement beyond static and dynamic effects. Consequently, the target of 
this chapter is empirically determining all these aspects in the case of Tajikistan 
membership in EurAsEc. To meet these goals, this chapter attempts to grasp, on one hand, 
the growth effects and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Tajikistan as essential 
components in terms of dynamic effects. On the other hand, we evaluate some of the 
welfare effects of integration for developing countries that are not covered by traditional 
analysis for developed countries, as well as some of the factors motivating developing 
countries to participate in an integration area that could give rationality to integration 
of Tajikistan into EurAsEC at both the current degree and perhaps a deeper degree in the 
future. Following Marinov (2014), we differentiate three categories: general economic 
(development objective), market-related, and trade-related determinants. In addition to 
economic determinants, there are also several political incentives of economic integration 
that are of special importance to developing countries. 
In addition to the static and dynamic effects, developing countries look for a 
development objective in join an integration agreement (Balassa, 1975). Aspects like 
poverty alleviation and improvement of Human Development Index (HDI) are the main 
components for improving the standard and quality of life; therefore, we analyze how these 
indicators developed after Tajikistan joins EurAsEC. Indeed, the Tajik government 
together with other developing countries participates into integration agreements or other 
international organizations, first of all, aiming at the outcome of the economic and political 
development under common projects such as poverty reduction programs, education and 
health challenges, infrastructure development as well as the promotion of peace and 
security within the country.  
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In regard to market-related determinants, we focus on the potential effects of 
integration in EurAsEc on employment and productivity and the industry development 
in Tajikistan. 
Before analyses trade-related determinant we show Tajikistan’s trade pattern 
performance, by sectors and by partner. After that, we turn to evidence on several trade-
related determinants which are relevant in the case of developing countries, namely, 
trade as a percentage of GDP, trade pattern with developed countries, intra-regional 
trade and total regional trade, and competitive versus complementarity countries. 
Since our interest lies mainly in the gains from integration, we review every 
differential impact of this process, including a number of political factors. Along with 
economic activities, political and economic institutions were also vital in maintaining 
peace and security and helping in transforming integration of the less developed countries 
in a way that soothes and heals the wounds of war and conflict, primarily in the case of 
Tajikistan.   
Whilst Tajikistan as a less developed country shows interest in economic issues as 
an important step toward development, at the same time the country attempts to further 
promote regional integration under the peace and security issues. This is evident in some of 
the integration initiatives at different nature. In fact, given the geo-strategic position of 
Tajikistan, one of the main reasons of being member within the scope of several 
integration options is a political factor, as security issues that have been predominant issues 
of economic development, chiefly after the awful civil war. 
With the limitation of the shortage of data for some of the variables (mainly for the 
labor market and transport cost), which is a common feature in dealing with less developed 
countries, we have widely discussed the traditional effects reached by Tajikistan under 
EurAsEC membership and several integration determinants, explaining the rationality of 
Tajikistan in join EurAsEC beyond traditional static and dynamic effects.   
After this general introduction, the present thesis is based on four complementary 
building blocks and is organized as follows: 
 The first chapter reviews the literature of economic integration theory 
emphasizing two main approaches (Traditional and New integration theories) putting the 
accent on the effects of economic integration for the developing countries.  
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The second chapter introduces the pathways of Tajikistan integration, describing 
agreements involving the country in the ambit of several options.   
In chapter three we estimate an augmented Gravity model using panel data to 
analyze the static trade effects of EurAsEC on the area and on Tajikistan, determining 
which one of these effects “trade creation” or “trade diversion” will prevail.  
Chapter four complements the analysis with an assessment of the potential effects 
of integration on Tajikistan based on some dynamic effects and main integration 
determinants in the case of developing countries. 
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The Theory of Economic Integration  
1.1. Introduction 
Globalization and regional integration processes are essential characteristics of 
today’s world economy, which have been significantly developed after the 1950s. 
Accordingly, on the threshold of the XXI century a process known as “new regionalism” 
has emerged. Since the second half of the XX century, in a context of rapid economic 
growth, an intensive development of international trade in goods and services took place; 
the result was a number of commercial agreements between countries. 
Following the Second World War, a few number of integration agreements were 
enforced, mainly in the developed regions of the world, but in recent years regional 
integration reached nearly all countries in all continents.  Nowadays, most countries in the 




Such generalization of the world experience shows that the dynamics and scale of 
foreign economic relations of national economies gravitate around neighboring countries. 
Such an orientation of the integration process is called regionalization. Then, it seems that 
geographical proximity adds weighty arguments in favor of regional trade and economic 
integration. However, the degree and forms of the union can vary greatly depending on the 
level of development of countries, their geographical location, historical traditions and 
complementarities of production structures. One of the important aspects of the present 
wave of economic integration is its shifting paradigm. The underlying motives for 
economic integration in the 1950s and 1960s were very different from those today. Current 
initiatives involving developing countries are part of a strategy to liberalize and open their 
economies to implement export and foreign investment-led policies rather than to promote 
import substitution (Bhalla and Bhalla, 1997).   
                                                          
2 
In June 2014, the WTO declared 585 RTA notifications, of which 379 were in force; 412 were made 
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994; 39 were pure Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs); and 134 
under Article V of the GATT, (WTO, 2014). 
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Given current developments of economic integration agreements, it has been more 
and more important to understand not only the rationale behind these arrangements but 
also their effects, particularly the impact on member states. The relevance of the economic 
integration has become a controversial topic for academics as well as for politicians. By 
reviewing the literature on economic integration, the aim of the chapter is to provide 
insights on what economic integration means, how the economic integration process takes 
place and, what it is more important, why countries engage in integration agreements, that 
is, the potential welfare effects of economic integration; in particular, in the case of 
developing countries.   
In very broad terms, we can consider that economic integration emerges from 
eliminating barriers between groups of countries. During this process, countries remove a 
number of elements (or barriers) which made them differentiated and permitted them to 
protect their respective production systems. In doing that, these countries give each other 
special benefits which are not extended to third countries. Depending on these barriers 
which would be deleted, economic integration can take different forms or degrees; usually, 
following (Balassa, 1961), five degrees are considered. Furthermore, together with that 
negative way to integration (by removing barriers), it is also necessary a positive way to 
the integration process in terms of common institutions and policies, both of them being 
complementary, (Tinbergen, 1954). 
Since the first step to economic integration and the most common forms of 
integration are the formation of a Free Trade Area or a Custom Union by reducing or 
removing barriers to trade flows, the expected gains of integration are firstly the gains from 
trade. However, economic integration does not take place at global level (multilateral 
liberalization of trade in the WTO context) but just including some countries (the members 
of the preferential agreement) in a discriminatory preferential process. So, the potential 
effects of economic integration cannot be fully explained by the international trade theory. 
The first work analyzing economic integration effects was (Viner, 1950), 
concluding that integration has two possible effects on trade flows, with different effects 
on welfare: trade creation (trade shifts from a high-cost supplier member state to a low-
cost supplier member state within the union; having a positive welfare effects) and trade 
diversion (imports are shifted from a low-cost supplier third country to a high-cost supplier 
member country into the union; implying negative welfare effects) (Balassa, 1975). 
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Viner’s static analysis of the effects of a Custom Union constitutes the Traditional 
Economic Integration Theory (or Old Regionalism). His conclusion that the net effect of 
customs union formation on welfare is ambiguous caused a large number of further 
developments during 50’s and 60’s by, among others, (Kreps, 1950; Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 
1957; Balassa, 1961-1975; Johnson, 1965; Cooper and Massell, 1965).  
As early as in the 60's, the conclusion was that the static analysis in terms of trade 
creation and trade diversion is insufficient to capture welfare effects of economic 
integration and the Dynamic Effects analysis is introduced by the so called “New 
Economic Integration Theory” in the context of the “New Regionalism Approach” 
(Balassa, 1961; Hansson, 1962; Cooper and Massell, 1965a).   
These dynamic effects influence the accumulation rate, transforming the productive 
structure to a more competitive and specialized one, and then raising the country’s rate of 
economic growth over the medium term (Balassa, 1961, 1975; Abdel Jaber 1971; Baldwin, 
1993; Schiff and Winters, 1998; Rueda-Junquera, 2006). The main dynamic effects are 
derived from economies of scale, technological progress and productivity growth, 
competition, reduced risk and uncertainty, a more favorable environment for economic 
activity, investment (and  foreign direct investment) and innovation (Badinger, 2001).  
When members of the integrated area are developing countries, although the new 
theory of economic integration is more appropriate than the traditional theory, the 
consideration of dynamic effects, as taken by the analysis of the integration of developed 
countries, do not explain adequately the welfare effects for developing countries.  
The orthodox theory of Viner-Meade-Lipsey, centered on the static effects of 
resource allocation, is not appropriate to the case of developing countries (Meier, 1960; 
Balassa, 1965; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Mackay, 1984). So, the emphasis should be put on 
dynamic effects (Mikesell, 1965; Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Rueda-Junquera, 
2006). The literature of economic integration theory was focused on integration of almost 
exclusively industrialized countries (Balassa, 1965). The assumptions of the basic theory 
do not conform to the economic preconditions and existing structure found in the 
developing countries, and the requirements for successful integration, as suggested by 
Traditional and New theories, are not usually fulfilled by developing countries (Mackay, 
1984). The environment and difficulties of developed countries do not apply to economic 
development, rather than to a tariff issue and production/consumption shifts. 
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So, soon after Viner’s contribution, in the framework of the new economic 
integration theory, a number of substantial researches have been done on the effects of 
economic integration agreements to less developed countries like, among others, (Allen, 
1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper and Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al,1969; Robson, 1980;  
Mackay, 1984; Marinov, 2014; De Melo, 2011; Hosny, 2013). These works are focused on 
the limitations of the traditional theory and the reasons why traditional approach is not 
sufficient or is not adequate in explaining potential economic integration effects (the 
welfare impact) in the case of developing countries, as well as the determinants that 
influence the motivation to participate in integration processes for these countries (Hosny, 
2013 and Marinov, 2014).   
In addition to production and consumption effects, welfare effects of economic 
integration between less developed countries should also encompass the positive effects of 
employment, productivity and income effects, production specialization, competitiveness, 
etc. (Abdel Jaber 1971; Mikesell, 1965). Regarding the determinants that influence the 
motivation to participate in integration processes, in the case of developing countries, these 
factors also go beyond the static and dynamic effects determining net welfare effect. 
Moreover, in general terms but especially in developing countries, not only economic 
factors but also a number of political factors determine the desirability and the success of 
an economic integration agreement (Allen, 1963; Inotai, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 
1994; World Bank, 2000). 
After this introduction, the chapter is divided into two parts and is organized as 
follows.  In the first part, in section 1 we discuss the concept of economic integration and 
in section 2 we analyze the different forms or degrees that an integration process can take. 
In the second part of the chapter, devoted to the analysis of the potential effects of 
economic integration, section 1 discusses the Traditional Economic Integration Theories; 
section 2 discusses the New Economic Integration Theories and section 3 focuses on the 
effects of the integration process in the particular case of the developing countries. Finally, 
we present the main conclusions.    
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1.2. The Economic Integration Process 
 We begin the review of the literature on economic integration by focusing on the 
meaning of the term "integration", in what is meant by economic integration and how this 
integration between independent countries takes place. 
1.2.1. The concept of economic integration 
The concept of “integration” has emerged and been added in the political dictionary 
since 1930s of last century (Sorokin, 2008), chiefly the famous theory of large spaces 
«Gross Raumtheorie» that developed by prominent German historian and jurist K. 
Schmidt. In this theory he pointed a weakness of the traditional nation-states in relation to 
the process of economic development in the XX century and came up with the idea of 
creating large geospatial as a new, more advanced and full subjects of international 
relations and international law. 
Despite the variety of the contexts in which the concept of integration is used, 
nowadays the engine of integration processes is the “economic integration concept” 
(Sorokin, 2008).
3
 However, the use of an integration concept in an economic sphere has a 
short history. Indeed, (Machlup, 1977) was unable to find a single instance of its use prior 
to 1940. In the same vein, (Jovanovic, 1998)  claims that the economic integration as a 
term is not found nowhere, even in the old historical literature on the economic 
interrelationships between states, neither in the literature about customs unions (including 
the German Zollverein 1834-71), nor in the literature on international trade prior to 1940s. 
Since then, the term has been used at various times to refer to practically any area 
of international economic relations. By 1950s the term has involved the amalgamation of 
separate economies into larger regions, however, it was in the more limited sense than the 
term is used today (El-Agraa, 1997).  
1.2.1.1. Some definitions 
The word “Integration” comes from the Latin term “integration”, which means 
merging, combining parts into a whole.  In the economic literature, the term “integration” 
                                                          
3 
The concept of integration is used not only in the socio-political context but also in scientific and 
technical fields. 
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does not have a clear-cut meaning.  At one extreme, the mere existence of trade relations 
between independent national economies is considered as a form of economic integration; 
at the other, it is taken to mean the complete unification of national economies (Balassa, 
1961). Similar to this, (Molle, 1994) argued that the expression “economic integration” 
covers a variety of notions: it may refer to the absorption of a company in a larger concern 
or it may have a spatial aspect, for instance if it refers to the integration of regional 
economies in a national one. 
Since Viner’s (1950), statement on customs union, the discussion about the concept 
of economic integration has started. In an attempt to define the different meanings of the 
economic integration, in the literature there are several definitions considering many 
different aspects which we can summarize as: 
 Myrdal, (1956): the economic integration is “...the realization of the old 
Western ideal of equality of opportunity.”  
 Balassa, (1961): defines economic integration as “process” and as a “state of 
affairs.” 
 Allen, (1963):”economic integration may mean something different to nearly 
everyone.” 
 Tinbergen, (1965): economic integration is “...the creation of the most desirable 
structure of the international economy, removing artificial hindrances to its 
optimal operation and introducing deliberately all the desirable elements of 
coordination or unification”.  
 Kahnert, (1969): Economic integration is “a process of the progressive removal 
of discrimination that exists along national borders.” 
 Mutharika, (1972):  the term ‘integration’, literally means to bring parts of an 
object into a complete whole, while in economic terms, it would indicate, in the 
narrowest sense, the coordination of economic activities within a nation for the 
purpose of improving the development of that particular nation.  
 Machlup (1977): integration is “a process of combining separate economies 
into a larger economic region” or “utilization of all potential opportunities of 
efficient division of labor.”  
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 El-Agraa, (1988): economic integration is “discriminatory removal of all trade 
impediments between participating nations and the establishment of certain 
elements of coordination between them.” 
 Carbaugh, (2004): an economic integration is “a process of eliminating 
restrictions on international trade, payments, and factor mobility.”  
 Molle, (1994): economic integration is “the gradual elimination of economic 
frontiers between independent states; as a result the economies of these states 
end up functioning as one entity.” 
Some other considerations on the concept of economic integration:  It is noteworthy 
the significant contribution of (Balassa, 1961) to the study of economic integration. He 
proposed differences between the concepts of “cooperation” and “integration” and 
suggested a dual interpretation of the category of integration: as the “process” and the 
“state of affairs”. Moreover, (Balassa, 1961) distinguishes political and economic goals of 
integration and gives attention to the government role in some extent on the integration 
process. He also introduced the different forms of economic integration. 
From a different point of view, the approach of Myrdal covers economic and non-
economic aspects of integration, giving a more important role to the government on the 
regulation of international relations. According to him, “ an economy is not integrated 
unless all lines are open to everybody and their reward paid for productive services are 
equal, regardless of racial, social and cultural differences” (Myrdal, 1956). In the sense that 
he has the main focus on the welfare of all members of an integrating group, he argued that 
complete liberalization of a market economy does not lead to the successful growth of 
countries, but instead it will lead to the divergence and inequality in incomes. He found a 
way toward disintegration. He admitted that “no liberalization of international trade can be 
expected by itself to change radically this situation of open international disintegration” 
(Myrdal, 1956), concluding that the process of “International disintegration” is one of the 
obstacles to the development of national economies in underdeveloped countries.  
Furthermore, the term economic integration, as considered by (Molle, 1994), can be 
interpreted in two senses. In a static sense: when national components of a larger economy 
are no longer separated by economic frontiers but function together as an entity in the 
situation.  In a dynamic sense: the process whereby economic frontiers between member 
states are gradually eliminated, with the formerly separate national economic entities 
gradually merging into a larger whole. 
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
50 
Moreover, (Mutharika, 1972) providing the integration term in a wider meaning, 
has referred to the process of integration as various economies in a given region joining 
together into a single unit with the objective of regional economic development. Other 
authors such as (Lawrence, 1996) distinguish between shallow integration and deeper 
integration: the first represented integration as trade liberalization while the second one 
goes beyond the removal of border barriers. 
It seems clear that there is no a single and precise definition of economic 
integration. But, in general, we can consider that economic integration is to unify a number 
of different countries into a whole. These countries seek, firstly, economic benefits of this 
unification through improving the economic efficiency of production.   
At any degree of integration, the economic integration process between certain 
countries implies a discriminatory trade liberalization which is against the “most favored 
nation” rules of the WTO and the general goal of multilateral free trade, which is assumed 
guarantying the optimum outcome (the first best) under certain assumptions. However, 
these types of agreements (which imply second best outcomes) are allowed, and they were 
allowed before by the GATT, as exceptions.  
Whether regional agreements are complements to or substitutes for multilateral 
liberalization is a subject of ongoing debate. Some authors consider that regional 
agreements are barriers to multilateral free trade and they reduce welfare (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 1996). By the contrary, for others (Ethier, 1998) regional agreements led to 
multilateral free trade, improving welfare.  
1.2.1.2. Positive and negative ways to integration  
The term “negative integration” coined by (Tinbergen, 1954) refers to the removal 
of discrimination on the process of trade liberalization (by reducing trading limitations and 
tariffs) and elimination of restrictions in national economic rules and policies, leading to a 
“better division of labor” between countries (Tinbergen, 1965). The case of “positive 
integration” is related to the modification of existing instruments and laws or transfer to 
common institutions. So, the relevant aspect in positive integration is the creation of some 
institutional powers and new policies that allow the market of the integrated area to 
function properly and effectively as well as to maintain harmonization of broader policy 
aims of the union. All degrees of economic integration need some elements of positive 
integration, but the need is greater as the integration is deeper (El-Agraa, 2001).  
CHAPTER 1  THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
51 
On the one hand, negative and positive integration may go together and the balance 
between these aspects is a task that any integration agreement must face. On another hand, 
positive integration can come to play after customs union when requires coordinating joint 
actions. Thus, the question is to decide at what point of the stages of the integration 
process, institutions and single regulation are required, what led to Tinbergen proposing 
policy views for economic integration. 
In the second edition of his work (Tinbergen, 1954) entitled “International 
Economic Integration” rather than “International Economic Cooperation" as the first one, 
he argued that in economic integration it is not correct to rely only on the market 
mechanism,  claiming that only through the creation of a supranational body the integrated 
area can get positive welfare effects. Therefore, he states that the main need for the 
integrating area will be the formation of a “supranational authority”, concluding that the 
most general problem of economic integration is optimum economic policy.  
Related with the different type of policies, he made distinction between qualitative 
and quantitative policy, considering that an important aspect of a qualitative policy is the 
choice between centralization and decentralization. (Tinbergen, 1965) tries to answer 
which functions of the international economic integration should belong to central and 
supranational control and which of them should be left to the local national structures, 
presenting four types of instruments “Supporting, conflicting, neutral and mixed”, each of 
them having specific effects on economic integration. 
What is more, he formulated four conditions for the integration forms 
“consultation, coordination, agreement of lasting character and the strongest form being 
one supranational authority”. According to these conditions, in each level of centralization, 
the role of joint policy should be stronger. (Tinbergen, 1965) came to the conclusion that 
countries have already developed effective international organizations which are involved 
in the supervision of the several basic spheres, including GATT (supervision and reduction 
of trade restrictions), IMF (supervision of the convertibility of currencies), FAO 
(regulation of agriculture and raw materials), ... While spheres like the supervision of 
spending equilibrium and employment policy are left to national governments and other, 
like regulation of migration, have no effective institutions. 
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1.2.2. Forms of Economic integration 
Understanding the integration as a process and a state of affairs gives the 
importance to the classification of the different forms (or degrees) of economic integration. 
As (Hosny, 2013) claims, one cannot talk about the different forms of economic 
integration without mentioning the cornerstone work of Balassa. Therefore, in this work 
we follow mainly Balassa’s classification (Balassa, 1961), considering five degrees or 
levels of integration (Figure 1.1).  
Based on Balassa’s classification, Molle (1994) outlined only three levels (like, for 
instance, (Tinbergen, 1954). Molle (1994) argued that transition between the various stages 
of integration is fluent and cannot always be clearly defined. The first stages seem to refer 
to market integration in a classical laissez-faire setting, focused on economic spheres. 
While other steps, especially the last two forms, entail more political integration. The 
duration of each level of integration depends on many different factors (internal and 
external, economic and political). Furthermore, El- Agraa, (1997) explained the final phase 
of integration as “political integration”, with the implication that the decision about full 
economic integration, that is the unification of main policies (monetary, foreign, and 
social) leads to the significant loss of sovereignty. Besides this classification with five 
levels, (Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Panagariya, 2000; and Jovanovic, 1998) added a first 
degree of integration: the Preferential Trading Area.  
Figure 1.1. Forms of Economic Integration 
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1.2.3. Degrees of integration 
Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs): According to Panagariya (2000) , PTAs 
refers to a union between two or more countries in which lower tariffs are imposed on 
goods produced in the member countries than on goods produced outside. The term 
Preferential Trade Agreement PTA, used synonymously of Preferential Trade Area or 
Preferential Trade Arrangement, can be used to describe FTAs, CUs and arrangements 
involving partial trade preferences.  Preferences, however, need not extend to all trade 
between the countries involved, and the coverage could depend on the type of PTAs. 
Countries provide to each other more favorable trade regime than to third countries. 
Such discrimination of non- member countries is not according to the principle of "Most 
favored nation" but this kind of agreements was the result of expansion of the world 
economy and the world trade in second half of the 20th century. Indeed, the first 
Preferential Trade Agreements have been signed after the Second World War. 
The ongoing integration of the European Union (EU), the formation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as the political discussion about a 
possible preferential trade agreement (PTA) between the Americas or between NAFTA 
and the EU have been major sources for the renewed interest in PTAs in the last two 
decades. A key feature of theoretical models of PTA formation is that countries or country-
pairs do not decide about PTA membership in isolation but their decision and behavior 
rather depend on other countries' actions. The formation of PTAs changes an outsider 
country's willingness to participate in a PTA. The establishment of a new preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) or the expansion of an existing one alters the incentives of non-members 
to participate in a PTA, leading to a domino effect (Larch and Egger, 2008).  
In some way, a PTA is the preparatory step to the FTA and deeper integration 
forms because it involves the simplest form of an integration process. In the case of 
developing countries, since tariffs are still non-negligible, it is sensible to start with the 
efficiency or welfare effects of PTAs (De Melo, 2011). But, most integration projects 
remain at the stages of preferential trading agreements or free trade areas because this is 
the stage that requires less policy coordination.   
Free Trade Area: Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), following Balassa (1975), have 
interpreted FTA as the first form towards any integration project when tariffs and non-
tariff barriers are eliminated among participating countries but each country retains its own 
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commercial policy against third countries. It is a form of “commercial integration”.
4
  More 
accurately, according with GATT, a Free Trade Area is interpreted as: "For the purposes 
of this Agreement: (b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or 
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
…. are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories."  Par.8, art. XXIV, GATT. 
Basically, two criteria were laid down in Article XXIV for a FTA (or CU) to be 
granted waiver from MFN obligations: first, "substantially all trade" among members must 
be free, and second, post-agreement barriers on trade with non-members are not on the 
whole more restrictive than those that members had prior to the agreement.   
Customs Union: The main difference from the previous form is the agreement about the 
gradual abolition of national customs tariffs that lead to the implementation of a common 
external tariff and an unified system of non-tariff regulation of trade towards the third 
countries. The GATT, in its article (XXIV), interprets a Customs Union as:  
"For the purposes of this Agreement: - A customs union shall be understood to 
mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so 
that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce …... are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at 
least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, 
and, (ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of 
territories not included in the union". Par. 8, art. XXIV, GATT. 
Other authors had referred to the customs union as the first specific form of 
economic integration to be dealt with extensively in economic science (Robson, 1993). In 
fact, the customs union issue became one of the basic research topics for many authors 
addressing the economic integration topic (Viner, 1950; Tinbergen, 1954; Meade, 1955; 
Lipsey, 1960; Balassa, 1961) as we will discuss later. Balassa (1975) has defined customs 
union, apart from the suppression of intra- area trade barriers, including equalizing tariffs 
on imports from non-member countries. Moreover, Viner’s definition stated clearly that 
the customs union is a free trade area which is complemented with a common external 
                                                          
4 
ASEAN (1967) or NAFTA (1993) are examples of this degree of integration. 
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tariff (Viner, 1950). Therefore, in this stage, the creation of coordination institutions of 
foreign trade policy will be important.
5
 
Common Market: The third degree of economic integration implies the creation of a 
common market. A common market goes beyond a customs union, inasmuch as it also 
entails the free movement of factors of production (Balassa, 1975).  If in previous stages 
integrating countries agreed only on free movement of goods and services, in this stage 
they should agree on free mobility of all production factors like capital, labor, technology 
and information. What is more, for the regulation of the integration process, member 
countries should develop and implement common economic, sectoral and trade policies 
towards non-member countries, upon the conditions of common institutions.
6
 
The first analysis on the welfare effects of the movement of factors of production in 
an integrated area (Meade, 1955) concluded that free movement of factors can increase 
gains derived from the custom union, by reducing relative scarcities of the production 
factors.  
Economic Union: In its turn, an economic union combines the suppression of restrictions 
on the movement of goods, services and production factor with some degree of 
harmonization of national economic policies, in order to reduce discrimination coming 
from national disparities in these policies, (Balassa, 1975). 
 In some case, the coordination is complete and refers to the more social aspects and 
involves the activities of supranational economic bodies. Supranational regulation implies 
intervention in various sectors of the economy, not only in the sphere of foreign exchange, 
but also in macroeconomic coordination. Therefore, the integration literature very often 
acknowledges this stage as "policy integration". Some authors distinguished the formation 
of Economic and Monetary Union as a separate stage of economic integration. Prominent 
and unique example of such an integration process is the current European Union.    
Full Economic Integration: When integration area is at the stage that performed the full 
coordination of monetary policy, exchange rate policy, common currency reserves, single 
central bank and the implementation of a common currency for all countries, we can talk 
                                                          
5 
Some examples of this kind of integration are: ASEAN (1992), European Community–Turkey (1996), 
EurAsEC (2010)... 
6 
Some examples of this kind of integration: MERCOSUR (1991), European Community (1993), Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) (2008) 
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about a “full economic union”. In the next stage, the evolution of integration processes will 
be the complete integration of the countries, in other words “policy integration", meaning 
the loss of national sovereignty and assuming a common government.  
According to Balassa (1975), total economic integration means the unification of 
economic policies, reaching a highest development point in the establishment of a supra-
national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states. Full Economic 
Union is the most advanced type of economic integration where common market space 
converted into the holistic economic-politic union. Political union implies common internal 
and external policy, formation of a common legal base, as well as the development and 
adoption of a common constitution for all member countries of the Union. It should be 
noted that some authors do not include this form of integration in their classification of 
economic integration degrees.  
Thus, economic integration historically has gone through several stages of 
development thereby creating certain forms that each has gradually evolved from the 
previous one.   
Each step of integration can have place as the ultimate aim of integration, since it is 
not necessary to follow full economic integration as the eventual goal. In fact, an 
integration project may choose remain for a long time in one form of integration, like 
North American Free Trade Area (El- Agraa, 1997). Usually, integrated areas giving a 
particular name to their integration projects do not necessarily indicates their stages of 
integration, but only means the intention of states. For instance, a group calling itself an 
“economic union” might only be at the level of removing customs restrictions or 
sometimes they have not even reached the level of a free trade area (Kiriev, 1998). 
 Finally, it is noteworthy that economic integration cannot be a simple and unique 
process generally applied because the development model of the integrated group in 
developed countries differs from such model in developing countries or in transition 
economies.  Most of the integrated regional areas, mainly for least developed countries, 
have not gone beyond the early stages, focusing the development of the agreements and the 
expected effects on the commercial integration. 
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2 Potential effects of economic integration 
Over the last century, more than half of the world trade has taken place in the Trade 
Blocks in the framework of commercial integration agreements. The current globalization 
process in the world economy is expanding the possibilities of deeper integration, not only 
in the sphere of multilateral trade relations, but mainly in the different kinds of regional, 
sub-regional organizations and integration arrangements. In some way, in recent decades, 
the world economy has become more ‘regionalized’ and more ‘globalized’. Apart from 
political reasons, when a group of countries decides to initiate an integration agreement, its 
economic reason is mainly increasing gains from trade and welfare of the participating 
countries. It is assumed that each member achieves this objective by exposing its economy 
to the competition with other economies of the integrating group.  
The theoretical basis for the effects of economic integration were first derived from 
the international trade theory and the international economic relations fields, which means 
that it was developed by internationalists, not regionalists. But regional integration 
agreements are discriminatory; they do not imply multilateral or global free trade. So, the 
effects of the integration processes cannot be fully explained by the international trade 
theory. The first work identifying advantages and disadvantages of economic integration 
further than the international trade theory was Viner (1950) with a static analysis in terms 
of trade creation and trade diversion effects, referred to as “traditional economic 
integration theory”. As early as in the 60's the conclusion is that the static analysis is 
insufficient (Hansson, 1962) and the Dynamic effects analysis is introduced by the so 
called “new economic integration theory” in the context of the “new regionalism 
approach”, considering that economic integration processes provides an incentive to an 
effective use of economies of scale, increase the competitiveness, raise productivity, 
investment climate, and technological transfer.
7
 In their review of the economic integration 
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In any case, regional economic integration agreements are a trade policy and, although in the last two 
decades there was a shift in the focus of international trade research from trade policy to other forms of 
trade frictions (transportation, information and communication costs), trade policy is still matter 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2016). In this work, they show a large evidence on the effects of trade policy on 
economically important outcomes that include: (1) aggregate outcomes, such as trade volumes (price and 
quantity subcomponents), the extensive margin of trade, and static, aggregate gains from trade; (2) firm 
and industry performance (productivity, costs, and markups); (3) labor markets (wages, employment, and 
wage inequality); and (4) long-run aggregate growth and poverty, secondary distortions and 
misallocation, uncertainty. 
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literature, (Baldwin and Venables, 1995) organized economic effects of regional 
integration into the types below:  
- Static allocation effects, consists of integration agreement's impact through the static 
allocation of resources, in setting models with both perfect and imperfect competition: 
Trade creation/trade diversion effects, procompetitive effects and effects for Economies of 
Scale and the variety of products.  
- Accumulation effects which encompass effects of the integration agreement from the 
accumulation of productive factors and cover both medium and long term growth effects 
(dynamic effects).  
- Location effects, related to the spatial allocation of resources (dynamic effects). 
The second half of the twentieth century presented unprecedented progress in 
regional integration agreements, especially in developing and least developed countries. 
This led to theoretical interest in dealing with the effects of economic integration for this 
group of countries (Sakamoto, 1969; Jaber, 1971; Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, 1975; Hosny, 
2013; Marinov, 2014). In result, along with these two static and dynamic approaches, the 
third type of integration theories appeared with a special emphasis on the case of 
developing countries.  
Thus, in terms of potential effects of commercial integration, the rest of the 
section is organized as follows: in the first place, we will present the literature on the 
traditional economic integration theory, beginning with the main theories of the 
international trade which explain the gains from trade. Secondly, we will discuss “new 
regionalism approach”, with particular attention to the dynamic effects including 
investment, innovation, and technological progress. Finally, with the purpose of finding 
the most appropriate approach for the effective integration in the case of Tajikistan, we 
will focus on the integration determinants in developing countries. 
2.1. Traditional theories of economic integration: Static effects 
Baldwin, (1993) divides the potential effects into "static" and "dynamic effects".  
Nevertheless, he concluded that static efficient effects are at the root of all dynamic effects; 
so it is essential discussing them and estimate their magnitude before turning to dynamic 
effects. According to Baldwin, (1993) static effects “lead to more output from the same 
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amount of inputs, where inputs include physical capital, human capital, knowledge capital 
(technology)”. Although the channels through which integration may affect static 
efficiency are various, the basic theme running through most is that removing all artificial 
market barriers allow market forces to play more freely across borders and within borders. 
In summary, static effects arise from three main sources: lower trade costs, 
increased competition and enhanced factor mobility. The market liberalization involved in 
closer economic integration can improve the efficiency of productive factors, allowing for 
greater output from the same inputs. Presuming that the 'invisible hand' is an efficient 
taskmaster, this will lead to a more efficient resource allocation.  
2.2. International Trade theory. Gains from trade 
The immediate consequence of an economic integration agreement is associated 
with gains from trade, which the member countries expect from its early stages after the 
removal of trade barriers. The trade gains were the main focus in international trade theory 
and have been explained by different approaches. In static perfectly competitive models 
(based on comparative advantage principle), the gains from trade stem from the increased 
efficiency of resource allocations and improved consumption possibilities. Under 
increasing returns and product differentiation, in an imperfectly competitive context (New 
trade theory), international trade relaxes the trade-off between economies of scale and 
product diversity.  
In “The Wealth of Nations", Adan Smith concludes that international trade leads to 
advances in productivity.  International trade increases the size of the market and the 
largest market size allows greater specialization and division of labor, which promotes the 
growth of productivity and efficiency. Trade will bring economic benefits if goods are 
imported from a country where the cost is absolutely less and exported the goods of which 
the cost in this country is lower than abroad. The removing of barriers and the expansion of 
international exchange leads to an increase specialization of the national economies and 
their interdependencies, which in result improves allocation of resources.  
The Adam Smith’s analysis in terms of “absolute advantage” becomes the starting 
point in the theory of “comparative advantage” of Ricardo. The prominent Ricardian’s 
(1821) model has a great contribution to the trade theory through its first demonstrated 
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positive effects of trade. While Smith´s absolute costs model has resulted into resource 
allocation effects, the Ricardian’s comparative advantage (based on differences in 
technology) and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samelson theory (based on differences in factor 
endowment) led to efficient resource allocation effects.
8
  
Ricardo demonstrated the remarkable result that both countries can gain from trade 
if their (constant) labor input ratios differ, even if one country had an absolute advantage in 
both goods. Although obviously important and theoretically robust, the existence of gains 
from exchange is fundamentally a precondition of economics, not a testable implication of 
a particular model. The observed terms of trade are bounded between the comparative 
labor cost ratios of the two countries.  The existence of gains from market exchanges is a 
theoretically sturdy result, derivable from different assumptions. But the Ricardian link 
between comparative cost ratios and the terms of trade is quite fragile, hardly surviving 
even the generalization to the multi-good case. Moreover, any serious attempt to study the 
determinants of relative product prices would surely allow for other inputs, including 
physical and human capital (Grossman, Rogoff and Kenneth, 1995). 
Moreover, if comparative advantage theory from Ricardo has first shown positive 
effects of free trade, the Heckscher-Ohlin, (1933) theory would have been the first theory 
of international trade showing a positive effect on welfare. This means that, in order to 
maximize welfare, all artificial barriers between economies, such as tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions, need to be reduced. International trade theory ranging from autarky to free 
trade has explained that the involved countries tend to maintain production specialization 
due to their comparative advantage which leads to increase trade flows and efficiency. All 
this leads to trade growth that eventually enhance economic integration, including falling 
transportation costs, rising incomes, and declining tariff and non-tariff barriers. Usually, 
the formation of an integrated area (a Custom Union, for instance) eliminates inefficient 
domestic production, by allocating to each country the production of goods in which they 
have comparative advantage, improving the allocation of resources. This is the concept of 
industrial complementarity. In such case, trade enhanced refers to the inter-industry type: 
trade of goods belonging to different industries, which require for their production 
different factor intensity and that were produced and interchanged in the context of perfect 
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In the H-O-S explanation, a country will have a comparative advantage in (and tend to export) those 
products which require production factors that are relatively abundant (and relatively cheap) in this 
country. 
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competition. The gains derive through better utilization of comparative advantages, will be 
greater when integrating countries are more "different" and their productive structures are 
more complementary.   
This theory has dominated the theoretical arguments of international trade for a 
long time. Economic integration was seen as a step towards free trade. But this vision 
nevertheless disregards the effects of economic integration on non-members countries 
(Robson, 1980).  
The traditional trade theories, explaining the patterns of trade and the gains from 
trade based on the difference between the supply side of the countries (technology or factor 
endowments), giving them a comparative advantage in the production of different goods, 
dominated the theoretical explanation of international trade until the 70’s.  
The New trade theory, developed among others by Krugman, (1979), Lancaster, 
(1980), Grossman and Helpman, (1991), emphasizes long run productivity effects of trade 
in the framework of scale economies and imperfect competition. In regard of imperfect 
competition, Baldwin, (1993) has submitted that in static models additional trade gains 
may result from the increase of returns to scale which firms realize as internal scale 
economies as well as from the increase of product and input variety for consumers and 
producers respectively. At imperfect competitive markets, trade liberalization can affect 
firm-stage variables, like size and productivity.  Such static gains make a one-time change 
in the quantity of aggregate output not in its quality.  These effects are at the core of the 
welfare insights emanating from basic trade theory. 
 Further, in the case of an industry marked by imperfect competition, Venables and 
Smith, (1988) have used simulation analysis to show that lowering even modest barriers 
leads to a substantial rise in the degree of competition. The result of the reduction in the 
monopoly pricing power of firms leads to lower prices and a more efficient allocation of 
resources. According to Krugman, (1979) static models of monopolistic competition and 
economies of scale suppose two sources of gain from international trade: First, opening up 
for trade among two states which produce differentiated products implies that there are 
more varieties available for consumption. This is a source of consumer benefit. Second, the 
increased competition lowers the equilibrium prices, as the large size of the market allows 
firms to realize economies of scale. The lower prices raise real wages, which lead to 
another source of consumer benefit.  
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
62 
Moreover, Baldwin and Venables, (1995) suggested that the welfare effects of an 
RIA (regional integration area) might be many times larger if industries are imperfectly 
rather than perfectly competitive and, in fact, much of the literature on RIAs for the last 
two decades has focused on environments that are imperfectly competitive. Models of 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale determine benefits from trade 
liberalization in the form of effects on output, scale, and variety. While this is a focus 
shared by much recent trade theory it is particularly important for the analysis of regional 
integration for two reasons. The first is that integration has occurred between economies 
with similar structures and large volumes of intra-industry trade, (in fact, European 
developments have motivated a good deal of this research). The second is the possibility 
that there is an interaction between market structure and gains from integration. Certainly, 
the "pro-competitive" effects of regional integration have figured prominently in such 
debate (Krugman, 1995). 
In this case, trade enhanced refers to the intra-industry, interpreted as “the 
simultaneous export and import of differentiated products‟ Parjanne, (1989) and Hansson, 
(1989).  The vertical intra-industry trade can be defined as ''the simultaneous exports and 
imports of goods classified in the same sector but at different stages of processing'' 
(Krugman and Obsfeld, 2000). Consequently, the widest explanation of intra-industry trade 
applies to the horizontal differentiated goods (all varieties have the same quality) 
belonging to the same industry, where each variety is produced under increasing returns in 
a structure of monopolistic competition (Krugman, 1979; Lancaster, 1980; Helpman, 
1981). Apart from product or horizontal specialization, there are possibilities for vertical 
specialization by subdividing the production process among individual establishment in the 
integrating group. As sales of the final product increase, different parts may be 
manufactured in separate plants, each of which enjoys economies scale, thereby resulting 
in cost reductions (Balassa, 1975).  
Although imperfect competition has been assumed in many numerical simulations, 
the theoretical literature on RIAs does not provide a unified treatment of imperfect 
competition (Baldwin and Venables, 1995). In any case, when the market is imperfectly 
competitive, the increase in its size takes on a new dimension. 
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2.3. The Static Effects of Economic Integration 
2.3.1 The Viner’s contribution: Trade Creation versus Trade Diversion  
Modern regional integration theory began with (Viner, 1950) under the name of 
customs union theory.  The Viner's most famous result that the net effect of customs union 
formation on welfare is ambiguous caused a flood of works.
9
 The so-called Viner's "static 
analysis" distinguishes two possible effects of economic integration on trade flows, with 
different effects on welfare: trade creation (which has positive welfare effects) and trade 
diversion (implying negative effects). “In the first case, there is a shift from domestic to 
partner country sources of supply of a particular commodity, in the second case, the shift 
occurs from non–member country to partner country sources of supply” (Balassa, 1975): 
   “The primary purpose of a customs union and its major consequence for good or 
bad is to shift sources of supply, and the shift can be either to lower - or to higher- cost 
sources, depending on circumstances".   
Trade creation occurs when a group of countries enter into a trade agreement, and 
trade shifts from a high-cost supplier member state to a low-cost supplier member state 
within the union. It is welfare improving because it results in a better allocation of global 
resources and represents a step in the direction of free trade. By contrast, trade diversion 
can take place when imports are shifted from a low-cost supplier of a non-member country 
of the union (third country) to a high-cost supplier member country into the union. It is a 
less optimal allocation of global resources. It is welfare reducing and a step towards 
protectionism.  
The process of trade creation and diversion can be illustrated by figure 1.2, by 
assuming three countries (Kreps, 1950): D (the home country), A (the potential partner), 
and W (the rest of the world).   
                                                          
9 
Most of these assumed perfect competition and constant returns and they illuminated special cases where 
total welfare effects can be signed, despite the fundamental second-best nature of RIAs (Baldwin and 
Venable, 1995). 
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 Figure 1.2: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects 
 
Source: own elaboration  
The curves DD and SD correspond to the curves of demand and supply of certain 
importing goods for the home country (D). Before integration, countries are trying 
independently to exploit their comparative advantage. Hence, in this case for home country 
D, the trading partner would be the rest of the world, where the price is lower (equalizing 
the lower cost of production) than in country A. Home country produces Q2 and it imports 
Q2Q1 from W.  
If home country applies a general tariff (t) on imports, domestic production 
increases (Q4) and imports decreases (Q4-Q3), which led to a welfare decrease represented 
by the area of the triangles (a c e) and (f j k), (the decrease in consumer surplus is higher 
than the increase in producers surplus plus the government revenue). Suppose now that the 
home country D and country A decide to become an integrated area (FTA or Customs 
Union). So, they remove all trade barriers between them but they do not with the rest of the 
world. Then, domestic production decreases (Q6), domestic imports increases (Q6Q5) and 
imports come from the higher cost country, the partner (A).      
Comparing this one with the above situation, the quantities (Q4- Q6) and (Q3- Q5) 
represent trade creation, while (Q3-Q4) corresponds to trade diversion. Net effect for 
welfare would be the sum of the positive effects from trade creation (b c d + f h g) and the 
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when initial tariff of members of FTA or CU is relatively high on imports from the rest of 
the world representing the differences in the cost of production.   
As we see, trade diversion occurs when discriminatory tariff liberalization leads 
private agents to import from a supplier that is not the lowest cost source, thereby reducing 
home welfare by raising the nation's cost of consuming such goods. Clearly, trade 
diversion can arise from discriminatory agreements, but not under MFN tariff reductions. 
In any case, if bilateral tariffs are reduced only on imports from countries that already are 
the lowest-cost supplier, trade diversion does not occur
10
. According to Balassa, (1961) in 
a free trade area, maintaining different tariffs among member countries on the products of 
non- members introduces the possibility of trade diversion. Furthermore, production and 
investment diversion may occur if one admits trade in intermediate products. The diversion 
of trade, production, and investment represent unintentional effects of free trade areas. To 
avoid this, member countries of free trade areas have imposed “country of origin rules.”  
Thus, according to the Viner’s approach, countries would have motivation to 
participate in integration processes if they bring more benefits (trade creation) than costs 
(trade diversion). The Viner’s (1950) general conclusion is that Customs Unions are 
unlikely to provide a net trade creation unless strict circumstances such as that the 
agreements are "...between sizable countries which practice substantial protection of 
substantially similar industries". 
2.3.2. Developments of the Viner’s analysis 
The Viner’s work was reviewed by many researches since the 50’s, adding on to his 
static analysis and contributing to the economic integration theory in different aspects. We 
will focus on the studies of Kreps, (1950); Meade, (1955); Lipsey, (1957); Balassa, (1961-
1975); Johnson, (1965) and Cooper and Massell, (1965).  
According to Meade, (1955), Viner’s analysis only apply if demand is inelastic and 
supply is completely elastic. Assuming this, Meade states that a customs union may 
increase the volume of trade even though there is trade diversion, due to the increase in the 
elasticity of demand. He claims that in the case of adding this effect (named “trade 
expansion”) to the traditional Viner’s effects, trade diversion may not be so adverse.  
                                                          
10 
This observation motivated the claim by Lipsey (1957) that RIAs are likely to be beneficial if the RIA 
partners initially account for large shares of each other's imports, as would be the case if they were low 
cost producers. 
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 Lipsey (1957) stays that Viner’s analysis was focused only on the production 
effects, losing sight of consumption effects, concluding that "...when consumption effects 
are allowed, the simple conclusion that trade creation is "good" and trade diversion is 
"bad" would no longer be valid". The changing relative prices in the domestic market of 
participating countries after the creation of the customs union have two effects: a 
production effect (as Viner's effects) and a consumption effect (the response of 
consumers to the drop in import prices). Trade creation and trade diversion may show 
production effects but they cannot be used to conclude the welfare effect of a custom 
union. 
The distinction between production and consumption effects does not imply the 
absence of interaction between the two. Substitution among sources of supply will affect 
the pattern of consumption through changes in the prices paid by the consumer.   
 Lipsey (1960), by reviewing his previous article related to "production and 
consumption effects" comes to a more satisfactory conclusion in terms of the difference 
between "inter-country substitution" (one country is substituted by another, like in 
Viner's analysis of trade creation and trade diversion) and "inter-commodity 
substitution" (one commodity is substituted by another). 
In some extent, Johnson, (1975) has disagreed with Viner’s investigation and has 
suggested that trade diversion can increase welfare taking into consideration production 
and substitution effects, that is, the welfare losses caused by trade diversion may be more 
than outweighed by the welfare gains resulted from the removing of import tariffs. 
In the Viner-Meade -Lipsey analysis, the participation in a trade-creating customs 
union was considered as a means to reduce the distorting effects of the country’s own 
tariffs. According to Balassa, (1975) this argument was carried to its logical conclusion in 
contributions by Cooper and Massell, (1965a) and Johnson, (1965) who suggested that 
participation in a customs union is inferior to the unilateral elimination of tariffs, which 
leads to greater trade creation without giving rise to trade diversion.  
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-1957) distinguished between “small and large tariff 
reduction”, arguing that a small tariff reduction can increase welfare while a large 
reduction can increase it or lower it. Taking into account the integration stages, they found 
that in the initial tariff reduction welfare increase, but in the later steps decrease. Also De 
CHAPTER 1  THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
67 
Melo, Panagariya and Rodnik, 1993 have proved that small tariff reductions positively 
affect welfare more likely to large reductions.  
Lipsey (1960), as Viner (1950) before, considers the welfare implications of 
differences in production structures between the participating countries. They have 
claimed that if a production pattern of the participating countries is competitive (less 
complementary) the chance of arising gains between member countries would be greater 
and welfare will increase. In a similar way, (Meade, 1955) concludes that for the increase 
of welfare, participating countries should be potentially complementary but actually 
competitive. On the other hand, (Sheer, 1981) stresses that welfare gains from customs 
union formation would be larger as member countries are more competitive. The gains will 
be larger as more dissimilar are the relative prices of protected products in the member 
economies and more similar these relative prices in other economies. Moreover, the gain 
will likely be larger if the initial tariff barrier is greater. Finally, gains will be larger when 
the products of prospective member nations and other nations are less substitute.   
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, countries with different factor 
endowments and different per capita income are expected to have larger trade flows and 
larger welfare gains after integration (Hosny, 2013).  Related with this, Linder, (1961) and 
Sakamoto, (1969) argued that H-O model, while apply for natural-resource intensive 
products, like agriculture, does not hold for manufacturing products. Thus, in contrast to 
H-O conclusion, Linder’s findings were that countries with similar per capita incomes 
(which will develop similar industries) enjoy more potential trade (in differentiated goods) 
than countries with different per capita income. 
The issue of trade between countries of similar or different per capita income is 
related with the concepts of intra-industry and inter-industry trade. Pelzman, (1978) 
and Greenway,(1981) have argued that the traditional customs unions theory has concluded 
that inter-industry specialization is what drives the trade integration. Unlike this view, 
recent empirical researches show that intra-industry specialization is a driving force Hosny 
(2013). The greater the similarity of per capita income between potential trade partners, the 
greater the scope for intra-industry trade (Lancaster, 1980; Greenway, 1981). On the other 
hand, intra-industry trade tends to fall between countries with different factor endowments. 
So, Hosny (2013) has suggested that the increase or decrease in trade flows among 
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participating countries will be determined by similarity of per capita income and the 
pattern of trade, whether it follows the lines of inter-industry or intra-industry flows. 
Given any country’s trade volume, welfare gains from integration are more likely 
as higher is the proportion of trade with its partner and as lower the proportion with 
the rest of the world (Lipsey, 1960; Bhagwati, 1971). On the other hand, countries more 
likely to benefit from integration are those with lower foreign trade as a percentage of 
GDP. Lipsey, (1960) suggested that the welfare effects of a customs union will depend on 
the relative importance in home consumption of goods produced domestically and 
imported from non-member countries prior to the establishment of the union.
11
 
Finally, Krauss (1972) stays that the consideration of the effects on the terms of 
trade alter the perspective of the welfare impact of economic integration and that this is 
always the case even for a small country. He disagreed with the assumption that if the 
considered country is a small country, it has no effects on world prices, suggesting that this 
may not always be true. 
From the analysis of (Viner, 1950) we can conclude that the size of welfare effects 
relies on market structure variables such as the elasticity of demand and supply, and the 
geographical proximity of members. Further, CU policies could have an important impact 
on trade creation and diversion: allowing more countries to participate in an agreement and 
decreasing outside tariffs on imports from non-member states are two substantial policies 
that contribute to trade creation and welfare growth. 
Balassa, (1975) also widely discussed the welfare effects of the customs union, 
concluding that in the abstract one cannot make a judgment as to whether establishing a 
customs union will increase or reduce welfare. Nevertheless, a consideration of certain 
factors may provide a presumption as to the possible direction of the welfare effects of a 
union. He suggested that the net welfare effects of the customs union will depend on the 
amount of trade created and diverted as well as on differences in unit costs
12
.  The welfare 
                                                          
11 
Ceteris paribus,  the larger the share of domestic goods and the smaller the share of goods imported from 
non-member countries, the greater is the likelihood  of an improvement  in welfare  following the union’s 
establishment. Such will be the case since substitution of partner country products for domestic products 
entails trade creation and their substitution for the products of non-member countries involves trade 
diversion (Balassa, 1975). 
12 
In a partial equilibrium framework, under constant  costs, there will be a welfare gain (loss) if the amount 
of trade created, multiplied by differences  in unit costs between the home and the partner countries, 
exceeds (falls short of) the amount of trade diverted, multiplied by differences  in  unit costs between the 
partner and the non-member countries. 
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effects of a customs union will also depend on transportation costs. Along with other 
conditions, the lower are transport costs among the member countries, the greater will be 
the gains from their economic integration. Thus, the participation of neighboring countries 
in a union, with greater possibilities for trade creation across their borders, will offer 




 Applying the argument that gains are obtained through the enlargement of a union 
because of increased possibilities for the allocation of production, it also follows that the 
gains are positively correlated with increases in the market size of the participating 
countries (e.g. small countries will gain more from participation in a customs union than 
large countries). These propositions are consistent with Tinbergen's (1957) conclusion that 
increases in the size of a customs union will increase the probability of favorable welfare 
effects; in the limiting case, the customs union includes the entire world, which is 
equivalent to free trade. 
Thus, after the review of the Viner’s pioneer work and further developments, we 
can conclude, as Meade, (1955), that "our main conclusion must be that it is impossible to 
pass judgment upon customs union in general. They may or may not be instruments for 
leading to a more economic use of resources. It all depends upon the particular 
circumstances of the case." 
In summary, we could expect that the net effect of an customs union would be  
trade creation (and welfare gains) when the integration takes place between countries for 
which the intra-area trade was important, they have a similar level of development, they set 
a low CET and for which its proximity implies low transportation costs. 
2.4. New Regionalism approach: Dynamic effects 
The economic integration may not only cause “static effects” but also a variety of 
potential “dynamic effects” which in the scope of the new economic integration theory has 
an important stance. Static analysis in terms of trade creation and trade diversion is not 
                                                          
13 
When initial tariffs on intra-RIA trade, but not extra-RIA trade, are in the neighborhood of zero, an 
increase in tariff revenues on external trade is a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare gain. 
Maybe a small country ought to prefer unilateral trade liberalization to membership of an RIA (Johnson, 
1965; Cooper and Massell, 1965b). 
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enough to capture welfare effects of economic integration and Balassa, (1961) introduces 
the “dynamic effects analysis”:  
             “Static efficiency, however, is only one of the possible success criteria that can be 
used to appraise the effects of economic integration. Instead of limiting our investigation to 
a discussion of efficiency in resource allocation under static assumptions, greater attention 
should be paid to the impact of integration on dynamic efficiency.” 
Cooper and Massell (1965a) agree with Balassa that static analysis is insufficient 
for assessing the welfare in the integration process, and they make the further point: 
            “the static analysis fails to show why a CU may be acceptable when a tariff 
reduction is not, and it fails to analysis how a CU may more efficiently serve the ends 
previously served by non-preferential protection” 
In his comprehensive theory on economic integration, Balassa removed the static 
assumptions in order to discuss the impact of an enlargement of the size of the market on 
the long term. Therefore, “dynamic effects” of economic integration is where Balassa 
makes a real contribution to the discourse on economic integration (Ingram, 1962).  
These dynamic effects will be long lasting or anything that affects the country’s 
rate of economic growth over the medium term (Balassa, 1961; Schiff and Winters, 1998). 
In the same line, Baldwin, (1993) defines “dynamic effects are those that influence the 
accumulation of factors, again broadly defined” and consequently, affects the growth in 
per-capita income.  
According to Balassa (1961), these dynamic effects are rooted in internal and 
external economies of scale, faster technological progress and productivity growth, 
enhanced competition, reduced risk and uncertainty, the creation of a more favorable 
environment for economic activity, increasing investment and lower costs of capital due to 
the integration of financial markets. More recently, special emphasis has been placed on 
the role of foreign investment and innovation in regional integration effects on long-run 
growth (Badinger, 2001).   
On the other hand, Marinov, (2014) summarizes the dynamic effects of economic 
integration as follows: increase of investment expenditure; sustainable increase of demand;  
consolidation of production and increase of its specialization; improvement of the 
organization and management of production and production technology;  rationalization of 
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territorial distribution and utilization of resources; increase of production efficiency;  
creation of economic growth, etc. 
According to Baldwin and Venables, (1995), the integration process will be 
successful when there is a positive effect on dynamics of the innovation and technical 
progress, especially the so-called "accumulation effect"-as integration effects should be on 
the variables relevant to the determinant process of integration (physical capital, human 
capital and knowledge) and on the growth rate of the relevant variables for welfare. 
Since the rate of capital accumulation depends on the costs and benefits of 
investing in human, physical and knowledge capital, for influencing growth, economic 
integration must affect these costs and benefits. Further, a side effect of this improved 
efficiency is an improvement in investment climate in the integrating region. This in turn 
will result in a higher investment rate, thereby augmenting the initial output gains by 
providing the economy with more resources. The same sort of induced capital formation 
can also boost investment in human capital and knowledge capital, which leads to 
technological progress and innovation. 
Dynamic analysis of the effects of economic integration was developed in parallel 
with the changes in the economic environment and global conditions, like the increasing 
relevance of the service sector (as percentage of trade and GDP), the private sector 
participation (private firms supporting integration) or foreign direct investment (with rising 
importance of FDI in services like banking, advertising or transportation) (Lawrence, 
1997).  
In regional economic integration literature, the Vinerian analysis and its 
developments, focused on static effects, is called "Old Regionalism" while analyses 
focused on dynamic effects are called “New Regionalism” (El-Agraa, 1988; De Melo and 
Panagariya, 1993; Lawrence, 1997; Burfisher et al., 2004; Bhagwati, 1993). To name the 
same approaches, some authors refer to "first regionalism" and "second regionalism" 
Bhagwati,(1993); "short-term" and "long-term" concepts Panagariya, (1999); "traditional 
and non-traditional aspects of regionalism" De Melo, (2011) or simply "static" and 
"dynamic" concepts or the "traditional theory and new developments" (Panagariya, 2000). 
Moreover, Burfishe et al., (2004), in their discussion about new and old 
regionalism, have characterized the new regionalism by many elements in the deepest level 
of integration. In addition, they have found a link between new regionalism and developing 
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countries, claiming that in most cases recent regional trade agreements have been created 
among developing countries and one or more developed countries partners.  
Dynamic effects, which transform productive structure to a more competitive and 
specialized one, have an impact on the rate of members’ growth Balassa (1961; 1975). 
First, the liberalization of the integrating area leads to increase market size and give a wide 
opportunity to the use of production capacity which in turn leads to economies of scale and 
a reduction in the economy costs. Secondly, the expansion of integration ties between 
countries improves the production and nonproduction infrastructure, which reduces costs 
related to the export and import transactions. Third, joining the integration unions usually 
entails increasing investments flows and quickens technological development in the 
economy of participating countries.  
In summary, following Jaber (1971), the production effects of the static analysis of 
economic integration are concerned with changes in the production mix on a given 
Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF). Dynamic effects may lead to a higher growth rate 
and exploitation of unused economic capacities leading to a shift of the PPF itself.
14
  
Economies of scale. The economic integration by increasing market size can allow an 
increasing exploitation of economies of scale as production volume increases, and to 
reduce production costs. Corden, (1972) first analyzed the implications of economies of 
scale for customs union theory in the terms of two effects: as a positive welfare effect, 
"cost reduction effects", and as a negative welfare effect, "trade suppression effect". The 
first refers to reductions of the average costs in inputs per unit, when domestic output 
expands after the formation of a CU. The second refers to the import replacement of more 
efficient producers from non-members by the less efficient domestic producers under 
economies of scale. So, Corden concluded that when economies of scale are allowed in an 
analysis of static welfare, “trade creation/trade diversion” concepts should be 
supplemented by the new concepts of "cost reduction" and "trade suppression" effects. 
From a different point of view, Krauss (1972) claimed that the effects of the economies of 
scale “should be accommodated by extending the definitions of trade creation and trade 
diversion not supplementing them.”   
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However, the dynamic analysis presents inconvenient at empirical level: while the static analysis has 
reliable general methods to estimate welfare effects of integration that is not the case for the several 
dynamic effects. We addressed this issue in the second part of our work. 
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Economic integration may lead to lower costs through increases in the volume of 
plant output, but plant size and unit costs are not necessarily correlated in the case of multi-
product firms (Balassa, 1975). In such cases, costs may be lowered by reducing product 
variety through specialization in the integrated area. Apart from product or horizontal 
specialization, there are possibilities for vertical specialization by subdividing the 
production process among individual establishments in an integrated area.   
An alternative approach to analyzing the implications of economies of scale 
consists on combining with imperfect competition and, often, product differentiation. 
Some of the key applications of this category of models have been developed in the 
context of issues such as the welfare implications of a simultaneous division of the world 
into several trade blocs and the expansion of a bloc through addition of new members, 
(Panagariya, 2000). Baldwin and Venables (1995) discuss the implications of imperfect 
competition and scale economies in the three-country framework, but while these authors 
carefully discuss the scale and cost effects of FTAs, identifying the relevant channels, they 
do not explicitly derive the welfare effects. 
The economies of scale typically have their origin in the existence of fixed costs. In 
many cases, these costs are due to technological factors, especially the high costs of 
research and development (R&D). When products are differentiated, marketing also can 
turn to an important fixed cost. As a result, sectors of high technology and differentiated 
products generally present economies of scale. Moreover, the effect of the increase in 
integrated market size, taking advantage of economies of scale, becomes more important 
when the type of the intensified trade is intra-industry trade (IIT); since, as we have seen, 
the most widespread explanation of IIT is the one which referred to the horizontally 
differentiated goods trade, where each variety is produced under increasing returns in a 
framework of monopolistic competition. 
Competition. The elimination of trade barriers creates the conditions for more effective 
competition of the domestic producers with those from the rest of the integrating area, 
which reduces the market power of domestic firms (Scitovsky, 1958). By increasing the 
number of firms, each producer considers, in the same way as his competitors, that the 
opening of national frontiers will contribute to the loosening of monopolistic and 
oligopolistic market structures in the individual countries. At the same time, there is no 
contradiction between gains from economies of scale and increased competition, since a 
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wider market can sustain a larger number of efficient units (Balassa, 1961). Greater 
competition may have beneficial effects through improvements in manufacturing 
efficiency as well as through technological change (Balassa, 1975).
15
 
Krauss (1972) suggests that the gains obtained by increased competition and 
economies of scale can be achieved with unilateral trade liberalization. In this case, 
domestic producers suffer from the discipline of foreign competition and the efficiency 
improves, but the gains through increases in output associated with sales in the markets of 
partner countries are not obtained.   
Technological change. Economic integration may contribute to the spread of 
technological knowledge by putting in touch the domestic producers with new products 
and processes originating in the trading partners. The transmitted technological knowledge 
will be higher when an integration arrangement includes not only goods and services 
mobility but also factors mobility, especially (fix and human) capital mobility. Moreover, a 
greater competition derived from integration can lead to technical progress in the member 
countries by stimulating the research activities to develop new products or processes. Coe 
and Helpman, (1993); Baldwin, (1993) have proved that integration enhances a country’s 
opportunities to improve its efficiency by participating in other countries’ technological 
progress or in R&D investment. Furthermore, Badinger, (2001), by estimating the growth 
effects of economic integration in EU members, supported the previous studies, concluding  
that technological advances are an important channel by which growth effects of economic 
integration are materialized. 
Investment. Investment is a necessary complement to trade, particularly in the case of 
service industries, which must provide their products at the source of consumption, and a 
variety of high-tech goods industries that require consumer education, special credit 
arrangements, and after-sales service (Gerber, 2000). 
 According to Baldwin, (1993), by allowing a more free interplay between market 
forces, the market liberalization involved in closer economic integration can improve the 
efficiency of productive factors, allowing for greater output from the same inputs.  A side 
effect of improved efficiency is an improved investment climate in the integrating region. 
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The pro-competitive effect will be more favorable with differentiated goods industries producing under 
economies of scale. Since the differentiated nature of the products boosts the market power and the 
economies of scale tend to concentrate production, this process becomes sometimes a justification of 
national monopolies. 
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This in turn will result in a higher investment rate, thereby raising the initial output gains 
by providing the economy with more resources. The same sort of induced capital formation 
can also boost investment in human capital and knowledge capital. In the same line, 
Baldwin and Venables (1995) have claimed that an RIA will affect growth if it changes the 
return on investment in physical, human or knowledge capital and hence spurs 
accumulation. 
Regional integration will usually affect factor prices, including the rate of return on 
capital, in member and non-member nations. So, the potential for investment creation and 
investment diversion have played an important role in the public debates on RIAs 
(Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Dee and Galli, 2003). Dee and Galli (2003) by analyzing 
“investment creation and diversion” suggested that in an increasingly integrated world 
economy, even minor trade concessions can have a significant impact on investment flows. 
If capital is perfectly mobile internationally, a pure "investment diversion" will be 
generated whereby capital flows to the RIA countries from the rest of the world.  
The hypothesis of the investment-led growth in the frame of integration agreements 
has its roots in Balassa (1961). He underlined the role of economic integration in 
generating a more favorable condition for entrepreneurial activities (less uncertainty) by 
reducing the risk premium for investments and reducing capital costs which leads to more 
efficient financial markets. Then, such hypothesis can be observed in the work of Baldwin 
and Seghezza, (1998), who suggests that lowering the risk premium raises the stock market 
value of any given investment. Further, by discussing capital accumulation they stressed 
that trade-induced growth can be done through three types, one of which was investment - 
led growth.  Badinger (2001) also shows that the ties between integration and growth run 
both over increases in efficiency as well as induced investments. 
It is noteworthy that from the point of view of Gerber, (2000) developing countries 
are interested in ensuring that they receive private capital flows, while high-income 
economies seek to take advantage of new systems of global production. In general, 
investment agreements seek to provide foreign investors with national treatment, to create 
an investment form of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, to remove performance 
requirements, and to eliminate restrictions on capital and profit remittances. From the 
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standpoint of host countries, the goals are to raise national investment levels, increase the 
rate of technology transfer as well as economic growth.
16
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The globalization ongoing process is accompanied 
with regional integration in which Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), or investment by 
transnational corporations and multinational enterprises in order to control assets and 
manage production activities in integrating countries, represents a great essential business 
phenomenon (Mallanpally and Sauvant, 1999). 
In the same line, the World Bank, (1997) claims that an important focus of the 
debate surrounding all RIAs is how such arrangements may affect inward and outward 
foreign direct investment flows in the integrating region.  In this connection, (Blomstrom 
and Kokko, 1997) argued that enhancing FDI, induced by regional integration, can be a 
catalyst to efficiency gains and greater growth due to spillovers of technology transfer. In 
compared static effects based on a more efficient resource allocation in terms of short-run 
effects, this can imply long-run effects on growth and productivity.
17
   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at a phenomenal rate since the early 
1980s and the world market for "direct investment" has become more competitive. 
Developing countries are becoming increasingly attractive investment destinations, in part 
because they can offer investors a range of "created" assets (Mallanpally and Sauvant, 
1999).  Also, although developed countries remain the leading source of outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI), developing and transition economies have emerged as an 
important source of outward FDI since the 1990s (Al-Sadig, 2013)
 18
. 
Since an important share of investment in developing countries is foreign direct 
investment (FDI), it is nowadays considered a major incentive of integration between 
countries, especially if integration takes place between developing countries, given the link 
with two important variables: exports and economic growth (Hosny, 2013).   
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Circumstantial evidence suggests that RIAS can generate investment booms, as occurred for example after the 
creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Iberian enlargement of the European Community, the 
European Community 1992, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Mercosur (World Bank, 
1998). 
17 However, (Anastasia and Panagiotis, 2014) examining the relationship between integration and growth for three 
different country groups (European Union member-countries, European Monetary Union member-countries and 
countries in transition) do not find a robust causality relationship between FDI and economic growth. 
18 
Between 1980 and 2011, their share of world outward FDI rose from 6.2 percent to 26.9 percent and 
peaked in 2010 at 31.8 percent (Al-Sadig, 2013). 
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Further, Peiris et al., (2015)  by reviewing several works, conclude that these 
studies in developing countries provide evidence for significant technology transfer from 
FDI. Due to  a limited investment in R&D and therefore a weak R&D base, as well as, 
infrastructure, production and manufacturing capacity in developing countries, most of the 
inward FDIs to these countries originate from the developed countries, generating a 
positive effect on the productivity of the developing countries. 
 Regional economic integration can provides an important incentive to FDI within 
the integrated region. In the context of economic integration theory, it is generally 
recognized that FDI is one of the principal dynamic channels managing to the long-run 
growth. So, one of the fundamental dynamic objectives of the RIAs is to increase FDI 
flows within the area. The argument that FDI not only provides direct capital investment 
but also means technology (know-how) transfer and diffusion, mainly due to the spillovers 
to local firms, is the hot topic of RIA debates  (Egger and Pfaffermays, 2002; Uttama and 
Peridy, 2009). These channels could increase productivity in the countries, which in result 
leads to more investments and a faster growth. 
Innovation. The dynamic effects are all connected with each other. The economic 
integration theory (in the context of the endogenous growth theory) considers that the key 
for a long-run growth is in the country’s ability to implement research and development 
(R&D). In this respect, innovation is assumed to be the engine of growth stemming from 
higher levels of FDI and technological transfer. The innovation occurring through new 
technologies resulting of investments (FDI) leads to the relationship between trade 
liberalization and technological progress, especially in the process of economic integration. 
According to the endogenous growth theory, profit-seeking investments in 
knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth process (Romer, 1986; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Innovation is an outgrowth of costly 
investments in industrial research. Obviously, such investments reply to opportunities, 
which reflect competitive conditions in national and international product markets. Since 
firm’s race in different countries brings out new products, the growth processes are linked 
with the international technological competition. This justifies that economic integration 
affects indeed the level of competition in a market, which in turn leads firms to innovate.  
Trade liberalization and integration lead to technological competition which in 
result increases foreign economic competition. This relies on firms facing price 
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competition, inducing them to raise R&D effort, innovation and growth. From this point of 
view, Grossman and Helpman, (1994) also put attention to the important role of 
international trade and integration agreements in the growth process involving the 
transmission of innovations within integrated area and noted that these perspectives have 
led to casting industrial innovation as the engine of growth. 
In summary, increased efficiency that leads to more output from the same amount 
of inputs in a first round (static effects) is one part of the economic integration effects. The 
second part occurs when dynamic principles lead to higher investment and an increase in 
the capital stock, which in turn increases output in a second round (dynamic effects). 
 Actually, though static and dynamic effects may seem diverse in nature, both are 
significantly connected through different links.  Baldwin and Segneza (1998), in a  work 
focused on trade-induced knowledge-led growth, emphasizing the impact of trade 
liberalization on the incentive to investment on product and process innovations, have 
found a number of static and dynamic growth links: Traded intermediate goods; Inter-
sectoral expenditure shifts and Pro-competitive Effects. 
Typically, the first link among the static and dynamic effects occurs due to the 
traded intermediate goods. The production of capital involves commerce intermediate 
goods and this creates a simple link between openness and investment-led growth. The 
increase of trade after the removing of trade barriers also affects intermediate goods, 
affecting the production of both forms of capital. When the manufacture of human 
knowledge or physical capital includes commerce intermediate inputs, the price of traded 
goods enters the marginal cost function. Trade barriers affect these prices, so the price of 
capital becomes a function of trade barriers.  
Secondly, these effects are linked by inter-sectoral expenditure shifts. When traded 
sectors are more (physical) capital intensive compared to non-traded sectors, RIAs shifting 
demand to the capital-intensive traded sector boosts the derived demand for capital. In the 
short-run, this would increase capital accumulation and in the long-run would increase 
growth.  
Finally, a connection emerges on the fact that reciprocal liberalization may produce 
a pro-competitive effect. The mechanism through which an RIA changes price cost mark-
ups is often referred to as the pro-competitive effect of integration. Pro-competitive effects 
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may be substantial, leading to significant increases in firm scale, and may increase or 
decrease the incentive to innovate.  
The possibility that an RIA will have pro-competitive effects on price cost mark-
ups means that two additional welfare effects come into play: trade-volume and trade-cost 
effects as terms of trade effects when prices change. Pro-competitive effects of integration 
bring about an expansion of firms in RIA countries, thereby reducing average production 
costs. Certainly, a reduction in average costs is spread over all the firms' output, non-traded 
as well as traded, which means that the effect may be quantitatively important (Baldwin 
and Venables, 1995). 
2.4.1. Effects of economic integration for developing countries 
After discussing the main static and dynamic effects of economic integration (in the 
context of the "traditional" and the "new" regionalism), in this section we discuss the 
particular case of developing countries. Some authors refer to the linkages between 
developing and developed countries, which many RTAs introduced in the past two 
decades, as the twin characteristics of “new regionalism", (Burfisher et al, 2004). For 
developing countries, in particular for the smaller ones, economic independence was not 
easily attainable and integration was seen as one way through which greater independence 
could be achieved (Mackay, 1984). 
The literature of economic integration dealing with developing countries has 
generally recognized that for such type of countries neither the “traditional” nor the “new” 
economic integration theory is adequate. Nevertheless, the traditional theory seems more 
controversial than of the new integration theory. 
 According to Meier, (1960); Balassa, (1965); Abdel Jaber, (1971); Mackay, 
(1984), the orthodox theory of Viner-Meade-Lipsey with their traditional restrictive 
approach (centered on the static effects of resource allocation) is not appropriate to the case 
of developing countries. “Old” economic integration theory was certainly derived from 
neoclassical assumptions of full employment, perfect competition, constant returns of scale 
and perfect mobility of production factors; accordingly, the analysis is constrained only by 
the static effects of economic integration (Abdel Jaber, 1971). The emphasis should be put 
on dynamic effects (Mikesell, 1965; Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Rueda-Junquera, 
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2006). Meier, 1960 had argued that Viner’s analysis was concentrated on a limited range of 
welfare effects in the frame of lesser-developed countries. 
 Furthermore, from Balassa's point of view Balassa, (1965), the content literature of 
economic integration theory was concentrated on the rational customs union relying 
exclusively upon industrialized countries. The environment and difficulties of these 
countries do not apply to economic development, rather than to a tariff issue and 
production/consumption shifts. Also Mackay, (1984) has claimed that assumptions of the 
basic theory do not conform to the economic preconditions and existing structure found in 
the third world, and the requirements for successful integration, as suggested by Viner 
(1950), are not usually fulfilled by developing countries.  
Hence, soon after Viner’s contribution, researchers come to argue with a special 
emphasis on the effects of integration to less developed countries and the motivation of 
these countries to participate in integration processes, in the frame of the new economic 
integration theory. Substantial researches have been done on this context like, among  
others, (Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper and Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al.,1969; 
Robson, 1980;  Mackay, 1984;  De Melo, 2011; Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014).  
Although both aspects are related, following Hosny, (2013) and Marinov, (2014), 
who applied an appropriate systematization, this section attempts to review the potential 
economic integration effects (the welfare impact) in the case of developing countries, as 
well as the determinants that influence the motivation to participate in integration 
processes for these countries. In both cases, we will focus on the limitations of the 
traditional theory and the reasons why traditional approach is not sufficient or is not 
adequate. 
2.4.2. The welfare impact of economic integration in developing countries 
From the point of view of developing countries, the traditional analysis on the 
welfare effects of an economic integration agreement is not adequate in different aspects, 
not just when only production effects are considered (Viner’s analysis) but also including 
consumption effects (Lipsey, 1957, 1960). Welfare effects of economic integration 
between less developed countries should also encompass the positive effects of 
employment, productivity and income effects, production specialization, competitiveness, 
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etc. (Abdel Jaber (1971); Mikesell, 1965). We present in what follows some of these 
aspects and its limitations in the traditional approach.  
 (1) Objective of economic development. To the developing countries, economic 
integration should be considered as a method to economic development or as development 
policies, not as tariff deals (Abdel Jaber, 1971; Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, 1975; and 
Mackay, 1984). 
Several studies have stressed that an orthodox theory of economic integration, 
engaged in the static efficiency through the better resource allocation, may not often 
correspond with economic development objectives, engaged in the benefits of economic 
faster growth in the long-run as well as labour market aspects like unemployment and 
under-employment of production factors (Kahnert et al., 1969; Mackay, 1984).
19
  
Moreover, Mackay, (1984) studying economic integration in developing countries 
in the case of "CARICOM", has claimed that the three basic objectives of integration 
agreements are: economic integration; functional cooperation in sectors such as transport, 
health, education, labour, information and services; and coordination of foreign policy. 
Therefore, he has concluded that economic integration also provides a framework for these 
forms of cooperation, as well as for increasing bargaining power in international 
negotiations and providing a suitable framework for the receiving and using of aid.  
In a paper about regional integration in "SADC" (Southern African Development 
Community), (Shams, 2003) claims that economic integration in this region is understood 
mainly as an economic development process and less so as creating various or upper stages 
of FTAs. A look at the list of objectives of the SADC shows that not regional integration 
under the reducing tariffs and promoting intra-regional trade but economic and political 
development is the principle motivation behind the creation of common projects such as 
poverty alleviation, improving standard and quality of life through promoting healthcare 
and education, productive employment and utilization of resources. In addition, to the list 
of political objectives he referred to the security achievement as well as to the list 
including ecological, social and cultural objectives. 
(2) Size of the countries. The potential economic integration gains in small and medium-
sized member nations have been suggested by (Kreinin, 1964). When integration or overall 
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In Europe, integration was concerned with the promotion of trade and more efficient resource allocation 
and utilization, whereas in the third world, objectives are based on the diversification of production 
structures and the general enhancement of development prospects (Mackay,1984). 
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trade occurs between a small country and a larger one, the small one will be more 
profitable due to the extension of its export via huge consumers demand. This is especially 
important when the small country is a less developed country and the large one is a 
developed country with higher purchasing power. 
According to traditional integration theory, the bigger the size of the economies 
participating in the integration agreement, the greater potential gains of integration would 
be. Abdel Jaber, (1971) has emphasized that in the case of taking GNP for the economic 
size measurement, the integration gains for developing countries will be small.   
But, as (Balassa, 1961) suggests, if the benefit of economic integration do not 
merely depend on the size of the countries, but also on the rate at which they increase,  the 
integration gains for the less developed countries would be bigger than for developed 
countries, as the most developing countries have a  higher growth rates. Taking population 
as a measurement of the integrating nation’s size, developing countries would surely 
benefit from integration, as they are usually over populated (Hosny, 2013). 
(3) Employment and productivity. The discussion of the employment and productivity 
effects can be found in Mackay, (1984), by debating features and problems in the third 
world he has claimed that the market structure of the less developed countries historically 
determined comparative advantage concentrates production and trade on a limited range of 
usually low technology goods. Moreover, unemployment and under-employment of factors 
of production remain a major problem. 
Similarly, Hosny, (2013) has stressed that in most developing countries, there exists 
a situation of generally low productivity, plus mounting unemployment. So, a country can 
get gains even under trade diversion. If trade diversion cause labor shifts from low efficient 
to high-efficient sectors or activities it can boost the welfare growth. The welfare gain will 
be most obvious under unemployment (Sakamoto, 1969).  
(4) Beneficial trade diversion. Trade diversion may be efficient in the case of developing 
countries (Demas, 1965; Linder 1966; Sakamoto, 1969). They underlined some basic 
principles about benefits of trade diversion: First, it will enlarge the size of the market by 
reducing costs due to economies of scale. Import substitution allows the integrated area 
spending more foreign exchange in imports of capital goods, contributing to the increase of 
investment and economic growth. From the consumption side, trade diversion by allowing 
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consumers to buy imports at lower prices, after the removal of tariffs, increases their 
savings. 
Linder, (1966) and Sakamoto, (1969) refer this fact as "efficient trade diversion." 
The economic conditions of developing countries should not allow welfare reduction in the 
case of trade diversion because the production replacement will be from an efficient non-
member developed country to a relatively efficient developing member country, creating 
benefits in terms of employment and income within the union.  
However, Elkan, (1975) has disagreed with the benefits of trade diversion arguing 
that the loss in tariff revenues will be balanced by all these effects. This assumption may 
be of significant importance to less developed countries, especially to the smaller ones, as 
these countries fear a decline in tariff revenue since the tariff revenue is a fundamental 
income source of the overall government budget in most of these countries.  
(5) Protection for industrial development. Although Viner’s approach was concentrated 
on a limited range of welfare effects, he has argued a very important point that economic 
integration in some cases may be a step for free trade, but in others a step to protection.  
Cooper and Massell, (1965b), perhaps the first who analyze economic integration in 
developing countries, as well as Sakamoto, (1969), argue that for less developed countries 
protected trade regimes may be beneficial.  
They consider that “a principle objective of economic integration among less 
developed countries is to foster industrial development and to guide such development 
along more economic lines."  
This objective can be obtained via protection provided by economic integration, so 
(Sakamoto, 1969; and Lizano and Willmore, 1975) referred it to the equivalent of import 
substitution and export expansion as an important tool for development and 
industrialization policies. Economic integration therefore provides through market 
extension and protection important preconditions that can aid development, in particular 
the opportunities to exploit economies of scale.  
The protection provided by economic integration may also allow for dynamic 
economies associated with new industry which has no inherent disadvantage but only a 
present inferiority of acquired skills and experience.  
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There is an expectation that over time the costs facing the industry will fall as the 
necessary skills and experience are acquired (Mackay, 1984).
20
 Furthermore, Cooper and 
Masselll, (1965b), who are willing to accept a reduction in national income to achieve an 
increase in industrial production, have concluded that for evaluating the customs union 
effects on each member country not only the national income changes, but also the level 
and changes in size of industrial production must be taken into account.  
The Cooper and Massell analysis is for integration between a North developed 
country and a South developing country. In the case of the establishment of a customs 
union between two less developed countries, trade diversion in industrial products will 
allow increasing welfare under the consumption terms resulting from decrease in prices by 
removing tariffs. Apart from such process, welfare will decrease under the production 
terms (here welfare viewed as the efficient use of resources). This occurs when production 
is shifted from an efficient non-member country (third developed country) to one of the 
inefficient developing member countries of the union. Hence, by joining such trade 
diversion together with a common external tariff that protects domestic industry, the 
development of the industrial sectors in both member countries can be achieved. 
Eventually, Cooper and Massell, (1965b) concluded that this process would give a 
greater benefit in the case of industry complementary of these developing countries since 
the supply of each country matches the demand of the other, resulting in the expansion of 
their industrial production. 
Finally, we should consider the work of Elkan, (1975) concerning the unequal 
distribution of the benefits for industrial production from integration among less developed 
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The favorable protection effect by stimulating industrial development is discussed by the “Training 
Ground Theory”. This theory starts out from the hypothesis that the international competitiveness of 
developing countries can be gradually improved by relying on the regional market in the first phase of 
industrialization, when free trade among members, together with the usual high common external tariff on 
imports from the third countries, temporarily protect infant industries and provide at the same time 
sufficient large markets for future development (Inotai, 1991). This inward oriented approach or "import 
substituting industrialization" approach, involve policies designed to encourage development within the 
national framework (Mackay, 1984; Rueda-Junquera, 2006). Developing countries can enter into the 
world's market at a later stage, after reaching a certain degree of efficiency due to the advantages of 
economies of scale, technical development, and specialization on the regional level. From this angle, 
economic integration among this group of countries is considered as a transitional period towards open 
competition with the rest of the world (Inotai, 1991). However, in many cases facts do not support this 
theory: the fundamentally narrow regional markets did not allow industrial development or economy of 
scale advantages; there are wide differences in the structural pattern of extra and intra-regional exports; 
little or even no structural improvement took place in a result of the learning (training) process. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that developing countries will eventually commit themselves to 
opening or liberalizing trade with the rest of the world, so in the end, protection instead of being 
temporary may actually become permanent (Hosny, 2013) . 
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countries: the bigger gains of economic integration are focused only in one or few member 
countries. While referring to economically weaker and geographically remote participating 
countries this effect will be lower.  
 (6) International competitiveness. Following the discussion given above one can suggest 
that developing countries have based their arguments for getting benefit from economic 
integration, firstly, in the benefits of trade diversion and import-substituting 
industrialization. The second kind of arguments, viewed as long-run ones, are the 
"dynamic effects" by enlargement of the market within an integration framework, 
arguments like economies of scale, investment, technology transfer, etc. 
These countries have taken a further step, and most of the less developed countries 
now follow another strategy consisting in trade liberalization and deregulation policies 
(Rueda-Junquera, 2006). They follow such policies in order to get regional market 
stabilization which helps in encouraging new investment opportunities and general 
adjustment programs under the international organizations frameworks. At this regard, 
developing countries are looking to economic integration as an instrument for a more 
competitive insertion into the global economy (Hosny, 2013). 
In this sense, according to Mackay, (1984) integration can act as a framework for 
the development of common policies (political and economic) toward the rest of the world. 
As such, the total may be greater than the sum of the parts in bargaining power vis-a-vis 
other economic groupings and international organizations. This is relevant to the political 
and economic independence of the region in having greater control over the direction and 
type of development. For many third world countries this aspect is particularly important.  
(7) Economies of scale. In general, developing countries are specialized in primary 
products, what is not a problem if the economic surplus from the primary sector is 
reallocated or reinvested efficiently in other sectors (Abdel Jaber, 1971). But, in general, 
that is not the case and developing countries have supported a diversification policy and 
import substitution to several degrees in order to speed up economic growth. 
However, balance growth can be achieved by small developing countries by 
increasing the size of the market, benefiting from economies of scale and expanding their 
inter-industry transactions in a context of economic integration (Demas, 1965). 
(8) Trade pattern with developed countries. Most of imports of developing countries 
from developed countries are capital goods (in the form of investment) (Mikesell, 1965). 
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This suggestion implies that the volume of imports of less integrating developed countries 
is likely to increase, as according to the dynamic approach integration between these 
countries requires higher investments. The inference of Mikesell, (1965) was significant, as 
he noted that the long-run target of integration between less developed countries should not 
be decreasing trade with the rest of the world but rather making changes in their trade 
structure.  
Sakamoto, (1969), who supports the conclusion of Mikesell, takes into account the 
availability of foreign exchange as a determinant of imports in developing countries. If a 
result of integration between less developed countries take place with a trade diversion in 
consumer goods, this will release the larger foreign currency targeting at more imports of 
capital goods from third (developed) countries. Eventually, the volume of trade flows with 
the non-member countries may not change or may actually increase, but the most 
important thing is the changing of the trade structure. 
2.4.3. Integration determinants in developing countries 
There are several determinants that influence the motivation of participating in an 
integration processes. In the case of developing countries, these factors go further the static 
and dynamic effects determining net welfare effect. Below we review the limitations 
showed by the traditional economic integration theory in relation with factors which are 
important to developing countries.   
(1) Macroeconomic policy coordination. Even if all trade conditions of a more developed 
countries could be fulfilled in less developed countries, the macroeconomic policies 




Certainly, the issue of policy harmonization between participating countries has 
been discussed as far back in the studies of (Balassa, 1961; Kahnert et al, 1969; 
Hirschman, 1971; Andic and Dosser, 1971). For instance, according to Balassa, policy 
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This paper, analyzing the MERCOSUR case, has claimed that the most serious obstacle to the 
development of this union is the lack of coordinated macroeconomic policies in the two most important 
member countries Brazil and Argentina, particularly in exchange rate policy. Uncoordinated changes in 
exchange rates can hamper trade integration in the region. Although Brazil and Argentina are profiting 
from their low transport costs and large market size, because of shortcoming coordination in 
macroeconomic policies, they are not getting full effects of economic integration. Consequently, (Shams, 
2003) concludes that the success of MERCOSUR is, therefore, dependent on the coordination of 
macroeconomic policy and a unification of exchange rate policies. 
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differences between the member countries may influence trade flows and factor 
movements, thereby modifying the welfare effects of economic integration. Industrial 
policies, social policies, fiscal policies, monetary policies, and exchange rate policies are 
relevant in this context (Balassa, 1961).  
Further, from the point of Hirschman, (1971), integrating countries should try to 
uniform their internal monetary and foreign exchange policies with the aim of trade 
agreements be durable. He suggested that such progress could be more important in 
promoting trade between the member countries than the customs preferences themselves. 
In addition, Andic et al., (1971) has got under consideration this issue in the context of 
developing countries, and claimed that two shortages in developing countries are the 
foreign exchange gap and the savings gap. De Melo et al., (1993) consider that, in addition 
to monetary and exchange policies, coordination should be extended to industrial, 
environmental, social and welfare policies.
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(2) Competitive Vs complementary countries. An interesting issue in the case of 
developing countries is the suggestion of Viner, (1950) and Lipsey, (1960) that competitive 
countries gain more benefits from economic integration than complementary countries. 
Makower and Morton, (1961), supporting Vinerian point, explain that gains will be larger 
the larger the cost differences of producing the same good in the integrating countries. 
Since most of the developing countries specialize in export of primary products, 
one can refer to these countries as competitive ones according to Viner’s argument, so this 
analysis is in favor of developing countries. Along with this true argument, there is another 
view that reduces the benefits of economic integration among less developed countries 
because the large export flows of less developed countries is attracted by developed 
countries, leading to decreasing the volume of intra-regional trade (El-Naggar, 1964). 
Nevertheless, Abdel Jaber, (1971), paying attention to the large category of primary 
products, has stressed that if these products are disaggregated the potential benefits can 
arise. Balassa (1965) mentioned that Vinerian argument concerning competitiveness and 
complementarity is not at all appropriate regarding to the less developed countries. 
Precisely, the objective of these countries is to achieve a significant degree of 
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The issue of harmonizing domestic policies will be especially important if member countries are of 
different development levels. The steps to deeper integration are determined by rich, developed countries, 
while developing countries will have to adjust their standards to those of the developed countries 
(Panagariya, 1998).  
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complementarity between them and then get benefits from economic integration (Mikesell, 
1965). Similarly, Marinov, (2014) claims that after obtaining higher complementarity 
developing countries can increase the volume of intra-regional trade between them and get 
integration gains.  
Moreover, several works Langhammer and Hiemenz, (1990); Inotai, (1991); 
Shams, (2003), supporting the above discussion, have argued that less complementarity 
and similar economic structure would not be useful between developing countries.  For 
instance, Langhammer and Hiemenz, (1990); Shams (2003) have considered that one of 
the obstacles to south-south integration was that it included countries with a low and 
similar level of development and similar resource endowment. In this case, there is neither 
much scope for inter-industry specialization nor the countries have the option of intra-
industry specialization. 
(3) Intra-regional trade and total regional trade. According to Mackay, (1984), in any 
form of economic integration it is likely that there will be changes in patterns of trade 
among the integration partners (intra-regional trade) and between the members and the rest 
of the world (extra-regional trade). In terms of trade pattern changes, (Lipsey, 1960) claims 
that a customs union will more likely produce welfare gains the higher is the share of trade 
with its partners and the lower the share of trade with the rest of the world. Since the 
proportion of trade between developing countries is small in comparison to trade between 
developed countries, gains from integration between developing countries would be small 
(Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014).  
However, other studies Balassa, 1965; Abdel Jaber, (1971) consider that this 
conclusion should not always be acceptable. If some factors limiting trade between 
developing countries, like a low level of economic development, inadequate transport 
facilities, foreign exchange controls and other import restrictions, inadequate marketing 
and shortcoming of standardization, are eliminated, trade flows probably would increase 
among these  countries in a context of integration.  
Although in general is supported that the best indicator of a successful economic 
integration agreement is the increase of the share of intra-regional trade to total trade of the 
member countries, Inotai  (1991) shows that it should not be the only one. In fact, the joint 
industrial development, adequate infrastructure, and growing level of technology are also 
important targets. What is more, the growth of total regional trade may actually be derived 
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from trade diversion from more efficient and competitive non-member countries. 
Consequently, it can be assumed as positive only when it is combined with improvements 
in competitiveness in world markets.  
(4) Trade as a percentage of GDP. Lipsey (1960) argues that countries are most likely to 
benefit from economic integration if their volume of foreign trade as a percentage of their 
GDP is lower. This factor is quite relevant for developing countries since the trade 
openness of these low-income countries has always been lower than that for high-income 
countries, although this ratio has increased in the past few years (Hosny, 2013). 
However, Hosny, (2013) has stressed that such observation does not apply to 
middle-income countries and least developed countries, both groups having higher trade 
openness level than that of the high-income group. Therefore, he has concluded that this 
criterion is not appropriate to developing countries, as sub-groups within these countries 
may have higher or lower ratios of trade to GDP compared with high-income groups. 
(5) Initial tariff rates. The higher the initial tariff rates between countries entering a 
customs union, the larger are the expected gains of economic integration between them 
(Meade, 1955). Since the initial domestic tariffs in developing countries are in general high 
(trying to protect national production system or increase revenue), this factor is of 
substantial relevance for the developing countries. 
(6) Transport costs. The transport costs, as a natural trade impediment, reduce the 
potential gains of trade integration between any countries. While many studies Linneman, 
(1966); Balassa, (1975) have proved that distance has negative effects in trade, Clark and 
Stanley, (1999) have asserted that distance affects negatively in particular intra-industry 
trade.  
This point is especially relevant to the conditions of less developed countries 
participating into trade agreements for at least two reasons. The first is connected with the 
findings of Linder, (1966), as mentioned above, that countries with similar per capita 
incomes rely more on intra-industry trade. The second is that transport infrastructure and 
facilities in general in the less developed countries do not correspond with conditions of 
the developed countries, as they have significantly poor or absent infrastructure. Perhaps, 
even existing facilities were historically determined to promote the transport of export of 
primary products from the less developed to more developed countries. 
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Consequently, according to Balassa, (1965) transport costs between two 
neighboring less developed countries may actually be higher than those between a less 
developed country and a remote developed country. This will turn to a more important 
issue when dealing with the economic integration between less developed countries. 
Therefore, Abdel Jaber, (1971) properly has asserted that regarding to the preparation of 
integration agreements among less developed countries one should pay special attention to 
the challenge of existing transport facilities and infrastructure. 
(7) Political factors. Not only the reviewed economic factors, but also a number of 
political factors determine the desirability and the success of an economic integration 
agreement; these factors are of general importance but with a special relevance in the case 
of developing countries (Allen, 1963; Inotai, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; World 
Bank, 2000).  Between other political determinants, we can mention the following:  
 The increased bargaining power of the members when they bargain together in 
international negotiations is an incentive to integration (Inotai, 1991; De Melo and 
Panagariya, 1993; Worl Bank, 2000).  
 Politicians can decide enter into trade agreements to gain the support of certain 
interest groups (lobbies). At this regard, producers are a group having more 
political weight (or power) than consumers. Then, in general, a PTA will be 
favored politically than free non-preferential trade. Moreover, since producers will 
have a higher chance of benefits, a PTA being trade- diverting will be favored 
politically than a PTA being trade-creating (Inotai, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 
1994; World Bank, 2000). 
 Some integration agreements are promoted by a member country, which is 
necessary for the successful of the integration project (Rueda-Junquera, 2006), but 
with the ultimate goal of strengthening its leadership position in the region and to 
avoid the influence of third-country on member countries. 
 Some regional integration agreements are created to encourage intra-regional 
security, behaving more as security organizations rather than economic 
organizations (Worl Bank, 2000; Shams, 2003).  
 An economic integration agreement between neighbor countries can reduce the 
illegal border migration and its associated problems. 
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 Strategic reaction. Countries tend to form Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) 
in response to other countries forming PTAs (De Melo and Panagariya, 1993). 
2.5. Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on economic 
integration, with special emphasis on the effects of integration agreements for developing 
countries. We began by defining the concept and forms of economic integration, that is, 
what economic integration means and how the integration process takes place. Then, we 
focused on the reasons why countries enter into an integration agreement, that is, the 
potential effects of economic integration on welfare. Two main approaches explain the 
gains from integration: the "Traditional Economic Integration Theory” and the “New 
Economic Integration Theory”. 
The Traditional Theory or “Old Regionalism”, based on the analysis of Viner 
(1950), explains the so called “static effects” in terms of trade creation and trade 
diversion. After several developments of the Vinerian approach in the 50’s and 60’s 
(Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 1957, 1961; Linder, 1961), studies by Balassa (1962), Hansson 
(1962) and Cooper and Massell (1965) introduced a different approach, outlining the 
potential welfare effects of economic integration on “dynamic effects”. These effects, 
which contribute to create a more favorable environment for economic activity, which 
have an impact on the members’ growth in the long run, are, among others: economies of 
scale, technological progress, productivity growth, the impact on market structure and 
competition, reduced risk and uncertainty, increasing investment and foreign direct 
investment, lower costs of capital and incentives to innovation.   
In the case of developing countries, the rationale behind economic integration 
cannot be defined in terms of static effects, but also the dynamic effects analysis has to be 
carried out carefully. In the light of the integration literature, we have seen that the 
orthodox theory of Viner-Meade -Lipsey with their traditional restrictive approach is not 
appropriate to the case of developing countries (Meier, 1960; Balassa, 1965; Abdel Jaber, 
1971; Mackay, 1984). The static effects are not usually a feature of successful integration 
in developing countries, as it may not always correspond with its economic development 
objectives. The assumptions of the basic theory do not conform to the economic 
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preconditions and existing structure found in these countries and the requirements for 
successful integration, as suggested by Viner (1950), are not usually fulfilled by 
developing countries (Mackay, 1984).  
So, in the context of the New Regionalisms, special accent should be put on 
potential dynamic effects in analyzing the effects of economic integration of developing 
countries and the motivation of these countries to participate in integration processes 
(Mikesell, 1965; Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Rueda-Junquera, 2006).  The review 
of the literature on the potential economic integration effects (the welfare impact) in the 
case of developing countries, as well as the determinants that influence the motivation to 
participate in integration processes for these countries show that in both cases the 
traditional theory presents limitations and the traditional approach is not sufficient or is not 
adequate. Welfare effects of economic integration between less developed countries should 
also encompass the positive effects of employment, productivity and income effects, 
production specialization, competitiveness, etc. (Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper and 
Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al,1969; Robson, 1980;  Mackay, 1984;  De Melo, 2011; 
Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014). In more general terms, economic integration in the case of 
developing countries should be treated as an economic development policy, not as a tariff 
issue. Moreover, in addition to economic factors, there are a number of political 
determinants explaining the gains from integration and the desirability to enter into 
integration processes which are especially important in the case of developing countries.  
 Further, due to the principal motivations of the integration groups in the less 
developed countries, the reviewed literature revealed that economic integration in these 
countries should be behind the creation of other common projects such as poverty 
alleviation, improving standard and quality of life through promoting healthcare and 
education, productive employment, information, services and coordination of foreign 
policy. 
Globalization and regional integration processes are essential characteristics of 
today’s world economy, which have been significantly developed after the 1950s. 
Accordingly, on the threshold of the XXI century a process known as “new regionalism” 
has emerged. Since the second half of the XX century, in a context of rapid economic 
growth, an intensive development of international trade in goods and services took place; 
the result was a number of commercial agreements between countries. 
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Following the Second World War, a few number of integration agreements were 
enforced, mainly in the developed regions of the world, but in recent years regional 
integration reached nearly all countries in all continents. Nowadays, most countries in the 




Such generalization of the world experience shows that the dynamics and scale of 
foreign economic relations of national economies gravitate around neighboring countries. 
Such an orientation of the integration process is called regionalization. Then, it seems that 
geographical proximity adds weighty arguments in favor of regional trade and economic 
integration. However, the degree and forms of the union can vary greatly depending on the 
level of development of countries, their geographical location, historical traditions and 
complementarities of production structures. One of the important aspects of the present 
wave of economic integration is its shifting paradigm. The underlying motives for 
economic integration in the 1950s and 1960s were very different from those today. Current 
initiatives involving developing countries are part of a strategy to liberalize and open their 
economies to implement export and foreign investment-led policies rather than to promote 
import substitution (Bhalla and Bhalla, 1997).   
Given current developments of economic integration agreements, it has been more 
and more important to understand not only the rationale behind these arrangements but 
also their effects, particularly the impact on member states. The relevance of the economic 
integration has become a controversial topic for academics as well as for politicians. By 
reviewing the literature on economic integration, the aim of the chapter is to provide 
insights on what economic integration means, how the economic integration process takes 
place and, what it is more important, why countries engage in integration agreements, that 
is, the potential welfare effects of economic integration; in particular, in the case of 
developing countries.   
In very broad terms, we can consider that economic integration emerges from 
eliminating barriers between groups of countries. During this process, countries remove a 
number of elements (or barriers) which made them differentiated and permitted them to 
protect their respective production systems. In doing that, these countries give each other 
                                                          
23 
In June 2014, the WTO declared 585 RTA notifications, of which 379 were in force; 412 were made 
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994; 39 were pure Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs); and 134 
under Article V of the GATT, (WTO, 2014). 
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special benefits which are not extended to third countries. Depending on these barriers 
which would be deleted, economic integration can take different forms or degrees; usually, 
following Balassa, (1961), five degrees are considered. Furthermore, together with that 
negative way to integration (by removing barriers), it is also necessary a positive way to 
the integration process in terms of common institutions and policies, both of them being 
complementary, (Tinbergen, 1954). 
Since the first step to economic integration and the most common forms of 
integration are the formation of a Free Trade Area or a Custom Union by reducing or 
removing barriers to trade flows, the expected gains of integration are firstly the gains from 
trade. However, economic integration does not take place at global level (multilateral 
liberalization of trade in the WTO context) but just including some countries (the members 
of the preferential agreement) in a discriminatory preferential process. So, the potential 
effects of economic integration cannot be fully explained by the international trade theory. 
The first work analyzing economic integration effects was (Viner, 1950), 
concluding that integration has two possible effects on trade flows, with different effects 
on welfare: trade creation (trade shifts from a high-cost supplier member state to a low-
cost supplier member state within the union; having a positive welfare effects) and trade 
diversion (imports are shifted from a low-cost supplier of a third country to a high-cost 
supplier member country into the union; implying negative welfare effects) (Balassa, 
1975). 
Viner’s static analysis of the effects of a Custom Union constitutes the Traditional 
Economic Integration Theory (or Old Regionalism). His conclusion that the net effect of 
customs union formation on welfare is ambiguous caused a large number of further 
developments during 50’s and 60’s by, among others, (Kreps, 1950; Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 
1957; Balassa, 1961-1975; Johnson, 1965; Cooper and Massell, 1965).  
As early as in the 60's, the conclusion was that the static analysis in terms of trade creation 
and trade diversion is insufficient to capture welfare effects of economic integration and 
the Dynamic Effects analysis is introduced by the so called “New Economic Integration 
Theory” in the context of the “New Regionalism Approach” (Balassa, 1961; Hansson, 
1962; Cooper and Massell, 1965a).   
These dynamic effects influence the accumulation rate, transforming the productive 
structure to a more competitive and specialized one, and then raising the country’s rate of 
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economic growth over the medium term (Balassa, 1961, 1975; Abdel Jaber (1971); 
Baldwin, (1993); Schiff and Winters, 1998; Rueda-Junquera, 2006). The main dynamic 
effects are derived from economies of scale, technological progress and productivity 
growth, competition, reduced risk and uncertainty, a more favorable environment for 
economic activity, investment (and  foreign direct investment) and innovation (Badinger, 
2001).  
When members of the integrated area are developing countries, although the new 
theory of economic integration is more appropriate than the traditional theory, the 
consideration of dynamic effects, as taken by the analysis of the integration of developed 
countries, do not explain adequately the welfare effects for developing countries.  
The orthodox theory of Viner-Meade-Lipsey, centered on the static effects of 
resource allocation, is not appropriate to the case of developing countries (Meier, 1960; 
Balassa, 1965; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Mackay, 1984). So, the emphasis should be put on 
dynamic effects (Mikesell, 1965; Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Rueda-Junquera, 
2006). The literature of economic integration theory was focused on integration of almost 
exclusively industrialized countries (Balassa, 1965). The assumptions of the basic theory 
do not conform to the economic preconditions and existing structure found in the 
developing countries, and the requirements for successful integration, as suggested by 
Traditional and New theories, are not usually fulfilled by developing countries (Mackay, 
1984). The environment and difficulties of developed countries do not apply to economic 
development, rather than to a tariff issue and production/consumption shifts. 
So, soon after Viner’s contribution, in the framework of the new economic 
integration theory, a number of substantial researches have been done on the effects of 
economic integration agreements to less developed countries like, among others, (Allen, 
1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper and Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al,1969; Robson, 1980;  
Mackay, 1984; Marinov, 2014; De Melo, 2011; Hosny, 2013). These works are focused on 
the limitations of the traditional theory and the reasons why traditional approach is not 
sufficient or is not adequate in explaining potential economic integration effects (the 
welfare impact) in the case of developing countries, as well as the determinants that 
influence the motivation to participate in integration processes for these countries (Hosny, 
2013 and Marinov, 2014).   
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In addition to production and consumption effects, welfare effects of economic 
integration between less developed countries should also encompass the positive effects of 
employment, productivity and income effects, production specialization, competitiveness, 
etc. (Abdel Jaber, 1971; Mikesell, 1965). Regarding the determinants that influence the 
motivation to participate in integration processes, in the case of developing countries, these 
factors also go beyond the static and dynamic effects determining net welfare effect.  
Moreover, in general terms but especially in developing countries, not only economic 
factors but also a number of political factors determine the desirability and the success of 
an economic integration agreement (Allen, 1963; Inotai, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 
1994; World Bank, 2000). 
After this introduction, the chapter is divided into two parts and is organized as 
follows.  In the first part, in section 1 we discuss the concept of economic integration and 
in section 2 we analyze the different forms or degrees that an integration process can take. 
In the second part of the chapter, devoted to the analysis of the potential effects of 
economic integration, section 1 discusses the Traditional Economic Integration Theories; 
section 2 discusses the New Economic Integration Theories and section 3 focuses on the 
effects of the integration process in the particular case of the developing countries. Finally, 
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Chapter 2 
The Integration Process of Tajikistan 
1.1. Introduction 
Regional integration initiatives in Tajikistan do not have a long history, although it 
seems quite complex. The integration of Tajikistan in the global economy began with the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991, continuing with 
agreements with some of the Post-Soviet Republics, like the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO), and with countries outside of the post-Soviet space like China (in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO), Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (Economic 
Cooperation Organization, ECO), as well as with the global market organizations and  
institutions like the UN, IMF or WTO. Since 2000, Tajikistan also takes part of the 
Eurasian economic Community (EurAsEC), the most successful integration agreement in 
the region. 
As before independence Tajikistan was a member of the Former Soviet Union, in a 
very wide sense we can consider that its integration process with other ex-Soviet republics 
has a certain re-integrating character. Briefly, the Soviet empire had burst like a soap 
bubble, leaving only memories and chaos. While some countries have re-established 
themselves more easily, others like Tajikistan have re-established themselves after many 
years enduring difficulties. So, the history of Tajikistan has been printed by the decay of 
the USSR and the inevitable economic collapse in early 1991. Since the early years of the 
separation from the Soviet Union, Tajikistan has understood that the logic of the 
sustainable economic development was behind the regional integration efforts. Thus, in an 
attempt to achieve successful integration, the Tajik government chose an open policy and it 
starts being involved in several integration projects (MEDT, 2005). However, the 
relationship between country’s objective and the options or integration direction was 
complex, as apparently Tajikistan wanted to be everywhere.  
In trying to understand the rationality of the integration decisions of Tajikistan in 
terms of the potential integration effects, the first step is to know the integration process 
followed by the country.  So, the main objective of this chapter is to provide a general 
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description and an analysis of the integration ways followed after independence and the 
most relevant integration agreements signed by Tajikistan. 
We can consider three different options followed by Tajikistan in its integration 
strategy. The first option is specifically devoted to the post-Soviet initiative, whose engine 
is Russia. This also in its turn combined two strategies: agreements including the whole 
post-Soviet space (like the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS, and the Eurasian 
Economic Community, EurAsEC) and the Central Asian regional agreements (like the 
Central Asian Economic Community, CAEC and the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization, CACO). In the framework of the first option, that is within the ex-Soviet 
orbit, immediately after the collapse of USSR in 1991, the heads of state of Russia, 
Belarus, and Ukraine have signed the Agreement of Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and almost all the allies join this integration project. However, some of them (three 
Baltic States) join the European Union. The Minsk agreement (CIS) was the starting point 
of the regional integration actions in the post-Soviet Union area. Unfortunately, this 
prominent integration project turned ineffective and most of its goals have remained on 
paper (Freinkman et al., 2004; Pomfret, 2004; TAI and Lee, 2009; Libman, 2012; 
Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013; Cooper, 2013; Embayev, 2014).  
The CIS organization has been an “fundamental aspect” for any other integration 
agreements of the former Soviet Union (Putin, 2011; Laruelle, and Peyrouse, 2013). 
Thereafter, the attempts to develop the post-Soviet integration process involves a number 
of countries not all of them. The Central Asian regional integration, as one of the small 
format, has derived also from this CIS alliance. The literature on Central Asia regional 
integration shows that the main initiator for establishing integration project in this region 
was the President of Kazakhstan (see: Pomfret, 2004; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013; 
Kassenova, 2013).   
Along with other Central Asian countries, the interest of Tajikistan in integration 
projects in this region remains uncertain. Because, in spite of several challenges such as the 
nationhood building, transition period and civil-war conflict, Tajikistan has shown especial 
interest in participation, but the result was a disagreement between most of the region 
countries (Ushakova, 2003; Kembayev, 2009; Kuzmina, 2012; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 
2013). The lack of success in Central Asia integration was accompanied by some main 
reasons: first, these Republics have greatly feared the loss of sovereignty once more 
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(Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013; Cooper, 2013). Second, Central Asia countries never had a 
common interest as well as the experience for integration (Kuzmina, 2012) or maybe these 
countries have become accustomed to Russia being always a “Big Brother” for them 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013).   
After a decade of ineffective economic integration within CIS, the Eurasian 
countries under the influence of Russia and in some extent Kazakhstan decided to reinforce 
their association at least among those CIS countries that were willing to create an effective 
integration through small format project as EurAsEC. This integration project was created 
with the idea of "multi-speed" integration, as they did not want to repeat the CIS situation 
that was marked by severe economic and political difficulties. Indeed, unlike previous 
initiatives, some of the EurAsEC members under the leadership of Russia moved to a 
higher level of integration like Custom Union and the Common Economic Space (CES). 
The three member states with a strong desire for the multispeed integration could not stop 
in the first or second stages of integration. Consequently, full operation of the “Economic 
Union” begun in January 2015. 
Although many works agree that today the Eurasian Economic Union (EurAsEC) 
led by Russia is the most successful and advanced union among all integration projects 
appeared in the post-Soviet area (Pomfret, 2004; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012; Kuzmina, 
2012; Libman and Vinokurov, 2010; Cooper, 2013; Kembayev, 2014; Galiakberov and 
Abdullin, 2014; Yesdauletova, 2014), several studies affirm that the EurAsEC “weighted 
voting principle” as Russia’s greatest weight  in any association in the post- Soviet space is 
a problem, that is, the most worrying in this integration project is the Russian  domination 
(Golovnin, 2008). Similarly, Cooper (2013) has claimed that a Russian leadership from a 
position of strength will have a negative impact on prospects for successful integration. As 
the dominant economy, there is a danger that any negative developments in Russia will 
have spillover effects in the smaller economies of the region. 
Tajikistan's integration process was also seen at the multilateral level. Bearing in 
mind the importance of the integration to the global market as an engine of growth, the 
integration to the world economy or international financial institutions have been the 
second option for the foreign policy of Tajikistan.  
Thus, within the Tajik open economy approach, accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) would be a natural institutional goal. However, after independence in 
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1991, Tajikistan together with other post-Soviet countries were suspicious regarding the 
international commitments of WTO, which restrict their home policy rules. Tajikistan was 
pleased of entering the United Nations (UN) as a signal of nationhood, to join the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and other regional development 
banks as potential sources of capital, but accession to WTO did not take place until 2013. 
The third integration option of Tajikistan was an agreement with outsiders of the 
post-Soviet Orbit, mainly China and the Southern neighbors. As the agent which changed 
dramatically the geopolitical and economic position in Central Asia, China has quickly 
become a key player in the regional scene with the prominent Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). Today the Central Asian region is acknowledged as the driving force 
ensuring the "peaceful rise of China" (Goldstein, 2005).  
Finally, since Islam is the most widespread religion in Tajikistan and given the 
geostrategic position of the country, Tajikistan is seeking to strengthen its status in the 
Islamic world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The country joined into a number of 
key institutions whose membership is based on the full or partial identification with Islam, 
like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO).  
In summary, Tajikistan has developed different integration options in parallel, 
being actively involved not only within the post-Soviet agreements or with a number of 
international organizations and financial institutions but also with other neighbors and 
outsider countries like China as well as with the Islamic World.   
After this introduction, the chapter is organized as follows. Before turning to the 
integration issue, section two focuses on the antecedents and the disintegration period. 
Section three provides a survey of economic integration agreements involving Tajikistan, 
considering the three different integration options followed by this country in three 
subsections: the first subsection focuses on the integration within the “Ex-Soviet orbit"; the 
second subsection focuses on the global market initiatives; and the third subsection 
presents the integration agreements between Tajikistan and outsider “Ex-Soviet” orbit 
countries. Finally, in section four, we present some conclusions. 
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1.2. Antecedents 
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (Tajik SSR), as it was the official name of 
Tajikistan in the period from 1929 to 1991 as part of the Soviet Union, was an agro-
industrial economy with no more developed industry and diversified agriculture which 
remain unchanged. In the structure of Tajik Soviet economy, the leading place was taken 
by agriculture (57%), followed by industry (31.5%) and services (11, 5%).  According to 
Amir and Berry (2012), Tajikistan had the lowest income among all the republics of the 
Soviet Union, as a very remote region landlocked and with a mostly mountainous 
landscape. Although some heavy industry was moved to the region during the Second 
World War, Moscow mainly dedicated the Tajik SSR to growing cotton. For this, people 
were relocated and a vast irrigation network was set up to increase harvest and output. In 
the 1980s the Tajik SSR was one of the highest-yielding of cotton in the world, which was 
characterized also by its top quality (long staple). Based on this marked comparative 
advantage within the USSR, Tajikistan became so specialized in cotton that it developed 
nothing else, food included.                       
 After the collapse of the Soviet empire, all Soviet Republics have faced many 
challenges with the shift from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, 
especially in the context of disconnection of ties among economic entities. Nevertheless, 
the consequences of the USSR's collapse have impacted on each member country in a 
varying degree. Some countries have re-established themselves more easily, while others 
like Tajikistan tried to re-establishing for many years with huge grave challenges such as 
alarming poverty, destruction and the terrible civil war. 
In this sense, the history of Tajikistan has been imprinted by the decay of the USSR 
and the inevitable economic collapse in early 1991.  Certainly, this dissolution had a 
number of serious negative impacts by falling output, the rapid rise of prices with a hyper-
inflation rate over 2000%, the sharply collapse of demand and supply chains between 
USSR countries that eventually led to the completely disconnection of economic entities. 
Most of the infrastructure that survived from the Soviet collapse was devastated during the 
civil war. While neighboring republics were on the way of establishing transition period, 
Tajikistan’s economy was experiencing drawbacks with the effects of disintegration from 
one side and a civil war from another side. 
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1.2.1. USSR divergence as a leading aspect to disintegration 
A high degree of convergence within integrated areas indicates the predominance 
of effective integration trends.  By contrast, divergence is interpreted as a tendency 
towards disintegration or ineffective integration. Therefore, this indicator gives essential 
importance to Tajikistan in the context of being in high divergence in compare to the 
EurAsEC members or the other post-Soviet countries.
24
 
Tajikistan has inherited this event from the Soviet era. Although in the Soviet 
period Tajikistan successfully bloomed, in terms of convergence, it was in dramatic 
divergence with the other USSR Republics. By analyzing convergence issues in the Soviet 
period, Didenko (2014) has found that spatial inequality diminished during the Soviet era 
but only modestly and not in all dimensions. However, by the 1980s the differences 
between these Republics have slowly increased considering a number of important 
parameters like (per capita GDP, physical capital, education index, etc.) which contributed 
to its disintegration.  The divergence trend that emerged in the 1980s was evidently 
reinforced after the USSR dissolution. In other words, the collapse of the USSR 
characterized drastically by inequality between its former republics after 1990s promoted 
the process of disintegration in both the economic and the political sphere. Only in 2000 
the disintegration process became stable, after the signing of numerous agreements within 
these countries (Didenko, 2014).
25
 
1.2.2.  From Disintegration to New Integration Projects 
The Soviet Union disintegration in 1991 led to the result that in Central Asia region 
five newly independent states have been formed, the smallest one is the Republic of 
Tajikistan. Soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former USSR republics 
realized that they needed each other’s assistance in the context of building their 
sovereignty, reform and economic development. Ever since, the former Soviet Republics 
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In this sense, Golovnin (2008) has claimed that one of the key obstacles to the integration of EurAsEC 
Community is the differences in their member economic strategies and national models of economic 
development. There are significant differences in social and economic indicators between these countries, 
in particular in income which is in Tajikistan 10 times lower than in Russia (Sherbakova, 2010). 
25 
This work also finds that the data for the post-Soviet period show that the divergence within the Eurasian 
Economic Community is much higher than among the CIS or post-Soviet countries. Hence, economically 
EurAsEC is a more heterogeneous association than the CIS or the USSR as a whole. 
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started signing integration agreements in order to build some union like the Soviet Union 
but in a “new style”.
26
 When the new independent states began searching for ways of 
interaction, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, they took (and continue taking) the 
"European Union model" as a reference point, as opposed to the Soviet model. Despite the 
many problems, this is the only successful integration model that is used as an example not 
only in Eurasia but in Latin America and other parts of the world (Valovaya, 2012). 
The disintegration process that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
the early of 1991 quickly gives place to various regional integration organizations with a 
military, political and economic nature. The first of them was the CIS (in 1991) and almost 
all the allies entered in this integration project. However, some of them (three Baltic 
States) join the European Union, which was the most important integration project in the 
time of the Soviet Union breakdown (Figure 2.1).
27
 
Figure 2.1: The regional architecture of the post-Soviet States after the USSR collapse 
 
  Source: own elaboration 
                                                          
26 
Dragneva and Wolczuk (2013) has claimed that between all ineffective post-Soviet integration projects only 
the Eurasian integration project can be referred to  the ‘new style’ project – one that appears to rely on a 
modern, rule-based legal and institutional framework in delivering economic benefits. 
27 
“On December 8, 1991, a decision to dissolve the Soviet Union was taken in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. And on 
the next day in Maastricht, leaders of the European community decided to create the European Union (EU). 
The coincidence in the timing of these two events allows me to reword the famous proclamation of the French 
royal ritual: The Union is dead, long live the Union!“ (Valovaya, 2012). 
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Moreover, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was signed on May 
15, 1992 for a period of five year, with the possibility of further prolongation. The 
Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and 
Tajikistan became parties of the CSTO. Later, Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the group 
also, but when Moldova, Ukraine and Turkmenistan refused to enter, they also left the 
Treaty.
28
 However, the attempt to collect all CIS countries into one collective security 
block failed since Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova seeking a more 
European orientation established another organization named by GUUAM in October 
1997. 
1.3. Integration agreements involving Tajikistan  
As was seen in chapter one, economic development is behind the regional 
integration efforts. For less developed countries like Tajikistan, economic integration is 
seen as the main engine of development not just, because tariff issues but also because 
these projects ensure poverty alleviation, education and health challenges, infrastructure 
development as well as the promotion of peace and security within and between the 
regions. 
In today's world everything is interconnected and the current crisis put that into 
surface, increasing the interest in the dynamics of integration. Emerged in one part of the 
globe, it had a negative impact on both hemispheres. In order to avoid such negative 
consequences the best solution for Tajikistan seemed to strengthen cooperation in the 
framework of the integration agreements. Thus, the Tajik government, in an attempt to 
achieve successful economic integration, implemented an open policy (MEDT, 2005) and 
began to be involved in several integration projects. However, the relationship between 
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According to the Article 3 of the Charter, objectives of the Collective Security Treaty Organization are to 
strengthen peace, international and regional security and stability, the protection of independence, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Member States. The essence of the Treaty, its principals and 
forms of cooperation, as well as declared positions predetermined a real possibility for the Treaty to 
become an integral part of common and comprehensive system of collective security for Europe and Asia. 
Moreover, there is a serious effort to develop relationships with other international organizations acting in 
the sphere of security, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council, the OSCE, 
the EurAsEC, the SCO, the CIS and the IMO (See: http://www.odkb-csto.org/structure/). 
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country objectives and the options or integration ways was complex, since Tajikistan 
wanted to develop different integration strategies at the same time (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2:  Integration options followed by Tajikistan 
 
Source: own elaboration  
From the beginning, the integration initiatives in Tajikistan have a different aspect. 
The first option followed by Tajikistan is specifically devoted to the post-Soviet initiatives, 
whose engine is Russia. This also in its turn combined two strategies: one including the 
whole post-Soviet space and other focuses on the Central Asian countries. 
Tajikistan followed other two ways in its integration strategy: one option consists in 
integration projects with the Southern neighbors as well as the countries outside the post-
Soviet space, whose main agent is on the one hand the Islamic world and on the other hand 
it is China. The other considered option involves the agreements with international 
organizations as well as economic and financial institutions like United Nations, IMF or 
EU. As a result, organizations and agreements differ in their status and areas of activity. 
Hence, in pursuing economic integration projects, Tajikistan together with other Central 
Asian countries has faced to the choice between four options (Pomfret, 2004; Tai and Lee, 
2009;  Kassenova, 2013). 
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 1.3.1. Agreements within the “Ex-Soviet Orbit” 
The agreements within the post- Soviet space were the first option for integration 
projects not only for Tajikistan but almost for all Former Soviet Republics.  This process is 
usually referred to as "re-integration" and is clearly led by Russia, perhaps because “the 
Russian Federation has never abandoned her aims about the reintegration of post-Soviet 
states” (Yesevi, 2014, p.1987).  
1.3.2. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
Immediately after the collapse of USSR in the early of 1990, at the first onset, the 
heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine signed the Agreement of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
29
. The CIS was formed based on the “Bialowieza Agreement” 
(December 8, 1991) and two weeks later the Alma-Ata Declaration (December 21, 1991) 
with the aiming to maintain integrating relations in the field of economic, political and 
security between most of the former Soviet Republics
30
.  
All of the current EurAsEC members signed the Alma-Ata Declaration and joined 
the Commonwealth in an early step.  From Central Asia, only Turkmenistan had never 
ratified the charter CIS but considered itself a member of the Commonwealth until 2005. 
After which UN has perceived its status as the "permanent neutrality,” it granted observer 
status as an "associate member.”   




The three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Georgia are not members of the CIS 
agreement. 
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Map 2.1: The map of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1991 
 
Source: Central Asia Research Group (http://www.asiacentral.es/grupoub/mapas.php) 
In short, the Minsk Agreement (CIS) came to the conclusion that “the USSR has 
ceased to exist as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality” and recognized 
the sovereignty, equality, and territorial integrity of each Republic.
 31
  The Minsk 
agreement (CIS) was as the starting point of the regional integration actions in the post-
Soviet Union area, especially in the Eurasian scope.   
Several studies Freinkman et al., (2004); Tai and Lee, (2009); Pomfret, (2004); 
Dragneva and Wolczuk, (2013); Cooper, (2013(; Kembayev, (2014) widely believe that the 
CIS soon would not be taken seriously neither by the majority of its members nor by other 
countries, since the CIS never had a clear purpose and those who have they had never 
reached it. Tai and Lee, (2009) argued that in reality the CIS agreements incorporated little 
in the way of effective sanctions and enforcement power. These agreements expressed 
intentions, but did little to create working mechanisms. What is more, Pomfret, (2004) has 
claimed that the CIS agreements revealed zero practical impact. Dragneva and Wolczuk, 
(2013) have referred to this project as weak and ineffective institutional framework that is 
characterized by limited economic results.  
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Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8 1991, 31 I.L.M. 142(1992). 
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In 1993 the CIS countries signed the Agreement on the Economic Union (EU), 
providing for the gradual establishment of a free trade area, a union, a common market and 
a monetary union. All countries of the Commonwealth became full members while 
Ukraine
32
 has obtained the status of associate member. However, this project also turned 
up unviable by the fact that even the decision to create a free trade zone has not been 
ratified by half of the members, including Russia, (Kembayev, 2014). Furthermore, in 
December 1994, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the treaty of a customs union 
signed in 1996 by Kyrgyzstan and in 1999 by Tajikistan making it a Union of Five. In the 
first place, this refers to a hastily developed integration project, whose principal function 
was ensuring a civilized character of the post-Soviet "divorce". In this sense, one can agree 
with the expression of the Russian President V.V. Putin (2007), when he said: "The CIS 
really help us in the process of disintegration of the USSR, which took place in a more 
civilized, without any great losses in economic and humanitarian spheres. Moreover, it 
positively managed regional conflicts among the newly independent young republics. 
However, the CIS never had the most important task in the economic integration. While 
EU worked together to combine, the CIS was created for a "civilized divorce". All the rest 
is political husk and empty chatter." 
                                                          
32 
It should be noted that Ukraine, and other countries whose integration policies target Europe, will not be 
keen to build a customs union with predominant Russian influence (Golovnin, 2008). 
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Figure 2.3: The CIS as a main key framework for the development of further agreements 
 
Source: own elaboration  
However, from another side, it should be remembered that the CIS has been an 
organization with a generic or fundamental aspect for any other integration agreements as 
well as the condition for the emergence of new configurations of the interaction of the 
former Soviet Union. At this regard, Putin (2011) points out that “namely, the CIS 
experience has enabled us to launch a multi-level and multi-speed integration in the post- 
Soviet space, create such required formats as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, Customs 
Union and finally the Common Economic Space”. 
By 1995 it was clear that the creation of a single “geopolitical space” encompassing 
the entire CIS was not possible in the near future due to fundamental disagreements 
between their Member States on the purpose of their organization (Kembayev, 2014). This 
leads to divide this great alliance into different smaller integration groups (Figure 2.3). In 
COMMONWEALTH INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES 





FREE TRADE ZONE (2000): Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan 
EURASIAN CUSTOM UNION (2010): Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION (2015): 
COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE (2012):  
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some sense, these initiatives tended to replicate the CIS model in a smaller format, 
something the development of the EurAsEC clearly illustrated it (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 
2012).  
1.3.3. From Central Asia integration to Eurasian integration  
Along with other Central Asian countries, the interest of Tajikistan in integration 
projects in this region remains uncertain. In spite of several challenges like the nationhood 
building, transition period and civil war conflict, Tajikistan has shown especial interest in 
participation, but results were unsuccessful and there was not agreement between most of 
the region countries.  Participating into several integration projects Tajikistan pursues 
different strategies depending on the conditions of the playing field and acting subjects 
(Laruelle and  Peyrouse, 2013). 
Firstly, it should be noted that agreements and organizations are combining in some 
way only five Central Asian republics, and that is not much. The literature of integration of 
Central Asia region Pomfret, (2004); Laruelle and Peyrouse, (2013); Kassenova, (2013) 
has shown that the main driving leader in establishing integration projects in this region is 
the President of Kazakhstan.   
The development dynamics of integration processes of Tajikistan within Central 
Asia begins with the Central Asian Economic Community, (CAEC). This was the first 
Cooperation Organization which was established in 1994 when Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on creating a Common economic space (CES). 
Tajikistan has joined it after overcoming the civil-war in 1998. In general, the results of the 
CAEC were more modest than expected due to the fact that the relations between the 
former Soviet republics have become less strong and each republic had no special desire to 
develop joint strategies with others (Kembayev, 2006; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). In 
this sense, Pomfret (2004) referred to the CAEC as a forum for resolving disputes within 
Central Asia and had little in the way of practical achievements. 
In 2002, with the changes in the regional geopolitical situation
33
, four Member 
States have tried to give a new impulse to organization, turning its structure into the 
Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). The main objective of transforming the 
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Especially after the event that related with blast of bombs in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan and 
changing situation in relation to Afghanistan and USA. 
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CAEC organization into the CACO was expanding cooperation from the purely economic 
organization to the cultural, humanitarian and political one as well as the creation of an 
integrating economic space and the coordination of foreign policy, particularly in the area 
of security in relation to Afghanistan  (Kembayev, 2006; Kuzmina, 2012; Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, 2013). Unfortunately, in this case success was not attainable (Ushakova, 2003). 
Regarding to the non-fulfillment of CACO, Kembayev (2009) argued that this organization 
did nothing even in comparison to the CAEC, since it did not strive to eliminate even 
partially trade tariffs and barriers. Kuzmina (2012), supporting above studies, stressed that 
CACO performance was not lavish either. None of the three consortia (transportation 
consortium, food consortium and water consortium) has ever emerged in spite of efforts 
made by specialists of the World Bank, Asian and Islamic Development Banks in their 
creation.  
Finally, with the entry of Russia in the EurAsEC in October 2004 and following to 
this the joining of Uzbekistan in November 2005, although left it in early 2008, the CACO 
automatically has merged with the EurAsEC (Kembayev, 2006; Kuzmina, 2012). In fact, 
in the same year at the meeting of leaders of CACO in Petersburg the members of the 




Since the composition of both was almost the same, the unification of the CACO 
and EurAsEC was a logical step by encouraging the process of integration on the post-
Soviet territory (Kembayev, 2006). The dissolution of the CACO and the EurAsEC 
emergence has made the Eurasian Economic Community the only feasible integration 
project not only in Central Asia but also in the entire post-Soviet area.  
Thus, here the question raised is why after the signing of several agreements the 
Central Asian countries failed to create even one effective economic organization.  
Actually, from one side the Central Asian republics very early after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union understood that they needed each other’s reinforcements. Due to the fact that 
this landlocked region was experiencing significant problems in their development by 
remoteness from major world markets and heavy transport costs. Therefore, their solution 
for solving such problems requires regional integration. However, from another side, these 
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However, countries, which were observers of the CACO (Georgia and Turkey), are not observers of 
EurAsEC. 
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Republics have greatly feared the loss of sovereignty once more, because they confused the 
Soviet integration with a new regionalism in terms of the global markets (as, the European 
Union) with different economic and political principles. 
In addition, Central Asian countries never had a common interest and the 
experience for the formation of integration (Kuzmina, 2012). In other words, maybe these 
countries have become accustomed that Russia being always a “Big Brother” for them. A 
good example of this situation is what happened after Russia joined CACO turning into 
EurAsEC; as a result, none of the earlier Central Asian organizations worked (Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, 2013).   
1.3.4. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) Agreement 
After an unsuccessful decade of economic integration within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS, 1991), the Eurasian countries under the Russia  and in some 
extent Kazakhstan
35
 initiative decided to reinforce their association at least among those 
CIS countries that were willing to create an effective integration through small format 
project like the Eurasian Economic Community (hereafter EurAsEC). This integration 
project was created with the idea of a "multi-speed" integration, as they did not want to 
repeat the CIS situation that faced many economic and political difficulties. Certainly, the 
agreement of Eurasian Economic Community is considered as one of the most important 
options for Tajikistan in the integration strategy within the post-Soviet area. 
The Treaty on the Establishment of EurAsEC (which is currently transforming into 
the EEU, Eurasian Economic Union) was signed in Astana on 10 October, 2000 and came 
into force on 30 May, 2001, after being ratified by all the EurAsEC member states. Five 
states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan – have been members of 
EurAsEC since its formation. In 2006, Uzbekistan joined to the organization, ending 
participation in October 2008. Three countries have observer status: Ukraine, Moldova 
                                                          
35 
The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev voiced the idea of the Eurasian Union of States for 
the first time at Lomonosov Moscow State University, during his first official visit to Russia on March 
29, 1994. In June 1994, a detailed integration project was submitted to the Heads of the States and then 
published in the press. For the first time, the integration alliance was called “the Eurasian Union” in an 
official document (Eurasian Economic Union, 2015).  http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about-history  
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since May 2002 and Armenia from January 2003. The Interstate Aviation Committee 
(IAC) and the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB)
36
 have also this status (EurAsEC, 2013). 
 
The EurAsEC as an economic integration project is the successor, firstly, of the 
Treaty establishing the "Customs Union" of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1995, later 
joined by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and secondly of the Treaty on the "Single Economic 
Space" from 1999. Both documents were in the frame of CIS but in fact have remained on 
paper (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). Only after 2000 a momentum built up for integration 
had real substance (Cooper, 2013).  
Map 2.2: The map of Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), 2000 
 
Source: Central Asia Research Group (http://www.asiacentral.es/grupoub/mapas.php) 
Many works underline that this project was inspired by the model of the European 
Union or an Eastern equivalent of the European Union
37
 (Valovaya, 2012; Laruelle and 
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The EDB is an international financial institution aimed to promote economic growth and integration 
processes in Eurasian space. It was established on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, signed in January 2006. Between 2009 and 2011, 
Armenia, Tajikistan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan have joined it. The main directions of the financial activities 
of the bank are related to electro-energy, transport infrastructure, industry and high-tech industries. Since 
2010, the EDB Bank manages EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund. One of the main objectives of the bank is to 
provide information and analytical support for the integration process. (See: 
http://www.adb.org/about/main). 
37 
Examining the institutions and the progression of stages of the envisioned EEU, one can easily notice a 
striking similarity with the process of European integration, which led to the creation of today’s European 
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Peyrouse, 2013; Cooper, 2013). As many other integration groups, EurAsEC also has its 
basic objectives or tasks which include: implementation of the free trade regime; the 
formation of a common customs tariff and a common system of non-tariff regulation 
measures; the creation of a common financial market; and the coordination of principles 
and conditions for the common currency.  
It ensures also economic security at the external borders of the Community and 
develops a coordinated position of the member States in their relations with the WTO and 
other international economic organizations along with establishing a common transport 
system as well as the formation of a common energy market.  
The project was created to effectively advance the process of forming the "Customs 
Union" and "Common Economic Space" by member states, as well as, to implement other 
goals and objectives connected with the enhancement of integration in the economic and 
humanitarian spheres. The idea was that the EurAsEC should also ensure the free 
movement of citizens of member states, and coordinate social policy in order to guarantee 
a common labor market. It should also harmonize national systems of education, 
developing science, culture and a common approach to health. Moreover, the final goal of 
the EurAsEC is the creation of a  customs union and an economic union between the 
member States. 
This is an accurately structured system with a firmly established mechanism for 
adopting and implementing decisions (EurAsEC, 2013). Unlike previous initiatives, some 
of the EurAsEC members moved to a new phase of integration, of course under the 
leadership of Russia. The first phase of this new project, the Eurasian Customs Union 
(CU), with the participation of the three countries -Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia- began 
in July 2010. These countries have accepted common rules and procedures regulating the 
mutual trade, and set up a common customs union
38
. In July 2011, they abolished customs 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Union. However, the legal nature of both integration groupings is completely different: while the EU is in 
principle an association of (mostly) parliamentary states with a significant degree of decentralization, the 
Eurasian alliance is a union of highly centralized presidential republics. Therefore, the present time 
(especially in light of the recent proliferation of integration processes in Eurasia) is characterized by the 
competition of two opposite models of regional integration (Kembayev, 2014). 
38 
The ECU Commission and Secretariat undertook a considerable volume of work to establish common 
rules of the game on many issues relating to external trade. There has been considerable progress in 
moving towards single systems of trade regulation, sanitary, veterinary and phytosanitary controls, 
technical regulation and protective measures. By the beginning of 2012 it could be considered a 
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controls at their common borders. After the formation of the “Customs Union” the rating 
of this project is increased. Golovnin, 2008 has properly claimed that without a customs 
union EurAsEC will become indistinguishable from other more amorphous formations (as 
for example, the CIS). 
The second stage led by the principle of multispeed integration started in January 
2012, with the creation of the Common Economic Space (CES).
39
 Its mission is to 
develop the well-functioning of the common market of goods, services, capital and labor; 
to coordinate fiscal, monetary, foreign exchange, trade, customs and tariff policy; 
development of common transport, energy and information systems.  Since 2009, Russia 
has taken the ruble in the trade with Kazakhstan and Belarus, and recently renewed talk of 
a possible creation of a monetary union. The three member states were interested that the 
ECU project take place within a wider framework for advanced economic integration – a 
single economic space, followed by an economic union. Consequently, the full “Economic 
Union” has begun in January 2015. 
Basically, this organization is able of solving many issues of economic integration 
in terms of today's requirements.  Many studies have stressed that today the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EurAsEC) is the most successful and advanced union among all 
integration projects which appeared in the post-Soviet area (Pomfret, 2004; Dragneva and 
Wolczuk, 2012; Kuzmina, 2012; Libman and Vinokurov, 2010; Kembayev, 2014; 
Galiakberov and Abdullin, 2014; Yesdauletova, 2014).  
In this sense, the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin said: “It is not an 
overstatement to say that EurAsEC is the most successful integration union of the CIS 
space. The Community has carried out all the tasks at hand: the Customs Union has begun 
its work, the Common Economic Space of the three countries has been launched, their 
unified regulatory standing body – the Eurasian Economic Commission – has been 
created”, (EurAsEC today, 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
functioning customs union, although much work remained to complete the process and ensure its fully 
effective operation (Cooper, 2013). 
39 
A powerful integration breakthrough was made in 2010. In just one year the heads of states drew up and 
signed a package of basic agreements, which enabled the establishment of the Common Economic Space 
(CES). It was ratified in 2011, and on 1 January 2012 the practical phase of the forming of CES was 
launched. There are 9 interstate targeted programs and 11 concepts being developed and implemented in 
EurAsEC. The following institutions are actively working in the Community: the Anti-Crisis Fund, the 
EurAsEC Centre for High Technologies and the Eurasian Business Council (EurAsEC today, 2013). 
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Similarly, Dragneva and Wolczuk (2012) have mentioned that until recently 
regional integration in the post-Soviet space was largely declarative. But the Eurasian 
Customs Union (ECU), the latest initiative,
40
 appears more viable thanks to its better 
institutional framework, it has proven commitment to implementation and introduction of a 
system of rules harmonized with international norms and the WTO regime. Kuzmina 
(2012) also has claimed that EurAsEC countries have the best integration pace, since the 
CU emerged as a milestone that is even able of changing negative trends in development of 
post-Soviet states economic cooperation. Libman and Vinokurov (2010) referred to the 
customs union of the EurAsEC as “the only truly functioning integration institution in the 
Former Soviet Union”.  
Moreover, Galiakberov and Abdullin (2014) showed that integration of post-Soviet 
countries based on EurAsEC is more successful than integration based on the CIS model 
despite the lack of supranational power of the institutions of EurAsEC. In the same way, 
Yesdauletova and Yesdauletova (2014) have stressed that The Eurasian Economic 
Community was the real integrative force in the post-Soviet space, with the formation of 
the Customs Union EurAsEC represented the highest level of integration within this area in 
the new century.  In regard to the legal aspects, Kembayev (2014) has expressed that in 
contrast to the CIS the EurAsEC was clearly endowed with the necessary legal capacity to 
exercise its functions and fulfill their objectives. Pomfret (2004) has distinguished the 
difference of the functional areas of this new Community from those agreed within the 
previous frameworks even in the earlier stages of the EurAsEC. The emphasis is on free 
intra-Community trade as well as a common market for labour and capital, common 
policies towards migration, and more general policy harmonization. He has claimed that its 
specific intention was to coordinate WTO accession negotiations. 
However, it must be noted that the EurAsEC “weighted” voting principle could be a 
problem for small countries.
41
 Russia has the strongest voice in adopting the EurAsEC 
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This initiative, which offers a forward-looking, advanced form of economic integration, has serious 
implications for EU–Russian relations in general and the EU’s strategy in the post-Soviet ‘shared 
neighbourhood’ in particular. The ECU is clearly seen by Russia as a vehicle for reintegrating the post- 
Soviet space, including the countries that fall within the sphere of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood ’ 
(Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012).  
41 
The EurAsEC had drafted mechanisms to coordinate the interests of member countries and had adopted 
the principle of “weighted” voting, which is based on the proportional contribution of each country to the 
Community’s budget. Thus, Russia has 40 percent of the voting rights and is responsible for 40 percent of 
operating expenditures, Belarus and Kazakhstan have 20 percent each, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 10 
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decisions and the fact of Russia’s greatest weight is a problem in any association in the 
post- Soviet space (Golovnin, 2008). Nowadays between Tajikistan and the EurAsEC 
members exists a free trade zone and relatively free people movement (with the absence of 
visa controls within most participating countries). On the other hand, Tajikistan still not 
entered into the Customs Union of EurAsEC, although it is on the eve of the accession to 
deeper stages of this union. Recently, the creation of a customs union is attracting issue in 
Tajikistan due its importance to formal integration process. The timely and successful 
decisions on this issue would bring about an effect on the future of the Tajikistan and 
EurAsEC as the most advanced integration project in the ex-Soviet orbit.  
There is a significant factor that distinguishes this process from other experiences 
of regional economic integration. Unlike the development of the European Union, 
NAFTA, Mercosur or similar groupings, economic integration in the former Soviet space 
is more in the nature of re-integration (Cooper, 2013). These were countries with a 
common past in the Soviet Union, with a shared economic system, common infrastructures 
in relation to energy, transport and communications and the same educational research and 
development systems. They also shared a common administrative language, Russian, and 
this is still to a large extent the case today. Thus, in principle, integration should be easier 
for these countries, and perhaps more rapid once initiated on an appropriate basis, than it 
was for the EU or Mercosur. However, there is an important political difference. 
Inevitably, Eurasian integration is asymmetric, Russia being the dominant party in terms of 
territory, population, economic strength and military might. A Russian leadership from a 
position of strength will have a negative impact on prospects for successful integration.  As 
the dominant economy, there is also a danger that any negative developments in Russia 
will have spillover effects in the smaller economies of the region.   
1.3.5.  The EurAsEC economic context: An overview 
The Eurasian Economic Community (formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan) covers a territory of 20.374 m sq km which represents one of the 
world's largest areas (15% of the inhabited land) with about 182.6 million inhabitants in 
                                                                                                                                                                                
percent each. Apart from Russia, this distribution of voting share by budget contribution gives more 
rights to each country than if other indicators had been used, for example, population, size of economy or 
industrial output, (Golovnin, 2008). 
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2013 (3% of the world population). In 2011 the Community produced about 4,5% of global 
GDP and accounted for about 3% of world exports (EurAsEC today, 2013). 
Thanks to its geographical position, located on the route between China and the 
EU, the EurAsEC countries have a great potential to become the transit countries for intra-
eurasian trade and playing the role of "bridge" between Europe and Asia. From an 
economic point of view, this regional integration group is a major regional market with a 
vast mineral useful resources, raw materials, and significant economic potential. The 
integrating countries account for more than 20% of the world's fresh water reserves and 
forest cover of the planet (EurAsEC Today, 2013). 




 in worldwide resources of industrial uranium, raw 
diamonds, palinodes, gold, silver, zirconium, rare metals, rare earth elements and many 
other useful minerals. EurAsEC countries are among the main exporters of mineral 
resources and metals to the global market and with regard to oil and gas, chrome and 
manganese resources, aluminum and others they play leading roles among exporting 
countries. The main part of the gas resources, oil and coal are in Russia. Kazakhstan also 
has significant reserves of oil and coal. Small oil and gas reserves have been explored in 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; coal in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Considerable 
reserves of hydropower have Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2011, the Community 
members possessed 7.5% of the world’s prospected oil resources, 22% of gas and coal, 
their share in the generation of electrical energy was 5.5%, steel production amounted to 
5.1%, and grain production was at 5.9%, (EurAsEC today, 2013).  
1.3.6. Main Economic Indicators  
The EurAsEC five former Soviet Union territories can be divided into two sub-
regions: North and South. The first one is formed by the northern Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Belarus. These countries are economically linked quite close and they constitute the more 
developed part of the EurAsEC. The second sub-region consists of the South Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They are less developed economies and Uzbekistan
42
 plays an 
important role in their economic relations (Dergachev and Vardomskiy, 2004). 
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Uzbekistan represents an example of the prevalence of the narrowly defined ‘electric power security’ over 
an economically more beneficial regime of transboundary electricity flows within existing regional power 
systems. This country withdrew from the Unified Energy System of Central Asia (UES-CA) on 
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Although these territories share a common heritage as former Soviet Union, they 
are heterogeneous by both the nature and depth of economic reforms implemented as well 
as in terms of political dimensions, in the size of territory, availability of mineral resources, 
population, and level of economic development. After the deep socio-economic recession 
linked with a break of economic relations as a result of the Soviet Union collapse and the 
transition period, EurAsEC countries achieved economic recovery only by the 2000s. In 
more developed part of the Community were held economic stabilization programs. At the 
same time, the less developed part, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, managed to improve their 
economies thanks to financial assistance rendered by international community (Kuzmina, 
2012). Consequently, all integrating members showed high economic growth rates in 2000: 
Russia and Kazakhstan recorded about 10% average annual real GDP growth, Belarus 
(5.8%), Kyrgyzstan (5.4%) and Tajikistan (8.3%) (Table 2.1).  
Definitely one of the main drivers of economic growth in most of the EurAsEC 
countries in these years was the upswing prices of raw materials, namely, oil, gas and 
cotton. Nevertheless, economic growth in these countries occurs in a background of 
considerable technological backwardness and low levels of competitiveness (Namoz, 
2014). As a clear example, the economic growth in Tajikistan is uncertain due to the high 
reliance on external factors like the high dependence on remittances, accounting by above 
50% of GDP in 2013 (according to World Bank Indicator Data). A similar situation can be 
observed in the case of Kyrgyzstan. In 2013 the economic growth rates slowed in all 
member countries, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan. The most negative effect was for 
Russia and Belarus. Tajikistan is not excluded from this, but its economic growth rates 
decreased not as much as other members, remaining in rates above 7% (Table 2.1).  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
December 1st, 2009. This unilateral act was apparently planning for two years, as the Uzbek power 
system was getting interconnected. Because of Uzbekistan’s central position, all Central Asian countries 
have been hit by this decision; Tajikistan, however, may be the worst affected. For the last 70 years, 
Tajikistan has received a substantial proportion of its power supplies from neighboring Uzbekistan (its 
energy deficit in the fall-winter period constitutes around 2bn kW/h; this is covered by 0.6bn kW/h of 
Uzbek energy and 1.2bn kW/h of Turkmen energy transited through Uzbekistan). Over the same period, 
Tajikistan has exported comparable amounts of electricity to Southern Uzbekistan in the spring-summer 
season, in the process of irrigating land located downstream on major rivers (Libman and Vinokurov, 
2010). 
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
122 
Table 2.1: Main socio-economic indicators of EurAsEC member states (2000 -2013) 
 BLR KAZ KGR RUS TAJ 
  2000    
Population (millions of  residents) 10.05 14.88 4.89 146.59 6.18 
GDP (current million U.S dollar) 12736.8 18291.9 1369.7 259708.5 860.5 
GDP per capita (current U.S dollar) 1273 1229 279.6 1771.6 139.1 
Economic growth (percent of real GDP) 5.8 9.8 5.4 10 8.3 
Industry (as percent of GDP) 39.2 40.5 31.4 38.0 38.9 
Agriculture (as percent of GDP) 14.2 8.7 36.7 6.5 27.4 
Service (as percent of GDP) 46.6 50.8 31.9 55.5 33.7 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 185.3 17.4 27.2 37.7 22.7 
Capital Investment (as percent of GDP) 25.4 18.2 20.0 18.7 9.4 
FDI (as percent of GDP) 0.9 7.0 -0.2 1.0 2.7 
Foreign Trade*(million U.S dollar) 15977.8 13579.1 1058.6 147954.7 1429.0 
Trade Balance (million U.S dollar)
 -1315.1 +3725.9 -49.6 +58230.7 +141.0 
  2013    
Population (millions of residents) 9.46 17.03 5.71 143.49 8.20 
GDP (current million U.S dollar) 73.097,6 23.1876,3 7.335,1 2079024.8 8506.6 
GDP per capita (current U.S dollar) 7722.1 13611.5 1282.4 14487.3 1048.7 
Economic growth (percent of real GDP) 0.9 6.0 10.5 1.3 7.4 
Industry (as percent of GDP) 42.3 36.9 26.7 36.3 21.8 
Agriculture (as percent of GDP) 9.2 4.9 17.7 4.0 27.4 
Service (as percent of GDP) 48.5 58.2 55.6 59.7 50.8 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 18.1 6.0 7.9 7.2 5.5 
Capital Investment (as percent of GDP) 38.7 26.2 31.7 22.6 19.1 
FDI (as percent of GDP) 3.1 4.2 10.5 3.4 1.3 
Foreign Trade*(million U.S dollar) 81225.8 133503.1 7756.3 842211.0 5291.0 
Trade Balance (million U.S dollar)
 -6819.6 +35893.9 -4209.9 +212320.8 -3010.4 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank Data 2015, *data from UNCDAT, 2015   
Note: BLR-Belarus, KAZ-Kazakhstan, KRG-Kyrgyzstan, RUS-Russia, TAJ-Tajikistan 
These countries have a positive short-term economic growth and if they overcome 
some factors such as depending on very few raw materials and high remittance and if they 
diversify exports, they could continue high-growth rates in the long term. Russia is the 
leader among all other countries with a large consumer market (a population made up of 
about 78% of EurAsEC); while Kazakhstan, as the second largest country, has 9.2% of 
population. In spite of the significant population growth observed in the case of Tajikistan, 
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The EurAsEC members are also quite diverse in terms of their GDP size, Russia 
representing the 88.6% of the total GDP in 2000 is clearly the leader, followed by 
Kazakhstan (6.2%) and Belarus (4.3%); while Tajikistan (0.29%) and Kyrgyzstan (0.47%) 
are almost negligible. In 2013, Russia (86%), Belarus (2.9%) and Kyrgyzstan (0.29%) 
decrease their share, while Kazakhstan (9.5%) increases. The share of Tajikistan also 
increases but it continues being negligible with a 0.35% of the total GDP (Figure 2.1). 
 Graph 2.1: Share in total population and GDP of EurAsEC, 2000 and 2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank data 
The comparison of the members regarding the share of the economic sectors in 
GDP also shows two groups of countries within the EurAsEC: Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus have a relatively well-developed industrial base while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
have a important weight of the agricultural sector. Recently the share of service sector 
increased significantly almost in all countries (Table 2.1). 
In terms of GDP per capita, it can be observed that there was an important 
improvement in all member countries between 2000 and 2013. At current prices and 
exchange rates, the per capita GDP of was multiplied from by 4.5 in Kyrgyzstan to by 11 
in Kazakhstan. However, GDP per capita in Tajikistan is only 7.8% of that of Russia in 
2000 and falls to 7.2% in 2013. These increases are not as large when data are taken at 
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Considering the size of the union as population size, Tajikistan will surely benefits from this integration, 
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constant prices and exchange rates (Figure 2.2). In this case, GDP per capita of Tajikistan 
is only 6% (2000) and 6.5% (2013) of that of Russia.  
Figure 2.2: GDP per capita, US$ at constant prices (2005) and constant exchange rate (2005) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD 
The integrating members are not so successful on attracting of FDI due to the poor 
institutional development and unfavorable business environment. The highest FDI inflow 
corresponds to Kirghizstan with 10.2% of GDP. The foreign trade turnover displays very 
high volume in 2013 comparing with 2000, almost in all these countries. According to 
(EurAsEC Today, 2013) the share of this regional trade agreement in world trade remains 
quite high (3% of world exports and 4% of world GDP). But, certainly, given such a huge 
economic scale the trade turnover of Russia is significantly huge between other EurAsEC 
members or even incomparable, especially with the small countries. In fact, Russia 
accounts by 78% of the whole union foreign trade, while the second one country, 
Kazakhstan, accounts by 12%. Both countries are the only ones in showing a positive trade 
balance. 
In general, EurAsEC member’s economies have huge opportunities for 
development through their richness in natural and mineral resources. Despite this, the 
macroeconomic indicators show that they should be concerned about extending investment 
rates and higher FDI related to the structure of its member countries’ economies. One of 



















 It has to be improved in order to increase the competitiveness of 
these individual countries and that of the whole Community within the global economy. 
The existing structure of the EurAsEC economies, among which only Russia and Belarus 
can boast substantial manufacturing sectors, is an obstacle rather than an asset to 
integration (Golovnin, 2008). 
At the same time, another worrying factor for successful economic integration 
within these countries is a high divergence between economies of larger and smaller 
countries. Eurasian countries can facilitate this issue only through the investment effort to 
the small countries in the terms of availability resources in each country. For instance, in 
the case of Tajikistan, it would be possible to have an enormous growth through expanding 
investment for the potential sectors, like energy generation
45
 or agriculture (Vinokurov et 
al, 2013). 
The potential effects of EurAsEC on Tajikistan, explaining the decision of this 
country in prioritizing this option of economic integration will be discussed in chapters 
three and four. Before, in next sections, we will discuss the other options also followed by 
Tajikistan in its integration strategy. 
1.4. Further development in the Global Market 
Bearing in mind the importance of the integration to the global market as an engine 
of growth, the integration to the global organizations and international financial institutions 
has been another relevant option for the foreign policy of Tajikistan. The UN was the first 
international organization being present in Tajikistan, in March 1992, starting with the UN 
                                                          
44 
The EurAsEC member countries have remarkable differences in the structure of their domestic 
economies. For example, Russia and Kazakhstan are major exporters of raw materials and produce a very 
wide range of goods (especially Russia), while Belarus specializes in producing finished goods from raw 
materials imported from third countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which lag behind other EurAsEC 
member countries in terms of industrial production, are importers of a large number of industrial goods 
from non-CIS countries. Because of this, Russia is keen to protect its economy by using duties on a wider 
range of products than would its EurAsEC counterparts. In addition, since the average weighted rate of 
customs duties in Russia is falling, Russia levies lower import tariffs on some goods than its partners do. 
Kazakhstan’s customs tariffs differ considerably from those of Russia and Belarus, the Kazakh economy 
is liberalized to a larger extent (Golovnin, 2008). 
45 
Of a fundamental importance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is an agreement signed by heads of EurAsEC 
states regarding joint development of Central Asian water resources, which allows increasing investment 
inflow from Russia and Kazakhstan (Kuzmina, 2012). 
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Tajikistan Office for Peace-building (UNTOP).  Beginning from 1993, the UN has 
increased its presence to 21 specialized agencies, funds and programs of the UN and World 
Bank. The aim of the UN in Tajikistan is to assist the Government in implementing the 
Country Development reforms and provide support in the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International 
Finance Corporation are also active in Tajikistan and are collaborating with the UN 
Country Team (UNCT)
46
. One year later, in April 1993, Tajikistan became member of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
47
 and in June of the same year it became member of 
the World Bank
48
, which includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and International Centre 
for settlement of investment disputes (ICSID).  
Together with the other countries in the region, Tajikistan also was actively 
involved in a number of regional financial institutions, being the only country that are 
member of both the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
 49
, since 
16 October 1992, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), since 1998. ADB is 
Tajikistan’s largest multilateral development partner and plays crucial role in the country’s 
aid position with ongoing necessary reforms
50
. In November 1996, Tajikistan joined the 
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Tajikistan also participates in the activities of the main United Nations agencies (UN) such as the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, UN realized a number of 
special programs in the region of Central Asia, including Tajikistan. These programs are the Special 
Program for Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). The European Union also is funding two programs that are implemented by the regional 
subdivisions of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the program to promote in border 







The EBRD with 102 projects in Tajikistan is focused on stabilizing and rebuilding trust in the banking 
sector, developing private enterprises and agribusiness, improving the availability and quality of 
municipal services and regulation and energy efficiency. The cumulative EBRD investment accounts for 




The ADB updated 2016-2018 country program in Tajikistan aims to support inclusive economic growth 
through structural reforms to strengthen the investment climate, road, energy development and improved 
food security.  http://www.adb.org/countries/tajikistan/main 
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Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and finally the young Eurasian Development Bank 
(EDB)
 51
 welcomed Tajikistan as a member in June, 2006. 
Thus, trying to develop an environment of open economy, the Tajik accession to 
the WTO would be a natural institutional simulation to economic openness. However, after 
independence in 1991, Tajikistan together with other post-Soviet countries were suspicious 
regarding the international commitments of WTO which restrict their home policy rules. 
Tajikistan was pleased of entering the United Nations as a signal of nationhood, to join the 
IMF and World Bank and the several above mentioned regional development banks as 
potential sources of capital, however it held back on WTO accession until 2013. 
1.4.1. The accession  to the World Trade Organization (WTO)  
After an increasing number of regional trade agreements becomes evident the 
question concerning their compatibility with WTO principles. Consequently, the main 
locomotives of development foreign trade are becoming regional integration groupings in 
parallel with WTO rules.
52 Considering the importance of the further integration of the 
country into the world economic relations as well as the improvement of trade and 
promotion of economic development and poverty alleviation, on 29 May 2001 the 
Republic of Tajikistan submitted an application to join the WTO membership under Article 
XII. The Working Party on the accession of Tajikistan was established by the General 
Council on 18 July 2001, and since its establishment the Working Party of Tajikistan has 
met 4 times. The country completed its membership negotiations on 26 October 2012 when 
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In autumn 2009, several months after the Tajikistan accession to the Eurasian Development Bank, the 
Bank financed the establishment in Tajikistan of high-quality cotton yarn production facility with 5 
thousand tons per year production capacity. Olymp-Textile CJSC affected the construction project of the 
spinning factory. EDB’s contribution to the project amounted for US$ 22.57 million over a total 
investments of US$ 29.75 million. In the framework of its investment activities in 2013–2017, EDB will 
provide assistance in developing export-oriented enterprises; will facilitate agriculture diversification and 
productivity improvement; and will participate in addressing the issues of food security. Taking into 
account the importance of the transport infrastructure for the country’s economy, EDB stands ready to 
support projects aiming at: servicing foreign trade; improving the quality of transport services and 
logistics; and the renewal of vehicles and fixed assets. http://eabr.org/e/about/edb-member/tajikistan/ 
52 
According to WTO rules, in particular the most favored nation treatment (MFN), such regional groups as 
EurAsEC destroys the multilateral principles by dividing the world into discriminatory segments, 
artificially changing the "natural" specialization and flows of goods. However, supporters of regional 
arrangements argument those integration agreements bring the common benefit, whereas stimulating the 
liberalization of global economic relations. Regional integration as "building block or stumbling block" is 
from a long time until now an “open question” of debate. 
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the Working Party adopted the accession package. The General Council approved the 
accession on 10 December 2012. Once after 11 years, when completing its domestic 
ratification procedures on 2 March 2013, Tajikistan became the 159th full-fledged member 
of the WTO family (WTO, 2013). 
Associated with this, Tajikistan’s President, Emomali Rahmon declared “Today 
constitutes a landmark in Tajikistan's history and lays solid foundations for further 
promotion of sustainable social and economic growth. Applying for WTO membership 11 
years ago was the right step forward for Tajikistan as it transforms itself into a market 
economy. Tajikistan will use its WTO membership as a means of fostering future economic 
growth and prosperity. The WTO accession has been a major instrument for pursuing 
Tajikistan’s main strategic goals as to achieve energy independence, food security and to 
tackle communication deadlock challenges it faces as a land-locked country. The 
immediate objectives of this process have been the establishment of a market economy, a 
friendly- investment environment, and integration in the global economy”.
 53
 
Moreover, Director-General Pascal Lamy said: “For Tajikistan, a small and 
landlocked country, WTO accession is a road leading to the world economy. For the WTO, 
it is another step towards universality and a sign of confidence in the values and benefits of 
the multilateral trading system” (WTO, 2012). 
The first Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of 
Tajikistan Mr. Saidrahmon Nazriev
54
 refers to Tajikistan’s WTO membership as one of the 
priority issues of the economic development of the country, which first and foremost 
actively contributes to the process of integration into the global economy. It has a positive 
effect on the country's rating at the global level, makes it possible to take advantage of 
multilateral trading system and contributes to the improvement of the structure of 
government administration related to the highly qualified specialists. Membership in this 
organization allows Tajikistan to implement the system of transparency, predictability, and 
most importantly compliance with the requirements of the global trade market access as 
well as to increase the competitiveness in the domestic market. In order to exploit full 
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See: Statement of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan in World Trade Organization. 
http://wto.tj/en/press-centr/video/292/ 
54 
See: Speech of the First Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of 
Tajikistan  Mr. Saidrahmon Nazriev. http://wto.tj/en/press-centr/news/359/ 
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advantages of the WTO membership and to recognize its membership commitments, 
Tajikistan has undertaken several internal reforms and measures.
55
 
Accordingly, due the basic WTO principles and by being a member of this 
organization, first, Tajikistan can take advantage of a most favored nation treatment from 
all WTO partners, especially with the main Tajikistan trading partners like China, Russia 
and Turkey, which are also members of WTO. But also it can get wider access to foreign 
markets by diversifying its trade in different geographical locations. Third is the 
simplification of the administrative intervention of the trading environment in terms of 
removal of non-tariff barriers. Finally, accession to the WTO also may have the positive 
influence for banking and financial sector relating to the FDI, including the newest 
technologies (Kayumov and Umarov, 2004; MEDT, 2008). Moreover, these studies have 
claimed that another main benefit is related to the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
WTO, which offers the opportunity of solving such issues, providing a strong incentive for 
the accession of small and weak countries to the WTO. 
However, it was recently noted by Director-General Roberto Azevêdo that "WTO 
membership is not an end in itself". A realization of the benefits of WTO membership is 
not automatic; it is inter-dependent with sustained domestic reforms and the 
implementation of the obligations and commitments of membership (WTO, 2015). 
Although, Tajikistan has agreed to undertake a series of important commitments to further 
liberalize its trade regime, it is difficult for such less developed country implementing all 
its commitments.  Usually small countries such as Tajikistan enter the WTO platform just 
with the aim of searching a haven from the worst external events, strengthening its 
reputation in the world, and creating favorable conditions for the attraction of foreign 
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The year 2015 will be noted in Tajikistan’s history as a remarkable year as the Government of Tajikistan 
adopted the Program of adjustment of the economy of Tajikistan to the WTO membership. The 
Parliament has ratified both the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and the Protocol of amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement, and also hosted the Dushanbe Third China Round Table on WTO accessions. For 
Tajikistan, like for other land locked countries, the implementation of TFA Agreement and in particular 
its transit related provisions, is not only a question of commercial interest but a matter of survival 
(Nazriev, 2015). 
56 
The First Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan Mr. 
Saidrahmon Nazriev in the Doha Development Round (2015) calls upon the WTO membership to 
redouble their efforts towards a successful conclusion of the Round with the main focus on development 
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In the light of this, many countries are linking their hopes to development of 
foreign trade with the WTO accession, presenting it as “magic wand” which removes all 
obstacles and leads the country to be the world leader in the trade field.  In this regard, 
Tajikistan also is not an exception since it becomes the 159th member of WTO, but this 
hope that Tajikistan access the WTO was not justified (Petrushkow, 2015). Petrushkow has 
claimed that, one can absolutely believe that WTO membership for countries can improve 
its exports, enhance competition, promote cost competitiveness, and increase integration in 
the multilateral trading system and FDI inflows. However, as clearly shown "stubborn 
numbers", the high expectations related to the country's accession to the WTO and the 
delaying participation process of Tajikistan to the deeper stage of EurAsEC as “Customs 
Union” or “Eurasian Union” has negative impact to the performance of foreign trade of the 
country.  
 From another angle, this situation may be only coincident with WTO accession, as 
the experience of Kyrgyzstan whose any negative shocks to their economy are regarded as 
being related with the negative effects of the WTO accession (Pomfret, 2004). Certainly, 
Tajikistan also has negative effects from accession of the WTO, as Kayumov and Umarov 
(2004) have argued membership of the WTO for developing countries entails not only 
benefits but also significant economic and social costs.  
Moreover, according to MEDT (2009), the public budget loses incomes through 
reducing import duties and decreasing protection of a number of sectors of the national 
economy. The Republic will lose the option of protecting the domestic market through 
limitations on foreign trade. In addition, entering the WTO will damage small and 
medium-sized businesses due to their uncompetitiveness with imported goods and services. 
The realization of such world institution reform in a short period of time cannot take place 
without capacity building and significant technical assistance, as well. Hence, the unsteady 
and vulnerable economy of Tajikistan certainly failed to profit much from immediate 
benefits through WTO membership, though it is difficult to show that it suffered from 
accession to this organization. 
In this way, today Tajikistan should realize that accession to the WTO not only 
might bring benefit from MFN treatment and from the removal of restrictive trade barriers 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and with meaningful results for the developing countries and LDCs, as well as on the special situation of 
the recently acceded members who have undertaken extensive market access commitments. 
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applied to the country in global market. Together with these, the country faces many 
commitments
57
 concerning a multilateral trading system as well as in the way of entering 
the integration group EurAsEC. Therefore, the assessment of the economic impact of 
regional integration of the countries in the multilateral trading system is ambiguous. Thus, 
in order to develop trade flows and come to effective integration in the frame of the world 
economy, Tajikistan should take concrete steps toward modification trade and foreign 
economic policy. Moreover, it should undertake the improvement of the institutional and 
legislative base for full compliance with the standard requirements, and measures of 
international trade relations. 
1.5. The Integration with the Outside “Ex-Soviet” Orbit  
The third integration option of Tajikistan is by signing agreements with an outsider 
of the post-Soviet Orbit as its Southern neighbors and China. As we mentioned above, 
Tajikistan tries to insert itself into the global economy in different ways, being actively 
involved not only within the post-Soviet space or by join a number of international 
organizations and financial institutions and other European transatlantic regional 
organizations, but also by its participation in several agreements with the Islamic World 
and China. 
1.5.1. Integration with the Islamic World 
Since Islam is the most widespread religion in Tajikistan, Tajikistan is seeking to 
strengthen its status in the Islamic world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
country joined into a number of key institutions whose membership is based on the full or 
partial identification with Islam. Thus, Tajikistan has pursued the insertion into the Islamic 
world organizations with the development of various economic integration options in 
parallel, in particular, with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). 
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Recently acceded members (RAMs) or Article XII Members, ie, countries that negotiated and joined the 
WTO after 1995, seeking lesser commitments in the negotiations because of the liberalization they have 
undertaken as part of their membership agreements. 
 See:https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm 
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The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
58
 was founded in 1969 as the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. In 2011 was renamed as the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation. The objectives of the Organization are the protection of the vital 
interests of the Muslims; the resolution of conflicts and disputes between Member States; 
development of economic and trade partnership and elaboration of a framework for 
economic integration in the form of an Islamic Common Market. This organization is 
supporting partnerships with the UN and other intergovernmental organizations. Currently 
it brings together 57 countries, including Tajikistan.  
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
59
 was founded by Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey in 1985. It is the legal successor of the Regional Cooperation for 
Development Organization (ORSR), established in 1964, the same three (at that time pro-
American) Muslim states.  
Map 2.3: The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 1985 
 
Source: Central Asia Research Group (http://www.asiacentral.es/grupoub/mapas.php) 
It promoted economic, technical and cultural ties between the member States. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan with other four Central Asian republics, 
Azerbaijan and Afghanistan joined the ECO. The objectives of its activities include the 
promotion of sustainable economic development of Member States, the gradual 
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elimination of trade barriers and the promotion of intra-regional trade. Other objectives 
include increasing the role of ECO region in the development of world trade, fostering the 
rational use of resources in the region, promoting both regional cooperation in struggling 
drug abuse and environmental protection as much as strengthening historical and cultural 
ties between people of the region. 
1.5.2. The new regional platform in the context of a "peaceful rise of China" 
As a beginner which dramatically changed the geopolitical and economic position 
in Central Asia, and as a model measuring by all other external actors, China has quickly 
become a key player on the regional scene. Even Beijing, which is traditionally accenting 
bilateral relations, in this case began to experiment with the new regional platforms. Today 
the Central Asian region is acknowledged as the driving force, ensuring the "peaceful rise 
of China" that contributes to diminish the concern of the international community, 
(Goldstein, 2005). 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
60
 , which was initiated by 
China, is another prominent integration organization outside the strict scope of post-Soviet 
Area that includes Tajikistan. The Republic of Tajikistan during the meeting held in China 
on 21 December 2001 becomes founding member.  
The SCO is the successor of the "Shanghai Five" Organization, founded in 1996 for 
resolving border disputes inherited from Soviet times between China and the four post-
Soviet states - Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The entrance of Uzbekistan 
in 2001 has become the symbol of the status change from "Five" to the SCO as well as the 
displacement of the accent from the demarcation of borders to the regional security issues. 
In 2004, Mongolia received the status of observer in the SCO. In 2005, Iran, India and 
Pakistan got such a status and in 2012 Afghanistan. Moreover, Belarus, Turkey and Sri 
Lanka have the status of Dialogue Partners. Although, Turkmenistan participates in some 
meetings, has no certain status. 
The principal aims of the SCO are to strengthen the mutual confidence, friendship 
and neighborship between member states, to develop multi-profile of co-operation in order 
to keep along with maintaining peace, security and stability in the region. Moreover, it 
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www.sectsco.org 
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encourages effective cooperation in politics and economy, trade, culture, education, 
tourism, environment fields as well as in transport and energy areas. Although this 
organization considered all these areas of interest until now it focused mainly on military 
and security issues. 
Map 2.4: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 2001 
 
Source: Central Asia Research Group (http://www.asiacentral.es/grupoub/mapas.php) 
1.6. Conclusions 
The objective of the chapter was to understand the integration decisions taken by 
Tajikistan and the more plausible future of its integration process. To achieve this 
objective, the chapter presented a survey of the integration process of Tajikistan, both from 
an economic and, in lesser extent, political perspective, by analyzing the different 
integration options followed by Tajikistan after independence.  
Logically, the first strategic option was to sign agreements within ex-Soviet orbit. 
This also in its turn combined two strategies: agreements including the whole post-Soviet 
space and Central Asian regional agreements. At the same time, Tajikistan tried to insert 
itself into the global market by joining multilateral and global international organizations 
and financial institutions, being the most relevant the UN, IMF, WB, and WTO; this is 
what we consider the second option. There was also a third option, consisting in the 
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integration between Tajikistan and countries outside “Ex-Soviet” orbit and, in some cases, 
including also other ex-Soviet countries. Within this option we distinguish the insertion 
into the Islamic World and The New Regional platform in the context of a "peaceful rise of 
China".  
The agreements within the post-Soviet space were the first option for integration 
projects not only for Tajikistan but almost for all Former Soviet Republics. This is usually 
referred to as "re-integration". The first agreement within this option was the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), signed in 1991, including the former Soviet 
republics with the exception of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and 
Georgia.  
In a broad context, the CIS was not a successful project. The majority of works 
analyzing the CIS agreement performance conclude that it was not taken seriously neither 
by the majority of its members nor by other countries, because it never had a clear purpose 
and even those who have had did never reach it (Freinkman et all, 2004; Pomfret, 2004; 
Tai and Lee, 2009; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013; Cooper, 2013; Kembayev, 2014). Also 
Putin (2011) claims that, in the first place, this refers to a hastily developed integration 
project, whose principal function was ensuring a civilized character of the post-Soviet 
"divorce" (Putin, 2007). However, from another side, he considers that the CIS has been an 
organization with a “generic” or “fundamental aspect” for any other integration agreements 
of the former Soviet Union. 
In 1995, it was clear that in the near future the creation of a single “geopolitical 
space” encompassing the entire CIS was not possible due to fundamental disagreements 
between the member States over the purpose of their organization, (Kembayev, 2014). This 
action led to the division of this great alliance into different smaller integration groups. 
These initiatives tended to replicate the CIS model in a smaller format; something the 
development of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) clearly illustrates 
(Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012). In some way, the integration initiatives between the 
countries of Central Asia could also be considered as small groups of integration within the 
integration of ex-Soviet space or within the CIS alliance but they were originally a 
different strategy. 
However, despite of the fact that main country challenges in Central Asian region 
have transboundary nature (water and energy, transport and the potential of Islamic 
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Resistance) which requires regional cooperation, both integration projects initiated by this 
region under the leadership of Kazakhstan (the Central Asian Economic Community, 
CAEC, stablished in 1994 and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, CACO, 
stablished in 2002) have remained, in fact, on paper (Ushakova, 2003; Pomfret, 2004; 
Kembayev, 2009; Kuzmina, 2012; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). The Central Asian states 
have not been able to establish even one regional integration organization, which would 
have formed a common strategy of the Central Asian countries, without the involvement of 
external actors (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). This is caused by either a lack of political 
will (like neutrality immediately after independence in the case of Turkmenistan, and with 
Uzbekistan from the second half of 1990) or the absence of consensus on who should lead 
the integration initiatives (competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and 
competition of Uzbekistan with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) (Linn, 2012). This situation 
has weakened all the Central Asian states and made any common action  impossible, 
allowing them to speak on more favorable conditions with outside factors, especially with 
Russia and China. 
So, into the ex-Soviet area, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is the 
most successful and advanced union and it seems the integration project with more 
perspectives of future development, (Pomfret, 2004; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012; 
Kuzmina, 2012; Libman and Vinokurov, 2012; Cooper, 2013; Kembayev, 2014; 
Galiakberov and Abdullin, 2014; Yesdauletova, 2014).  
Unlike other world experiences of regional economic integration like the European 
Union, NAFTA or Mercosur, this project is more in the nature of a re-integration 
perspective (Cooper, 2013). EurAsEC countries had a common past in the Soviet Union, 
with a shared economic system, common infrastructures in relation to energy, transport and 
communications and the same educational research and development systems. They also 
shared a common administrative language, Russian, and this is still to a large extent the 
case today. CIS also was a re-integrating project but in that case, they were new young 
states keen on preserving their newfound sovereignty, which explains the fail on getting 
deeper integration.  
Thus, in principle, integration should be easier for these countries, and perhaps 
more rapid once initiated on an appropriate basis, than it was for the EU or Mercosur. 
However, there is an important political difference. Inevitably, Eurasian integration is 
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asymmetric, Russia being the dominant party in terms of territory, population, economic 
strength and military might. A Russian leadership, which can explain an important part of 
the current and expected success of EurAsEC in terms of the reintegration objective, can 
also have a negative impact on prospects for successful integration. Being the clearly 
dominant economy, there is also a danger that any negative shock in Russia will have 
spillover effects in the smaller economies of the region.  
In the terms of the second option, that was referred to as the global market, it is 
evident the interest of Tajikistan in join international global organizations as a signal of 
nationhood (in the case of being a member of UN) or as potential financial support and 
assistance (as a member of the IMF and the World Bank). Moreover, the potential benefits 
of WTO membership for Tajikistan would be considerable, especially after WTO 
accession of China and Russia. These benefits will increase significantly after the 
accession to the WTO of other main partner countries such as Kazakhstan.  
Finally, regarding the third integration option, also in the context of regional 
integration agreements but not just with ex-Soviet countries but including other countries 
or strictly with outsider countries, Tajikistan followed essentially two alternatives: the 
insertion in the Islamic world and the regional integration with China. In both cases, the 
objectives are more in terms of security issues, in a generic sense, than economic goals.  
However, given the geo-strategic position of Tajikistan and after the terrible civil 
war, security issues have been predominant issues of economic development and, in fact, 
the proposals offered by external actors and international organizations are supported only 
if they are of interest in terms of internal problems. Some regional organizations are seen 
as representing a threat to the order of Tajikistan or Central Asia stabilization (Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, 2013). At this regard, he argues that, for example, Islamic organizations are 
perceived with antipathy, since these organizations tend to spread this kind of Islam that is 
understood as a potential political rival of the legitimacy of secular regimes; but also 
European organizations promoting democratic principles, because they are considered as a 
menace to the security conditions. 
Furthermore, China's interest is to continue promoting the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) as its main multilateral and multi-polar forum for contacts with 
Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan and to promote bilateral relations with each 
country in the region. Chinese economic expansion in trade and investment does not 
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require the presence of a patron in the form of a regional organization, and even if Moscow 
succeeds with Eurasian Union, China will remain a key trading partner and investor in 
Tajikistan and in all Central Asia (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). 
Thus, once seen the negative and positive aspects of the different integration 
options followed by Tajikistan, we can conclude that integration way of this small country 
is being, in fact, complex and in any case to continue playing in such multiple integration 
fields would be difficult for this country. The country has to pay special attention to some 
of these integration projects for both economic reasons and politic ones. We can conclude 
that currently the most natural way for Tajikistan would be to continue the EurAsEC 
integration and this for two main reasons. As for the economic reason, the community of 
States does not need to create a common market from “scratch” because for many decades 
they have worked in the framework of a single economic complex. The second reason is a 
political one, as that the most military potency possesses only this project. This is, of 
course, the think of Putin (2011) but also the findings of researchers like Cooper (2013) or 
Laruelle and Peyrouse (2013). Although the EurAsEC project may not be the best option, it 
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Chapter 3 
The Static Trade Effects of EurAsEC:  the impact on Tajikistan trade 
1.1. Introduction 
In the first chapter we have provided a review of the theoretical literature on 
regional economic integration: causes (determinants) and consequences (potential effects). 
Although it is known that not only economic factors but also a number of political and 
geostrategic factors determine the desirability and the success of an economic integration 
agreement, especially in the case of developing countries, the potential economic effects 
which increase the welfare level of the members remain as the most relevant element in 
justifying the accession to an integrated area (Allen, 1963; Inotai, 1991; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994; World Bank, 2000; Hosny, 2013;  Marinov, 2014). So, focusing on 
potential economic effects, in spite of the relevance of dynamic effects, which influence 
the economic growth rate in medium and long terms, static trade effects (in terms of the 
theory of Viner-Meade-Lipsey) remain as essential determinants in the formation of 
integration agreements. In chapter two we have shown that among the several integration 
options followed by Tajikistan, the EurAsEC agreement stands as the currently most 
successful one and as the one with the greatest future, being the priority integration process 
of Tajikistan in the last years.  
In the current chapter our interest will turn to the empirical identification of 
economic integration effects, in particular, the static trade effects of the EurAsEC 
agreement for the integrated area as a whole and for Tajikistan trade. At this regard, the 
balance between trade creation and trade diversion is one of the key elements determining 
the net welfare effects of a commercial preferential agreement. Trade creation occurs when 
high cost domestic production is substituted by low cost production from partners of the 
regional area while trade diversion occurs when low costs production from the rest of the 
world is substituted by high cost production from a regional partner.  
The static trade effects of an economic integration agreement (in terms of trade 
creation and trade diversion) were analyzed by a large number of papers; either following 
the Computable General Equilibrium Models methodology (Deardorff, 1998; Brown et al, 
2003; Robinson and Thierfelder, 2002, Piermartini and Teh, 2005; Hertel, 1997, 2006; 
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Baldwin and Venables, 1995) or by estimating a Gravity Model (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985;  Deardorff, 1998; Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Rose and van Wincoop 
(2000); Glick and Rose (2001); Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Wall, 2000, 2002, 
2003; Dee and Gali, 2003 Bergstrand and Baier, 2007; Yang and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013).  
This chapter analyses the static trade effects of the EurAsEC agreement, in 
particular for Tajikistan. By estimating an augmented Gravity Model with panel data in 
which regional dummy variables are included, we analyze the impact of EurAsEC on 
bilateral imports and exports with main partner countries, focusing on trade creation and 
trade diversion effects. Testing the model for a sample of 26 countries over the period 
1995-2013, we find that EurAsEC had a trade creation effect without evidence of a trade 
diversion effect. Moreover, trade creation effect within the EurAsEC area is larger than the 
trade creation effect with the rest of the considered partner countries. Moreover, the 
EurAsEC agreement had a positive impact on the Tajikistan trade. 
After this introduction, the chapter is organized as follows. Section two provides a 
review of the empirical analysis of the effects of regional integration, taking into account 
the different approaches with special attention to Gravity Models. In the third section, we 
show a brief overview of the EurAsEC trade performance. Section four analyzes the trade 
creation and trade diversion effects of EurAsEC and the effects on Tajikistan trade by 
estimating with panel data an augmented gravity model. Finally, in section five, we present 
some conclusions.    
1.2. Empirical analysis of the regional integration effects 
In recent years, the empirical analysis on the effects of regional trade integration on 
economic outcomes has grown sharply. WTO (2005) has appropriately noted that these 
exercises in quantification have been made possible by advances in theory and in analytical 
techniques, and no less importantly, by the dramatically increased computational and data 
processing power of computers.  
Undoubtedly, any debate of the effects of RTAs begins with Viner’s (1950) 
seminal investigation in terms of trade creation and trade diversion effects. While a number 
of criteria have been put forward for evaluating the chances of trade creation and trade 
diversion in a union, it seems to be generally agreed that an a priori decision regarding the 
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net effect of customs unions on trade flows cannot be made, giving relevance to empirical 
studies of trade creation and trade diversion in a RIA. 
In general, we may attempt to evaluate the possible effects in advance or after the 
union has been established (Balassa, 1967), that is, the analysis can be of an ex ante or an 
ex post character. In this regard, Grimwade et al., (2011) have reviewed some of the main 
methods used to measure the impact of regional integration, and distinguished four broad 
approaches to the empirical analysis of the effects of economic integration. They compare 
and contrast the different approaches, identifying in each case their major strengths and 
weaknesses. The considered methods are the following: 
 The first and simplest approach is to construct an "anti-monde", showing what 
would have happened to trade flows in the absence of integration according to a set 
of clear hypotheses and to treat any difference between actual and predicted trade 
flows as being a measure of the integration effect. Such an approach is often 
referred to as the "residual approach". A commonplace in such models is to 
assume that the changes would have been the same in the post-integration period as 
in the pre-integration one.  This approach was widely used in the early days of post- 
war European integration to determine the ex-post effects of the formation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Although such approach has the 
attractiveness of great simplicity, there are many problems in predicting the path 
that trade would have taken had integration not happened. 
 The second approach is an extension of the first. It consists of an attempt to 
formalize a model of the factors that determine some "natural” amount of bilateral 
trade taking place between any two countries, given their geographical features or 
the so- called "intensity of trade". The major task is to find a suitable index for 
measuring trade intensity.  In short, the intensity of trade approach measures the 
extent to which any two countries are economically integrated, although without 
distinguishing between market and institutional integration effects. Particularly, this 
issue related to policy changes leads academics to the third approach.  
  The third method is largely an extension of the second and has come into renewed 
prominence over the last decade. It uses stochastic econometric models to 
estimate the impact of integration on trade. This, too, involves the construction of a 
model capable of explaining most of the factors that determine the amount of trade 
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one country does with another or the change in the level of this trade over time, 
including factors such as membership of the same regional trading block. The 
model is then applied to bilateral trade over the relevant period of time and the 
coefficients of the different variables are estimated. The most common model for 
this kind of exercise is the gravity model of trade.  
 The fourth approach is to use a multicountry, static or dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model. Such models seek to explain the main 
equilibrium relationships between the different sectors of the economy of each 
country and between the different countries themselves. Having done so, the model 
is simulated dynamically to analyze the extent to which different economic 
variables have been affected by the integration process. The difference between the 
actual and predicted levels of different variables measures the impact of economic 
integration. Therefore, CGE models are especially useful for measuring the effects 
of integration on economic growth. However, CGE models are not exempt of 
criticisms. In particular, some authors find such models as unduly abstract and 
divorced from reality because they describe a purely hypothetical situation of what 
will happen at some stage in the future with and without integration.
61
 Even applied 
to the past they require strong assumptions.  
Another methodology pursued in the literature in the analysis of the effects of 
regional integration on trade is a descriptive approach (Anderson and Norheim, 1993; 
Yeats, 1998). These works use several indicators to measure the regional concentration of 
trade. In the descriptive approach is assumed that the share of trade with the partner 
country would not have changed in absence of the preferential agreement. The approaches 
most commonly used in the empirical literature, especially in the most recent works, are 
the Computable general equilibrium (CGE) and the Gravity models. Next, we discuss these 
two widespread approaches for the the analysis of the effects of trade into the context of 
RTAs.  
1.2.1. General Equilibrium Models 
General Equilibrium Models (GEM) assume a certain model structure, with specific 
functional forms and are often used to predict the effects of a regional trade agreement 
                                                          
61 
See De Rosa, 1998 and Robinson and Thrierfelder, 2002 for a survey of studies based on CGE models,  
CHAPTER 3.  THE STATIC TRADE EFFECTS OF EURASEC 
145 
(RTA) before it is formed. Ex-ante studies have used counterfactual analysis based on 
partial or general equilibrium models (GEM).
62
 These models with a sufficiently tight 
theoretical structure can also be used to draw direct inferences about welfare. The model is 
then subjected to the preferential removal of tariffs alone, and the welfare effects are 
calculated (Dee and Galli, 2003). 
In essence, CGE models are computer-based simulations, like laboratory 
experiments. They compute how today's economy will look in the future as a consequence 
of a specified set of policy changes. In the trade field, CGE models are used to estimate the 
trade and income effects of different liberalization scenarios. They identify the sources of 
income gains or losses from further opening up to trade and show how these are distributed 
among countries or regions. 
The main benefit of CGE models is that they offer a rigorous and theoretically 
consistent framework for analyzing trade policy questions. The figures that come out of the 
simulations should only be used to give a sense of the order of magnitude that a change in 
policy can mean for economic welfare or trade. In order to create further confidence in the 
results the simulations should make use of sensitivity analysis (Piermartini and Teh, 2005).         
Since the contributions of Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957), General Equilibrium 
Models have played a relevant role in economic analysis. In the area of RTA there is a 
significant number of empirical works following this methodology (Deardorff, 1998; 
Brown et al, 2003; Robinson and Thierfelder, 2002, Piermartini and Teh, 2005; Hertel, 
1997; Baldwin and Venables, 1995). These papers use the ex-ante CGE approach to 
analyse the impact of different trade agreements and investigate what effects can be 
expected from them. Robinson and Thierfelder, (2002) have used multi-country 
computable general equilibrium (CGE)
63
 models to analyze potential and actual regional 
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Economic analysis may be partial equilibrium or general equilibrium in nature. A general equilibrium 
analysis explicitly accounts for all the links between sectors of an economy - households, firms, 
governments and countries. A partial equilibrium model typically focuses only on one part (specific 
market) or sector of the economy, assuming that the impact of that sector on the rest of the economy and 
vice versa is either non-existent or small. It does not take into account the link between factor incomes 
and expenditures. Therefore, partial equilibrium models cannot be used to determine income, while 
general equilibrium models can. However, there are circumstances when the benefits of a general 
equilibrium model are offset by the high level of aggregation required to be able to use comparable and 
consistent data and by the difficulties in the specification of parameters and functional forms in the model 
(Piermartini and Teh, 2005). 
63 
The theoretical models suggest that the net impact of an RTA on trade creation and trade diversion is 
ambiguous. It depends on the export capacity of the partner country and how the world price from the 
RTA partner compares to the world price from the least cost producer who is not an RTA member. An 
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trade agreements (RTAs) such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, EFTA or EU. Their results 
indicate that these RTAs improve welfare, that trade creation greatly exceeds trade 
diversion, and that they are consistent with further global liberalization. They show that the 
welfare gains are greater when the models incorporate aspects of ‘‘new trade theory’’ such 
as increasing returns, imperfect competition, and links between trade liberalization, total 
factor productivity growth, and capital accumulation. 
Baldwin and Venables, (1995) also used Computable equilibrium models and 
suggested that such methods have perhaps become the predominant research approach to 
assessing RIAs. According to these authors, GEMs have made two distinct contributions to 
the evaluation of RIAs. Firstly, they provide estimates of the effects of actual or proposed 
RIAs. However, since even the most sophisticated models cannot capture the full impact of 
complicated RIAs, the results give only a partial estimate of the true impact. Secondly, 
they have also helped to understand the theoretical interactions in models that are too 
complicated to study analytically. The studies of NAFTA and EC92 cases illustrate the 
wide range of possible effects that can be captured in such models and the range of 
predictions that can be generated. It is important to think of these models as playing two 
distinct roles; namely, policy analysis and "theory with numbers". 
Dee and Gali (2003) discuss some examples in their study and note that CGE 
analyses suffer from a number of practical difficulties: some assume fixed terms of trade, 
which rules out one of the key effects of RTAs, namely, terms of trade changes. In 
addition, these studies typically ignore many of the non-tariff measures and provisions 
affecting non-merchandise trade.  
However, they conclude that when used with appropriate assumptions CGE can 
give valuable insights into the possible effects of tariff provision of RTAs. Further, Hosny 
(2013) provides a recent summary of the literature on Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) trade models by analyzing the effects of trade policy changes. He concluded that 
CGE models have numerous advantages and are a powerful tool for analyzing the effects 
of trade policy changes. Nevertheless, although the use of CGE’s is widely accepted, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                
RTA can be net trade-creating in one sector and net trade diverting in another sector. To determine the 
implications of an RTA for aggregate welfare and trade patterns, one needs economy wide, multi-sectoral, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Further, multi-country CGE models differ widely in 
terms of country and commodity coverage, assumed market structure, policy detail, and specification of 
macroeconomic closure (Robenson and Thierfelder 2002). 
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doesn’t imply that the CGE type of analysis is not without limitations as showed by Dee 
and Gali (2003). Therefore, conclusions drawn from surveys of CGE studies should be 
treated cautiously.   
Piermartini and Teh, (2005) in their clear explanation of CGE and gravity models 
have stressed that models differ in the type of analysis they conduct regarding how a 
change in trade policy affects the initial equilibrium of the economy, i.e., its initial state 
before the policy is introduced. In a comparative static approach, one examines how a 
change in policy changes the endogenous variables.  
The concern is with the difference between the initial and final equilibrium of the 
economy and not with the transition required to move from the initial equilibrium to the 
final one. One limitation of this approach is that it may fail to capture some of the costs 
and benefits associated with the transition and therefore overstate or understate the benefits 
from the change in trade policy. All the costs associated with this re-allocation of resources 
would not be included in a comparative static analysis. 
In contrast to the ex-ante approach, ex-post studies of RTAs do not estimate welfare 
effects directly, they measure trade creation and trade diversion effects by using 
econometric techniques to establish a link between actual RTA formation and actual trade 
outcomes, controlling for the effects of all other influences, (Dee and Galli, 2003).  
Following the view of Dee and Galli, for the evaluation of static trade effects (trade 
creation and trade diversion), the present work will use an ex-post estimation, i.e., an 
econometric approach based on the Gravity model. Furthermore, Dee and Galli (2003) 
suggest that the gravity model is the key ex post econometric technique for the analysis of 
the determinants of bilateral trade flows and effects of RTAs.  
1.2.2. The Gravity model  
1.2.2.1. Theoretical underpinnings and development  
The Gravity model is a widely used econometric technique on international trade, 
and has been applied in a large number of empirical researches. Its name originally comes 
from the similarity to the Newtonian “Law of Universal Gravitation”: the force of gravity 
between two bodies is positively related to the mass of the attracting items and negatively 
to the square of the distance between them.   
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Related with this, the gravity model on international trade predicts that the volume 
of trade between two countries will be positively related to the size of their economies 
(their GDP) and negatively related to the distance (transportation costs) between them. 
 The roots of this approach can be found in the early paper of Tinbergen (1962) 
who suggested that approximately the same functional form of the traditional gravity 
equation could be used in evaluating international trade flows: the volume of trade as a 
growing function of the national incomes of the participating countries. The basic equation 
is given as: 
𝑿𝒊𝒋 = 𝑨
    𝒀𝒊 𝒀𝒋        
𝑫𝒊𝒋
  ,          (1) 
where  
A is a constant  
𝑋𝑖𝑗  is the value of exports (or trade flows) from country  𝑖 to 𝑗; 
𝑌𝑖  is the GDP of country 𝑖  and  𝑌𝑗  is the GDP of country 𝑗; 
𝐷𝑖𝑗  represents the geographical distance between the two countries. 
Tinberger (1962) tried to determine the “normal pattern” of international trade in 
the absence of “discriminatory trade impediments” (such as the Commonwealth or the 
BENELUX) and to estimate the effect of such agreements (Bergstrand and Egger, 2011). 
Later, many other works, our work among them, had the same motivation for using the 
gravity equation.  
Since its emergence, this model became a very actively used tool in empirical 
studies, most commonly specified as equation (1), and a large body of empirical literature 
has emerged, see inter alia Linnemann, 1966; Balassa, 1967; Aitken, 1973; Anderson, 
1979; Bergstrand, 1985; 1989; Deardorff, 1998; Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Rose and van 
Wincoop, 2001; Glick and Rose, 2001; Wall, 2000, 2001, 2003; Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand and Baier, 2007; Yang and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013. This 
literature has made significant contribution on the theoretical and empirical foundation of 
the gravity model.    
Nevertheless, even though this model became prominent due to its perceived 
empirical success, at the same time it has been criticized due to its lack of a consistent 




. Therefore, the gravity model has been regarded as a weak 
approach to the analysis of trade flows by some academics, who suggest that estimated 
coefficients are not reliable given the aforementioned problems.  
The first attempts to provide a theoretical rationale to the gravity model is 
Anderson (1979), who was the first to present a formal theoretical foundation for the 
gravity model
65
. This model was built under constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
preferences, and assumed that products are differentiated by country of origin and that 
consumers have preferences defined over all the differentiated products. In other words, 
this is the so called Armington assumption. This first theoretical background for the gravity 
model was subsequently developed by the works of Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and 
Krugman (1985), Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003. 
Further, the absence of price terms in Anderson’s model motivated the development 
of the monopolistic competition model of Bergstrand (1985), who investigated the 
theoretical determination of bilateral intra-industry trade in a series of papers. Bergstrand 
presented this model as a reduced form of the general equilibrium model of international 
trade, and following Anderson’s (1979) assumptions he considered CES preferences over 
Armington-differentiated goods and added price indexes. He found that price indexes, 
besides to the traditional gravity variables, were also statistically significant. Bergstrand 
(1989) and Helpman (1987) depart from the Armington assumption and consider the Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition model, focusing their attention on product 
differentiation among firms rather than among countries. Piermartini and Teh (2005) point 
that Bergstrand models with monopolistic competition overcome the undesirable feature of 
Armington models, where goods are differentiated by location and production by 
assumption. The firm location is endogenously determined and countries are specialized in 
the production of different sets of goods.  
                                                          
64 
The good fit and relatively tight clustering of coefficient estimates in the vast empirical literature 
suggested that some underlying economic law must be at work, but in the absence of an accepted 
connection to economic theory, most economists ignored gravity models (Anderson, 2011). According to 
Bergstrand and Egger (2011), prior to 1979 the absence of rigorous theoretical microeconomic 
foundations for the gravity equation in international trade inhibited its use for policy work and left the 
equation on the periphery of mainstream international trade research. 
65 
The Andderson`s model is based upon three assumptions. First, he assumes that each country specializes 
completely in the production of its own good, and there is one good for each country produced 
exogenously (i.e., an “endowment economy”). Second, he assumes identical, homothetic preferences. 
Third, he also assumes a frictionless world with zero transport costs, tariffs, and distribution costs; with 
no frictions, all prices can be normalized to unity (Bergstrand and Egger, 2011). 
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Deardorff (1998) derived the gravity model for the value of bilateral trade 
following Anderson (1979) in the use of market clearance from extreme cases of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin structure. Deardorff’s framework was in fact very similar to what 
Anderson (1979) had examined in his work. This author tries to find whether a gravity 
model works in a neoclassical world with impeded trade, although Deardorf motivated the 
differentiation among products by the HO model’s case to explain specialization rather 
than by the Armington assumption. Anderson modeled preferences over only traded goods, 
while Deardorff assumed for simplicity that they hold over all goods. Anderson’s primary 
concern was to examine the econometric properties of the resulting equations, rather than 
to extract easily interpretable theoretical implications as tried to find Deardorff.  
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) showed that indeed, gravity equations were not 
theoretically grounded, although they had a very good fit to the data and estimates were 
sensible. This implies both that the econometric estimations suffered from the omitted 
variable bias and that comparative statics analysis was unfounded. Moreover, the models 
generally suffered of a lack of understanding of what was driving the results. According to 
these authors, the theoretically appropriate average trade barrier refers to the "multilateral 
resistance." In order to conduct a comparative statics exercise, such as asking what the 
effects of removing certain trade barriers are, one has to be able to solve the general-
equilibrium model before and after the removal of such trade barriers. From this point of 
view, they developed a method that consistently and efficiently estimated a theoretical 
gravity equation (using a system of equations to allow for the endogeneity of prices in 
estimation) and correctly calculated the comparative statics of trade frictions.  
Consequently, their basic gravity model significantly simplifies the expressions 
derived by Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998). 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 =  







       (3) 
 In this equation, they refer to the price indices (Pi) as "multilateral resistance" 
variables as they depend on all bilateral resistances (tj), including those not directly 
involving (i). A rise in trade barriers with all trading partners will raise the index. It should 
be noted that (Yw) represents world’s GDP. Moreover, they implemented the theory both 
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in the context of a two-country model, consisting of the United States and Canada, and a in 
a multi-country model that also included other industrialized countries.  
 In the light of above discussion, they suggested an alternative to the estimation 
method consisting of the replacement of the multilateral resistance terms with country-
specific dummies. This leads to consistent estimates of model parameters. The main 
advantage is simplicity as the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is feasible. 
Another advantage is that there is no need to make any assumptions about internal 
distances to states and provinces, which are needed to compute the structural multilateral 
resistance terms and are difficult to measure. Rose and van Wincoop (2000) and Glick and 
Rose (2001) have used this estimator when applying the method in their papers to 
determine the effect on trade of monetary unions. In any case, Anderson and Winccop 
(2003,) conclude that “the key aspect of the gravity model, the dependence of trade on 
bilateral and multilateral resistance will hold up under a wide range of generalizations".   
 In general, existing literature indicates that, far from being a purely econometric 
approach without a theoretical foundation, the gravity model is a valid tool to analyse 
bilateral trade flows. Following Anderson (1979) these studies have preserved the CES 
preference structure and have presented the gravity model as a reduced form of the GEM 
of international trade in goods. In addition, they showed that, on the one hand, gravity 
models in a simple form can be derived out just from the trade theories (Ricardian 
Approach, Heckscher-Ohlin structure to explain specialization and Helpman-Krugman 
Approach of monopolistic competition). On the other hand, they have also taken into 
account the two main determinants that characterize the models of the new theory of trade: 
economies of scale combined with differentiated products and transportation costs, which 
ultimately provide a theoretical justification of the gravity model. 
 The above discussion shows that there exists a theoretical foundation underlying 
the use of gravity models for the anlaysis of international trade flows. Once more, the 
empirical success of the revised literature, departing from Anderson (1979), Bergstrand 
(1985), Deardorrf (1998) and Anderson and Wincoop (2003) stimulates our concern for 
evaluating regional trade flows by using the gravity model in the present work. 
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1.2.2.2. Theoretical linkages of explanatory variables 
    In gravity models, a number of variables are generally used to capture trade 
costs. For example, distance and dummies for island, landlocked and common borders are 
used to reflect the hypotheses that transport costs increase with distance, they are higher 
for landlocked countries and islands, but are lower for neighbouring countries. Dummies 
for common language, adjacency or other relevant cultural features, such as colonial 
history, are used to capture information costs. Search costs are probably lower in trade 
between countries whose business practices, competitiveness and delivery reliability are 
well known to one another. Tariff barriers are generally included in the form of dummies 
for the existence of regional trade agreements (Piermartini and Teh, 2005).   
According to Sologoa and Winters (2001), the gravity variables of the model (GDP, 
population, distance, exchange rate, cultural similarities) control for those factors that are 
assumed to explain “normal” trade between countries. Thus, in the absence of a 
preferential trade agreement (PTA), members’ trade would have the same relationship to 
the gravity variables as the other countries in the sample. In this setting, the block-related 
dummy variables capture “abnormal” levels of trade that could be attributed to a PTA. 
The large number of studies using the gravity equation starting by Aitken (1973), 
have identified the importance of RTAs-specific dummy variables for the identification of 
the impact of the RTAs in the participating countries, especially in estimating static trade 
creation and trade diversion effects. While  Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985 and 1989), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985), Deardorf (1998), Anderson and Wincoop (2003) made 
their contribution to the gravity model departing from the  rigorous theoretical foundation 
and explanations for the log linear form, others as Linnemann (1966)
66
, Aitken (1973), 
Frankel (1997), Frankel and Wei (1995), Limao and Venables (2001) Soloaga and Winters 
(2001)  developed a methodology to identify the explanatory variables specification and 
the supplement of new variables to the model. 
 In the context of capturing trade effects of RTAs, the first who added a dummy 
variable, was Aitken (1973). He introduced such type of dummy aiming to evaluate the 
effect of trade creation and trade diversion. Later, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), 
Frankel (1997) and Frankel and Wei (1998); have included a second set of dummy 
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Linnemann (1966) augmented the gravity model by adding the coefficient of population variable to 
capture economies of scale and used the GNP as an independent variable for the propensity to import. 
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variables for each PTA to capture the separate effects on intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade. 
They used such dummies for testing the effects of membership in a common regional 
grouping. Sologoa and Winter (2001) have augmented the gravity model by adding a third 
set of dummy variables. Their main goal was to explore the effects of regional 
arrangements on the members’ internal and external trade flows in terms of Viner’s trade 
creation and trade diversion. Moreover, their concern was to reduce uncertainty about the 
latter effects proxying for omitted variables. They modify the usual gravity equation to 
identify the separate effects of PTAs on intra-bloc trade, members' total imports, and 
members' total exports by defining three sets of dummy variables for each trade block.  
1.3. The EurAsEC trade performance: A brief overview 
Since 1995 the trade volume of EurAsEC had an increasing tendency, which was 
intensified after 2001, with the exception of 2009, which like for the rest of the world was 
characterized by a general reduction in the volume of trade due to the global crisis. In spite 
of the area's trade was multiplied by 6.5 between 1995 and 2013, the percentage of intra-
regional trade has not increased over the average; by the contrary, the participation of 
intra-regional trade in total trade of the region has decreased slightly (from 12% to 11% of 
total trade) (Graph 3.1).  
So, in terms of the contribution of the economic integration process on intra-
regional trade, on one hand, one could say that the Eurasian Economic Community is not a 
successful commercial agreement, since the share of intraregional trade on total trade does 
not increase. But, on the other hand, intra-regional trade increased over the period. Then, 
what we can interpret as trade creation within the area and also trade creation with the rest 
of the world (no trade diversion) should be interpreted as a positive result. The existence of 
trade creation and trade diversion effects of EurAsEC, once many other explanatory 
variables are considered, is what we determine in the next section.  
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 Graph 3.1. Total foreign trade and intra-regional trade turnover of EurAzEC 
 
 Source: Own elaboration from UNCTAD DATA 
The intra-regional trade within EurAsEC is distinguished by some particular 
characteristics which explain the poorer dynamic of intra-regional trade. First, a high 
reliance on one country market (Russia and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan), which makes 
the members of the regional association very vulnerable to the economic situation 
prevailing in Russia. So that, despite the extra-regional orientation of trade of the EurAsEC 
countries, Russia remains as the principal trading partner for almost all members of the 
Community. Belarus and Kazakhstan represent the second and third position respectively. 
Although the weight of Russia fell in recent years, by 2013 it still represented 45% of total 
EurAsEC trade. Tajikistan's participation has been declining over the period, accounting 
only 1.1% in 2013. The second characteristic is the prevalence of traditional products (with 
low added value) and the absence of significant changes in the structure of the comparative 
advantage. Third, EurAsEC trade is also characterized for its high export commodity 
concentration, especially in the trade with the rest of the world and for the reduction of 
intra-industry trade, as well as the intensity and the complementarity of trade (Tochitskaya 
et al, 2008). Finally, a fundamental challenge related to the little relevance of trade within 
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1.4. Trade creation and trade diversion effects of EurAsEC: Trade effects 
in Tajikistan    
1.4.1. The Gravity model in the context of the present study. Why a Gravity 
Model?  
As stated earlier, gravity models have been widely used to evaluate the effects of 
regional integration agreements (RIAs) –particularly, free trade agreements (FTAs), 
customs unions (trade creation/trade diversion), trade patterns (the impact of trade policies 
on trade flows) and other forms of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
 The gravity equation has been one of the most successful empirical models in 
economics, ordering remarkably well the enormous observed variation in economic 
interaction across space in both trade and factor movements. It has been widely used to 
infer trade flow effects of institutions such as customs unions, exchange-rate mechanisms, 
ethnic ties, language differences, and international borders and so on,  Anderson (2011).  
Moreover, econometric evaluations have an advantage in that they can be appraised by 
standard statistical criteria and such approaches have evaluated the effects of RTAs on a 
wide range of variables, Baldwin and Venables (1995). 
 According to the World Trade Organization (2005), there are two main reasons for 
the central role played by the gravity model in empirical work on international trade. The 
first has to do with the high explanatory value of the model in explaining bilateral trade 
flows. This ability to provide accurate representations of trade flows is related to the fact 
that the gravity model has the distinguishing feature of integrating the weight of the 
geographical, linguistic, historical and cultural similarity in bilateral trade between the two 
trading partners. The second reason is that these models provide an easy method to 
estimate the impact of other variables in the trade process.  
 In the light of the above discussion we consider that the econometric gravity model 
is very appropriate for assessing the trade effects (trade creation and trade diversion) of the 
economic integration agreement Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) as a whole 
and, in particular, in the case of Tajikistan. 
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1.4.2. Specification of the model and variable selection 
In this section, we estimate a gravity model for the EurAsEC countries in order to 
disentangle two main questions. Our first aim is to assess whether the agreement has 
implied increased trade among bloc members. We should expect that the existence of such 
an agreement should foster trade between members, which can be measured either through 
total imports, total exports or total trade (imports + exports) from other members of the 
agreement. There is, however, a second important question related to the first one, 
specifically whether this increased trade has implied also increased trade with the rest of 
the world (ROW), i.e., if the reduction of barriers to trade has fostered also trade with other 
trade partners, or alternatively, whether this agreement actually reduces trade with the rest 
of the world. The former case would be identified with trade creation, whereas the latter 
would be identified with trade diversion. 
There are some important issues to deal with before we begin with our econometric 
exercise. The first one is related to the sample of countries to be included in the analysis. 
The obvious approach is to include the five members of the EurAsEC agreement. 
However, restricting our analysis to these five countries would limit the scope of the study, 
since we would only be able to observe trade flows between these countries and therefore 
the identification of trade creation or trade diversion from the rest of the world would not 
be possible. Therefore, we need to increase the sample of countries to be included. These 
additional countries should share some similarities in order to correctly asses the effects of 
the agreement. In origin (before the agreement was signed) these countries should share 
some economic, social or political linkages, so that we can compare how trade has evolved 
in the countries that form the trade area (between each other and with the rest of the world 
partners) and in those countries that chose not to join. Our approach has been to construct a 
panel of 10 countries, all of them former members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which is the origin of the EurAsEC agreement. This provides a natural 
ground to assess the trade effects of the agreement. Thus, we gather data from Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
and Ukraine. Note that in this panel, 5 members belong to the EurAsEC and 5 members do 
not. 
A second issue is related to the sequence of our analysis. We are interested in the 
effects of the agreement for the countries that formed the EurAsEC area in general, and for 
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Tajikistan in particular. Therefore, our analysis will follow this structure, determining first 
the effects for the whole area, and then for Tajikistan. Also, we will provide several 
specifications of the gravity equation, in order to check for robustness of the econometric 
results. 
As we have already seen, the existing gravity model literature gives several 
indications as regards the factors that affect trade direction. Indeed, the literature has 
showed that in this model trade flows between two countries are explained, in the first 
place, by their economic size, measured through GDP (income), and geographical distance 
(transaction costs). Both are core-determining variables of trade capacity in gravity model 
(Balassa, 1967; De Rosa, 2007). Nevertheless, the model is augmented with further several 
variables, which could either facilitate or dampen trade flows. Among these variables we 
may point GDP per capita, population, real exchange rate and so on. Other variables, 
which have been included in some models as a result of the particular countries under 
study, try to control for geographic impact and historical ties, as dummy variables for 
common language, landlocked, colonial, contiguity, trade policy (RTA) and others. 
Our study follows the methodology applied previously in the literature (see inter 
alia Zidi and Dhifalla, 2013 or Akoete, 2008) and augments the basic formulation of the 
gravity model with variables representing factors that could either facilitate or impede 
trade. We will use the value of imports and the value of exports as the dependent variables, 
using as explanatory variables GDP (coded as GDP), population (POP), distance (DIST), 
the real exchange rate (RER), dummies for contiguity (CONT), common speak language 
(COMLANG), landlocked (LAND) and adjacency by USSR (USSR) and, in order to 
verify the impact of the regional agreement on bilateral trade, we include two “regional” 
dummy variables (imports from (exports to) EurAsEC members, MTEurAs, and imports 
from (exports to) non-members of EurAsEC, MTROW). The equation we will estimate, in 
its logarithmic form, taking imports as the dependent variable, is given by:
67
  
𝑳𝒏 𝑴𝒊𝒋𝒕  = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝒏 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒋𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒏 𝑷𝑶𝑷𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒏 𝑷𝑶𝑷𝒋𝒕 +
 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝒏 𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝒏 𝑹𝑬𝑹𝒊𝒋𝒕 +  𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟖𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒔𝒑𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒋 +
 𝜷𝟗𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒏𝒂𝒕𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑼𝑺𝑺𝑹𝒋 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑫𝑳𝑶𝑪𝑲𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑴𝑻 𝑬𝒖𝒓𝑨𝒔 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑴𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑾 +
 𝑼𝒊𝒋𝒕  (4) 
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We also estimate the same equation taking exports as the dependent variable.  
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Were the form of the error term uijt will be discussed below. 
Because of the multiplicative nature of the gravity equation, it is common practice 
to use its log-linear form. In practice, the gravity equation relates the natural logarithm of 
the monetary value of trade between two countries to the log of their respective GDPs, a 
composite term measuring barriers and incentives to trade between them, and terms 
measuring barriers to trade between each of them and the rest of the world. This 
specification allows in addition an easy interpretation of the estimated parameters: the 
parameters of an equation estimated in logarithms are elasticities. For example, the 
estimated parameter for the GDP in a gravity equation estimated in logarithms is the 
elasticity of trade to GDP, indicating the percentage variation in trade following a 1 per 
cent increase in GDP (UNCDAT, 2012).  
The definitions of each of the included variables are provided next: 
𝑳𝒏 𝑴𝒊𝒋𝒕  is bilateral imports of a country i from a country j in year t; measured in 
million US dollars. Several works take total trade as dependent variable, but using as the 
dependent variable the value of exports or imports is better because it allows estimating 
different income elasticities for exports and imports (Frankel and Wei, 1998). Moreover, 
Cernat (2001) showed that for a given pair of countries, the use of total bilateral trade does 
not allow distinguishing between the impacts of RTA formation on exports from a non-
member to RTA members from that on exports from an RTA member to a non-member. 
He argues that a constant level for overall bilateral trade (exports and imports) might be the 
result of a reduction in imports from non-members and an increase in exports from RTA-
members to third countries.  Further, Akoete (2008) suggests that the use of imports value 
as a dependent variable is better when flows are studied from the country of arrival 
perspective, because countries tend to monitor their imports more accurately than their 
exports, given that taxes are levied on the former.  
In Tajikistan, from 2000 to 2013 exports increased in average just 1.8% per year 
(from 748.9 million to 1141.9 millions), but imports boomed 4.4 times that figure (from 
688.1 million to 4139.4). Therefore, it is interesting to analyse separately the effect on 
imports and on exports. So, we also take as dependent variable the value of bilateral 
exports of country I from country j, 𝑳𝒏 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕  . 
𝑳𝒏 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒕  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑳𝒏 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒋𝒕 are the GDP of the country i and country j, respectively 
(measured in million US dollars). GDP, a variable indicative of the size of the economy, is 
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a powerful predictor of trade potential. This variable should have a positive impact on 
trade flows in both directions. This means that GDP growth in an importing country will 
increase economic capacity which in turn, will boost imports. Likewise, GDP growth of an 
exporting country induces richness and competitiveness. Related to this, Frankel and 
Kahler (1993) suggest that real GDP is included to capture the factors associated with the 
level of economic development, as well as the productive capacity of the exporting country 
and the purchasing power of the importing country. 
𝑳𝒏 𝑷𝑶𝑷𝒊𝒕   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑳𝒏 𝑷𝑶𝑷𝒋𝒕 are the size of the population of countries i and j 
respectively. On the one hand, a larger population promotes large market size and 
economies of scale, and should therefore lead to a positive sign for its impact on trade. 
However, on the other hand, a large domestic market with rich resource endowments can 
imply a large internal absorption effect, which could restrain bilateral trade; in this case 
this variable can have a negative impact on trade flows.  
𝑳𝒏 𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒋  is the geographical distance between capital cities of the country i and 
country j, measured in thousands of miles. Distance variable has a significant impact on 
trade flows, mainly when one of the trade partners is a landlocked. Tinbergen (1962) 
already suggested that the volume of trade could be evaluated as a growing significant 
function of the GDP of the trading countries and a decreasing function of the distance 
between them. Since this variable represents a restriction or friction to trade we expect the 
distance coefficient to be negative. However, there are other various factors which 
influence the trade flows even more than physical distance. Worse access to the market, 
delivery time requirements, transport costs and other distance factors related costs tend to 
reduce the volume of trade. 
𝑳𝒏 𝑹𝑬𝑹𝒊𝒋𝒕  is the real bilateral exchange rate between country i and country j in 
year t. The exchange rate allows to capturing the evolution of competitiveness (Soloaga 
and Winters, 2001). Following Bergstrand (1985), the majority of studies using a gravity 
model include the real exchange rate (RER) because this variable includes the impact of 
trading member’s prices. An increase in this variable, reflecting a real currency 
depreciation of the importing country (i) with respect to the exporting country (j), leads to 
a decrease of imports of country (i) from country (j). Thus, the expected sign of this 
variable is negative. 
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
160 
We compute the RER from the nominal exchange rate of each country vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar and the consumer price index for each countries (CPI) in every year from 1995 
to 2013. Following previous contributions (Akoete, 2008;  Zidi and Miloud, 2013) we 
compute the RER by the following formula: 
















To control for economic, political, geographical, cultural and historical influences 
on the direction of trade, we have included some dummy variables. Dummy variables 
commonly used in order to identify factors of resistance or promotion of trade are: 
Common speak language, Common Border, Landlocked, etc. Usually such dummies are 
defined as variables facilitating trade and therefore their expected sign should be positive. 
In our empirical model we include
68
:  
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝒊𝒋 is the dummy variable for common border between country i and country 
j, which takes value 1 if the countries share a common border and 0 otherwise.  
𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒔𝒑𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒋 is the probability (0-1) that a random pair of people from the two 
countries understand one another in some language
69
. 
𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒏𝒂𝒕𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒋 is the probability (0-1) that a random pair of people from the two 
countries speak the same native language.             
In this regard, based on the CEPII-language data, (CSL and CNL: percentage of 
population by at least 4% of the population in two countries
70
), and following the thorough 
work of Melitz and Toubal (2012), we try to estimate separately the impact of these two 
language aspects on bilateral trade, in order to understand whether the linguistic influences 
come from ethnicity and trust or from ease of communication. If CSL is significant in the 
presence of CNL, the significance of CSL would clearly reflect ease of communication 
rather than ethnicity and trust. 
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Even though we present a list of potential dummy variables, only those statistically significant will be 
kept in the analysis. Appendix B summarises the estimation of the full model, with all of these dummy 
variables included in the regression. As can be seen, only a limited subset of these variables is significant, 
and therefore included in our final baseline model. 
69 
The usual measure of a common language is a binary zero - one, based on official status. However, it is 
not obvious that such a measure of a common language can adequately reflect the diverse sources of 
linguistic influence on trade, including ethnic ties and trust, ability to communicate directly, and ability to 
communicate indirectly through interpreters and translation (Melitz and Toubal, 2012). 
70 
See: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=19 
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The findings of Melitz and Toubal (2012) have shown that the impact of linguistic 
factors, all together, is at least twice as great as the usual dummy variable for a common 
language, resting on official language. 
𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑫𝑳𝑶𝑪𝑲𝒊𝒋 is the dummy variable for landlocked, taking value 1 if partner 
country is landlocked, and 0 otherwise.   
𝑼𝑺𝑺𝑹𝒋  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the partners have been members 
of the Former Soviet Union, and 0 otherwise. 
In principle, being former Soviet Union (USSR) members is a facilitating factor for 
trade since these economies had closer economic relation before independence and 
certainly they still have some common ways of doing things in addition to a common 
speaking language to a greater or lesser extent.  
Because we are interested in capturing the impact of regional trade agreements, 
regional dummy variables between country i and country j are key in our model. We 
introduce two specific dummy variables for EurAsEC agreement: 
𝑴𝑻 𝑬𝒖𝒓𝑨𝒔 takes value 1 if both countries are members of the EurAsEC bloc at time 
t, and 0 otherwise. 
 𝑴𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑾 takes value 1 if the importing country is member of the EurAsEC bloc and 
the exporting country j is not a member, and therefore is part of the ROW at time t, and 0 
otherwise.  
According to UNCTAD (2012) a positive (and significant) coefficient on both 
variables is suggestive of trade creation; a positive on the first but negative on the second 
one is suggestive of trade diversion.  
1.4.3. The Sample of countries and Data Source 
In order to achieve relevant empirical results, the availability of an appropriate and 
reliable dataset is crucial, especially when the researcher analyses small and undeveloped 
countries, which often do not have relevant economic data available. It has been generally 
recognized in empirical work the absence of good quality data for some countries, 
especially with sectorial breakdown data and a relatively large time dimension (World 
Trade Organization, 2005). Missing data, measurements errors and sample selection bias 
can be the source of differences in estimation. Some of these problems arise from the data 
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sources themselves. For example, bilateral trade data fail to distinguish between zero trade 
and missing data. 
The existing literature has proven that the best approach to the estimation of a 
gravity model is through the use of panel-data, in order to balance the cross section 
dimension (number of included countries in the estimation) and the time dimension that, as 
noted previously, is not always long enough as to perform single-country econometric 
analysis. On the other hand, especially in terms of trade, data scarcity and the importance 
of trading membership do not allow us to choose any countries. Moreover, time dimension 
is another issue. For instance, in our case, initially we wanted to use a sample from 1991 
(year of the independence of CIS countries) to use as much statistical information as 
possible. However, we could not follow this strategy because of missing data before 1995 
for most of the countries included in the sample.  Therefore, the selection of partner 
countries to be included in this study has followed several requirements: First, availability 
of data. Second, the relevance as trading partners. For each of the reporter countries, 
selected partners account by above 60% of total imports and exports. For instance, in 2000, 
imports from the 25 partner countries account from 60% for Armenia to 92% for 
Tajikistan; in 2013, from 67% for Armenia and Russia to 89% for Tajikistan and 86% for 
Belarus and Kazakhstan.  
Thus, in the light of the above discussion we estimate our model with annual data 
for a panel that covers bilateral import flows for the 10 CIS reporter countries with 25 
partner countries included in the sample, for the period from 1995 to 2013. Each cross-
section unit in the panel is identified as a bilateral relationship between each of the 10 
reporter countries and the remaining 25 trading partners, i.e., an import flow from each of 
the 25 partner countries towards one of the 10 reporter countries. Therefore, the cross-
section dimension of the panel comprises 250 units. The group of 26 trading partners 
includes, besides Tajikistan, 10 countries from the CIS; 10 from the EU and 5 others main 
trade neighbour partner countries like China, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 
full list of the selected countries is given in the (Appendix 1).  
Given the type of variables included in our gravity model, we have gathered our 
data from different sources. Nevertheless, the majority of the data has been taken from the 
datasets provided by the World Bank, WTO, UNCTAD, and the French database CEPII. 
We consider all of these datasets reliable sources since they have been widely used in the 
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empirical literature. We have also taken some additional data from several National 
Statistical databases. Table 1 below summarises the data sources for each of the variables 
included in the model. 
Table 3.1. Data sources 
Brief Description Dataset 
Bilateral import and export values from Trade 
Data:  
Import and export data are mainly taken from 
UNCTAD. Some missing UNCTAD data are 
replaced by the remaining datasets 
 
- World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) – the World 
Bank. http://wits.worldbank.org/ 
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development-
UNCTAD. www.unctad.org 
 - Agency on Statistics under President of the Republic of 
Tajikistan. www.stat.tj 
 -National Statistical Organization. 
http://www.unece.org/stats/links.html 
Data on GDP, Index of consumer price (ICP), 
Population and Exchange Rate 
 
- World Bank Data (WDI, 2013); World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
 http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-
indicators/wdi-2013. 
-International Monetary Fund-IFM, www.ifm.org; 
 Data on the Regional Integration Agreements -The Regional Trade Agreements Information System 
(RTA-IS) – the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
Data on Distance, Languages, Landlocked: 
In order to calculate the distance between  
countries, we have generally used the index 
called “distwces” and “diskm” (between their 







1.4.4. Econometric methodology 
Before discussing our econometric results, it is important to summarise the 
empirical methodology, as well as to discuss the estimation technique. Following the 
discussion in Matyas (1997), the correct econometric representation of the gravity model 
takes the form of a triple-indexed model: 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where M is the volume of imports of country i from country j at time t, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the 
GDP in country i at time t, 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is the GDP of country j at time t, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the distance 
between countries i and j, i=1,…,N, j=1,…,i-1,i+1,…,N+1, t=1,…,T; 𝛼𝑖 is a home country 
effect, 𝛾𝑗 is the target country effect, 𝜆𝑡  is the time effect (business cycle), and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a 
white noise disturbance term. This representation is a simplified version of a standard 
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gravity model, where we have only included two variables measuring “mass” (GDP) and 
one variable measuring distance, but this equation can be easily augmented to include 
further determinants of trade, as suggested by theory. In this regards, this representation 
should be regarded as an explanatory tool. 
There are two major issues discussed in the literature with respect to this equation. 
First, whether 𝛼, 𝛾 and 𝜆 should be modelled as random or fixed effects. Second, whether 
this specification allows for the inclusion of regional dummy variables to test the 
hypothesis that trading blocs have a significant role in the explanation of trade. We will 
start with this last issue, and leave the discussion about fixed vs random effects aside for a 
while. 
Matyas, (1997) shows that, assuming the effects are fixed, the above model is a 
generic form of any gravity model, and a generalisation of the two-way fixed effects panel 
data model. If a cross-section data set is used (Aitken, 1973, Bergstrand, 1985, Frankel et 
al, 1995), T=1 and an additional restriction is imposed, namely𝜆 = 0. If, alternatively, 
time series data is used, then N=1 and the restriction 𝛼 = 0 is imposed. When panel data is 
used, none of these restrictions are imposed. Matyas (1997) shows that if regional 
dummies are included in the model to take into account the effects of bloc trade, failing to 
account simultaneously for local, target and time effects leads to a misspecification of the 
model, and therefore to biased estimations. Therefore, he suggests that any estimation of 
the gravity model with regional dummy variables should be augmented with such type of 
effects. This result is confirmed by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), who show that the 
Matyas model is only a restricted version of a general counterpart which also includes 
bilateral interaction effects. They apply this general model to a panel of 11 APEC 
countries, and test the restriction that these interaction effects are jointly zero, which is 
firmly rejected. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, (1997), Cheng (1999), Wall (2002, 2003) and 
Coughlin and Wall (2003) reach similar conclusions, while Glick and Rose (2001) and 
Pakko and Wall (2001) use the gravity model augmented with all of these effects to 
analyse the trade effects of currency unions. 
Once it is generally accepted that these type of gravity models should include local, 
target and time effects, the discussion can move forward as how to model these effects, i.e., 
whether they should be modelled as random or fixed. Egger (2000) discusses the pros and 
cons of such models. He points that the fixed effects specification is preferred due to two 
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main reasons. First, fixed effects are introduced to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
among trading partners, which can be related to tariff policies, environmental variables, 
size of country, access to transnational infrastructure networks, geographical and historical 
determinants, etc. All of these effects are clearly non random, and should therefore be 
captured by a fixed effect. Secondly, when the gravity model is applied to a specific set of 
countries, with the objective of projecting trade flows between the areas under study, the 
selection of countries involved in the analysis is not random (i.e., countries included in the 
sample are not randomly drawn) but are ex ante fixed. Therefore, the best option should be 
a fixed effects model. Cheng and Wall (2005) reinforce this idea, and show that if country 
heterogeneity is not accounted for correctly, gravity models tend to overestimate the 
effects of integration on the volume of trade. Glick and Rose (2001), Pakko and Wall 
(2001), Wall (2000), Millimet and Osang (2004) or Egger (2002) use gravity models with 
fixed effects to study trade effects of different contexts, such as currency unions, trade 
potentials, etc. 
Therefore, in this analysis, and following previous literature we opt for a fixed 
effect version of the gravity equation (4). This equation is estimated by OLS, including a 
home country, a partner country and a period fixed effect. 
Before performing any regression we must take into account the dynamic properties 
of the variables in the panel, namely whether they are panel-stationary or not. This is 
important, because if variables were not stationary and residuals from the estimation are 
indeed stationary, equation (4) could be interpreted as a cointegrating relationship, and a 
panel-VECM model should be estimated in order to correctly identify the long and short 
run elasticities of the different variables. However, if the panel is stationary, we can rely on 
standard panel-data techniques, and estimate equation (4) as a stationary long run 
relationship. Therefore, we perform panel unit root tests to the variables in the model. 
The literature on panel unit rots has grown rapidly during the recent years. The aim 
of the majority of contributions has been to provide reliable tests to identify the presence of 
unit roots in the panel variables of the econometric models. Among all of the tests that 
have been suggested in the literature we rely on the Maddala-Wu test (Maddala and Wu, 
1999), which is an exact nonparametric test based on Fisher (1932). The test statistic is 
given by: 
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where pi is the probability value of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for the i-th 
unit (country). Since it combines the significance of N different independent unit roots 
statistics, the Fisher test has a number of interesting advantages, which we summarise next: 
 The autoregressive parameter is not restricted to be homogeneous across 
countries under the alternative of stationarity. 
 The lag length and the inclusion of a time trend in the individual ADF 
equations are determined separately for each country, taking into account, 
thus, for potential specific development in individual country data. 
 The sample sizes of the individual ADF test can differ according to data 
availability for each cross-sectional unit. 
 The test can be used with any type of unit root test for the individual units.  
Following the usual practice in the literature we have opted for the ADF test in 
these individual regressions, but have checked that results are similar with other unit root 
tests. Results of the Maddala-Wu test are summarised in table 2, which provides the value 
of the test statistic and the associated p-value. Note that the null is the existence of a unit 
root in the panel variable, and therefore low values of the p-value would allow to reject the 
null of unit root.  
Table 3.2: Panel unit root tests 
  Fisher's  p-value 
Ln Mijt 1063.45 0.00 
Ln Xijt 1198.46 0.00 
Ln GDPit 863.73 0.00 
Ln GDPjt 1279.74 0.00 
Ln GPDPCit 727.85 0.00 
ln GDPPCjt 885.34 0.00 
Ln Popit 588.36 0.00 
Ln Popjt 600.59 0.00 
Ln RERijt 2062.04 0.00 
CHAPTER 3.  THE STATIC TRADE EFFECTS OF EURASEC 
167 
Our results suggest that all of the variables included in the panel are stationary, 
given that the values of the test-statistic are well above the 5% critical value of a 𝜒2(500), 
which is 553.12, and therefore we can confidently proceed with stationary panel 
econometric techniques without risking obtaining spurious relationships between the 
involved variables in the model. 
1.4.5. Results 
Estimation of different specifications of equation (4) are summarised in tables 3 and 
4. Specifically, table 3 summarises the estimates when the dependent variable is total 
imports, while as a consistency check, we have also run the estimations using the exports 
as the dependent variable. These results are summarised in table 4. As discussed 
previously, in each of these estimations we include a fixed effect for each home and trade 
partner country, as well as a time fixed effect. 
We start by column (1) in table 3, which describes the point estimates for the 
standard baseline model, in which imports are regressed on GDP (both in the home country 
and in the exporting country), total population in the home and exporting country, the real 
exchange rate, the distance, and dummies controlling for contiguity, common speak 
language and common native language. We observe that both GDP’s coefficients are 
highly significant, with a positive value of 0.742 for the home country and of -0.141 for the 
partner’s GDP. Population in the home country is not significant, while the population in 
the exporting country is negative and significant at the 10% level. The real exchange rate is 
not significant, while distance shows a significant negative coefficient of -0.966, and 
contiguity and sharing the language have a significant and expected positive coefficient.  
Overall, the model seems to fit well with the gravity model assumptions, but the 
low value of the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests signs of serial correlation. We then re-
estimate the model including the first lag of imports to control for such correlation. Results 
are summarised in column (2). The inertia in imports is remarkable, with an autoregresive 
coefficient of 0.714. Home GDP shows now a coefficient of 0.268 while partner’s GDP 
has a coefficient of -0.148, which imply long run elasticities of 0.93 and -0.51 
respectively.
71
 Population is again not significant, both in the home and in the exporting 
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For a estimated dynamic model of the type 
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country, suggesting that this variable plays no role in the explanation of trading flows in 
the area under study. The real exchange rate is marginally significant at the 12% level, 
with a coefficient of -0.014 and a corresponding long run elasticity of -0.05. Finally, 
distance is also significant with a negative coefficient of -0.190 (long run impact of 0.66), 
contiguity has a significant coefficient of 0.210 (long run impact of 0.734) and both 
variables controlling for common language are significant: the common speaking language 
has a short run coefficient of 0.195 and a long run elasticity of 0.68; while common native 
language has a coefficient of 0.243 and a long run elasticity of 0.84. 
Thus, these preliminary results suggest that the gravity model captures well the 
bilateral trade flows (measured through imports) between the 10 CIS countries included in 
the sample as reporter countries and the corresponding 25 trade partners. The fact that 
population has no role in the explanation of trade flows within the area forces us to drop 
both variables from the model and re-estimate the equation. Results are summarised in 
column (3). Essentially, results are maintained, and all of the estimated coefficients are 
significant at standard levels. Home GDP has a coefficient of 0.269 and a long run 
elasticity of 0.94; partner’s GDP shows a coefficient of -0.157 (long run elasticity of -
0.55); the real exchange rate is now significant at the 10% level (short and long run 
elasticities of -0.015 and -0.05 respectively). The remaining variables have virtually the 
same estimated coefficients as in column (2), with slight differences in the long run 
elasticities. In sum, the model described in column (3) is a standard gravity model, with 
expected signs on the included variables and a reasonable goodness of fit (R
2
 and Adjusted 
R
2
 of 92% and 91% respectively). We therefore rely on this specification to analyse the 
impact of EurAsEC on the volume of trade through the inclusion of two regional dummies: 
one to control for bloc trade (MTEurAs) and another one to control for trade with the rest 
of the world (MTRow). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑦𝑡−1 + ?̂?2𝑥𝑡 
 the long run solution can be derived under the assumption that the dynamic variable y stabilises in its 
steady state value, given the long run values of the exogenous variable x, i.e. 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑠𝑠 








 Therefore, while the short run elasticity of y with respect to x is (assuming the variables are in logs) ?̂?2, 
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We have started with an augmented specification, in which all of the dummy 
variables described above were included, and checked for significance. Only those 
dummies that became significant were kept in the estimations.
72
 In this process we found 
that the Common Native Language variable became not significant, and has been 
consequently dropped. Therefore, we estimate the gravity model, including one lag of 
imports, to account for serial correlation, and including all of these dummies, as well as the 
local, target and time fixed effects. Results are summarised in column (4) of table 3. 
All of the coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and all of the signs are as 
expected. Coefficients for lagged imports, home GDP and partner’s GDP are similar to 
those obtained in previous specifications. Thus, home GDP has a local impact of 0.275 on 
imports, and a long run elasticity of 0.95, while partner’s GDP has a short run elasticity of 
-0.157 and a long run elasticity of -0.55. The real exchange rate impacts negatively on 
imports, with a long run elasticity of -0.06, and the distance between the two trading 
partners also is negatively related to imports (short run impact of -0.208 and long run effect 
of -0.72). The contiguity dummy has an expected positive coefficient of 0.203, which 
implies that the long run effect of sharing a common border is 0.70). The Common 
Speaking Language variable has a positive coefficient of 0.163, with a long run elasticity 
of 0.56). Turning now to the analysis of the regional dummies, the MTEurAs variable 
identifies the impact of this trade agreement on the volume of trade among members. This 
effect is unambiguously positive and significant, with a point estimate of 0.586. Once we 
allow for the dynamics of imports to be settled, the long run impact is 2.04, which implies 
that the effect of the agreement on imports is an increase of 670% with respect to the 
trend.
73
 This obviously indicates that the effects of this agreement have been powerful and 
that the result has been a large increase in the level of trade among members.  
The dummy MTRow allows identifying whether this increase in trade has taken 
place by a substitution of imports from the rest of the world towards the other members of 
the agreement, or if on the contrary, the agreement has also fostered imports from the rest 
of the world. The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy indicates that the latter 
                                                          
72 
In each case, the deletion of the variable from the model was tested with a standard Wald test, whose null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. 
73 
To compute the elasticity of imports with respect to these regional dummies we use the approximation 
𝑒𝐼𝑀𝑃/𝐷 = 𝑒
?̂? − 1, where 𝑒𝐼𝑀𝑃/𝐷 is the elasticity of imports with respect to the dummy variable D, and ?̂? 
is the corresponding estimated long run impact of the variable. 
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has been the result, with a short run impact of 0.359, and a long run impact of 1.25, which 
implies that in the long run, trade with the rest of the world is 249% larger than in the 
absence of the agreement. These results, therefore, allow asserting that the EurAsEC 
agreement has been a source of trade creation in the area. 
Two further questions remain open: first, what are the specific effects of the 
agreement for Tajikistan? Has Tajik’s foreign trade been boosted after the agreement or 
not? Secondly, do these results hold if we consider exports as the dependent variable 
instead of imports?  
Table 3.3. Summary of Estimation Results (Case 1: Intra-EurAsEC bilateral imports as dependent 
variable) 
 EurAsEC Tajikistan 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Ln Mijt-1 
  
0.714 0.00 0.715 0.00 0.713 0.00 0.911 0.00 






























 Ln Popit -0.906 0.20 0.027 0.91 





       Ln Popjt -1.60 0.06 -0.464 0.17 

















































 ComNatLangij 0.820 0.00 0.243 0.01 0.238 0.01 







     MTEurAs 
      
0.586 0.00 0.272 0.01 





      
0.359 0.00 



















 DW 0.49 
         NxT 4412  4239   4139   4139   450   
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To answer the first question, we construct a simplified sample of our dataset, 
including only bilateral trade in which one of the trading partners is Tajikistan. Then, we 
re-estimate the gravity model, including the corresponding regional dummies, except the 
MTRow variable, to avoid perfect collinearity: given that we are analysing only one 
country, which is a member of the EurAsEC, we can investigate whether the agreement 
increases trade or not with the remaining countries of the bloc, but necessarily, by 
construction, the remaining trading partners must be part of the rest of the world.  
Therefore, the MTEurAs and the MTRow portray the same information, and cannot be 
included in the same regression simultaneously. The results of the estimation of the gravity 
equation for Tajikistan are reported in column (5) of table 3. Results are in general worse 
than those obtained for the whole sample. The degree of inertia in Tajik’s imports is even 
greater than for the whole CIS group (autoregressive coefficient of 0.911), and for the rest 
of the explanatory variables, only home GDP is significant, with a point estimate of 0.068 
(long run elasticity of 0.76). Partner’s GDP, distance and contiguity are now not 
significant, and the real exchange rate has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.032. 
Interestingly, the impact of EurAsEC is positive with a short run coefficient of 0.272, a 
long run impact of 3.05. Therefore, we can assert that this agreement has also boosted 
foreign trade for Tajikistan. 
Table 4 summarises the econometric results for the model considering exports as 
the dependent variable. In general, the conclusions drawn from the imports model are 
maintained. Firstly, columns (1), (2) and (3) show that the gravity model expressed in 
terms of total exports seems to describe accurately the bilateral trade flows of the 10 
reporter countries,
74
 being the main variables significant, except the real exchange rate, 
whose coefficient is not significant in any of the three specifications. Therefore, exports (as 
a proxy of trade) are positively related to GDP in the home and in the target country, while 
distance is negatively related to export flows. Contiguity and a common speaking or native 
language also foster export flows.  
                                                          
74 
Column (1) is the standard baseline model with no dynamics, while column (2) controls for serial 
correlation adding a lagged term for the endogenous variable. Finally, column (3) drops population in the 
home and target countries given the non significance of these variables in the estimation summarised in 
column (2). 
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Table 3.4. Summary of Estimation Results (Case 2: Intra-EurAsEC bilateral exports as dependent 
variable) 
 EurAsEC Tajikistan 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 













0.777 0.00 0.777 0.00 0.778 0.00 0.824 0.00 
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 DW 0.41 
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Column (4) summarises the results for the augmented model with regional 
dummies. In this case we find that exports are positively related to home and partner’s 
GDP’s and negatively to the distance between countries, being all of these coefficients 
significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on contiguity (even though marginally significant) 
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is positive (as expected), with a short run impact of 0.103 and a long run effect of 0.46, 
while the common speaking language has a coefficient of 0.190, with a long run impact of 
0.85. The MTEurAs dummy has a positive coefficient of 0.199, with a long run impact of 
0.89, which implies an increased trade of 145%, a weaker than that obtained in the imports 
model. This increase in exports is followed by increased exports to the rest of the world, 
since the coefficient on the dummy MTRow is positive, even though rather small (0.027), 
which implies a long run effect of 0.121 and an increased trade of 13%. Also, as in the case 
of imports, the model for Tajikistan is rather poor, since few of the variables are significant 
(only partner’s GDP, distance and the common speaking language). In this case, sharing a 
common border is positive for Tajik’s exports, while the impact of the EurAsEC agreement 
is estimated to be greater than for the whole bloc, with a short run coefficient of 0.308, a 
long run impact of 1.75, which implies that exports are 475% greater with respect to trend. 
1.5. Conclusions 
Regional trade agreements are trade policies that try to encourage trade between 
members and with the rest of the world. Estimating an augmented gravity model, this 
chapter analyzed the effects of EurAsEC for bilateral trade of member countries and for 
trade of these countries with the rest of their main partners. As a particular case, the 
chapter also analyses the impact of the EurAsEC agreement on Tajikistan trade flows.   
From the results we can say that the gravity model explains well intra-regional 
trade in the case of EurAsEC. In general, the traditional variables of the gravity model 
explaining the “normal” trade are significant and have the expected signs. Results show 
that intra-regional trade flows between EurAsEC members are positively related to GDP of 
the reporter country (as importer or as exporter) and variables representing aspects 
facilitating trade like share a common border or a language, and negatively related to 
distance. Partner’s country GDP has a positive effect on intra-regional exports but a 
negative effect on intra-regional imports. Real exchange rate has the expected negative 
effect on intra-EurAsEC imports and for intra-regional exports the sign of the coefficient is 
positive but this variable is not significant.  
With regard to the effects of the preferential agreement, the coefficients of the 
regional dummy variables show unambiguously that EurAsEC generated a net trade 
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creation effect. Membership in EurAsEC had significant effects on bilateral trade within 
the area, mainly in terms of imports, without generate trade diversion from the rest of the 
world. Imports from and exports to the no-EurAsEC partners also were positively affected 
but to a lesser extent than intra-regional flows.   
Results for Tajikistan trade flows show that imports are positively related to 
Tajikistan’s GDP and exports are positively related to partner countries GDP. Sharing a 
language positively affects both imports and exports. Moreover, exports are positively 
affected by sharing a border and negatively affected by distance; however, both variables 
are not significant in explaining imports. Membership of EurAsEC positively affects 
Tajikistan trade flows, to a much larger extent on imports than on exports but in both cases 
to a larger extent than on total EurAsEC trade flows.  
We can conclude that EurAsEC had a positive net trade creation effect and, 
therefore, a positive welfare effect. So, moving towards greater integration degrees seems a 
good recommendation to achieve the objective of increasing trade flows and welfare of the 
members.  
Tajikistan imports greatly increased after the entry into EurAsEC, both from the 
area and from other partners outside the area. However, exports have showed a very poor 
performance, generating a huge trade deficit. Nevertheless, the export performance has not 
been so bad with EurAsEC partners than with some of the non-member which were 
traditionally important partners, namely the European Union. Therefore, in the context of 
EurAsEC, intensifying relations with member countries and reducing costs of transporting 
goods to these countries seem to be good recommendations. But Tajikistan should not 
concentrate its commercial policy efforts only on these partners. There are more dynamic 
neighboring economies outside EurAsEC, namely Turkey and China, which also should be 
stated objectives for the Tajikistan exports.  
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Appendix 1 




Code_Partner Patner_Country Full-name 
1 AFG Afghanistan 
2 ARM Armenia 
3 AUT Austria 
4 AZE Azerbaijan 
5 BEL Belgium 
6 BLR Belarus 
7 CHI China 
8 CZE Czech Republic 
9 DEU Germany 
10 FRA Francia 
11 GBR United Kingdom 
12 IRN Iran 
13 ITA Italy 
14 KAZ Kazakhstan 
15 KGZ Kyrgyzstan 
16 LTU Lithuania 
17 MDA Moldavia 
18 NLD Netherlands 
19 PAK Pakistan 
20 POL Poland 
21 RUS Russia 
22 TKM Turkmenistan 
23 TUR Turkey 
24 UKR Ukraine 
25 UZB Uzbekistan 
26 TJK Tajikistan 
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Chapter 4 
Dynamic effects of EurAsEC integration agreement for Tajikistan 
1.1. Introduction 
Among the several integration options followed by Tajikistan over the past two 
decades (as it was showed in chapter two), it seems that in recent years it is giving priority 
to integration in EurAsEC, which has recently moved towards a greater degree of 
integration by forming an Economic Union of three member countries (Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan). In the eve of Tajikistan' accession into the EurAsEC-Customs Union, the 
relevance of potential effects from integration for Tajikistan became a more decisive issue, 
especially in view of the existing political and economic backwardness. 
Tajikistan, a small landlocked country with a geostrategic mountainous terrain, 
relative remoteness and communication isolation from the existing global transport 
infrastructure as well as numerous other transition challenges,  confronted immediately 
after independence in 1991 a terrible civil war. This brought to the poorest country of the 
Former Soviet-Union to a deeper level of poverty, vandalism, and low pace of 
development in human capital and, of course, damaged infrastructure. Ensuring that 
regional economic integration succeeds in Tajikistan is vital, not only because of the 
previously mentioned challenges but also because of the policies that could ensure 
successful integration for a country that together with its neighbors has many elements of 
transboundary nature (water and energy, transport and the potential of Islamic Resistance) 
which inevitably require an "integrated" answer. 
Chapter three has shown that the welfare effects of the EurAsEC agreement through 
static trade creation and trade diversion effects (in the context of the Traditional Theory of 
Economic Integration) are positive for Tajikistan although of a moderate amount. As it was 
seen in chapter one, the New Theory Economic Integration claims that the most important 
effects of integration processes are dynamic effects in terms of large-scale economies, 
technological change, effects on market structure and competition, productivity growth and 
investment activity. In essence, dynamic effects of economic integration are defined as 
anything that affects the country's rate of economic growth over the medium term, (Schiff 
and Winters, 1998, p. 179). Although the dynamic effects are the most relevant, mainly for 
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developing countries, the literature of economic integration dealing with developing and 
least developed countries, as it is the case for Tajikistan, has generally recognized that for 
such type of countries neither the “New” nor, mainly, the “traditional" economic 
integration theory are adequate. So, in the frame of the new economic integration theory, 
an extensive literature focus on the potential effects of integration to developing countries 
and the motivation of these countries to participate in integration processes beyond the 
static and dynamic effects, (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper and Massell, 
1965b; Kahnert et al, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Robson, 1980; Mackay, 1984; De Melo, 
2011; Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014). 
At this regard, regional integration in Tajikistan is essential, expecting that it will 
help in enhancing development of not only because the static effects of resource allocation 
(as the traditional theory claims) but also enhanced economic growth and development 
objectives through creation of common projects such as poverty alleviation, improving 
standard and quality of life by promoting health and education issues, productive 
employment, services and coordination of foreign policy aiming at peace and security 
within and between the regions. 
Thus, this chapter analyzes, on the one hand, the dynamic effects of EurAsEC for 
economic growth of Tajikistan and, on the other hand, also in the context of the New 
Regionalism, some of the welfare effects of integration for developing countries that are 
not covered by traditional analysis for developed countries, as well as some of the factors 
motivating developing countries to participate in an integration area that could give 
rationality to integration of Tajikistan into EurAsEC at both the current degree and perhaps 
a deeper degree in the future. Following Marinov (2014), the potential effects and factors 
which are relevant for developing countries, constituting the economic determinants of 
integration that influence the motivation of these countries to participate in integration 
agreements are organized into three categories: general economic (development objective), 
market-related, and trade-related determinants. In addition to economic determinants, there 
are also several political incentives of economic integration that are of special importance 
to developing countries. 
In the context of dynamic effects, economic integration by attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) may affect aggregate productivity in the economy through technology 
transfer and increased competition and, then, positively affect the economic growth rate. 
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In Tajikistan, FDI has been dominated by investors such as Russia, China, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, and International financial organizations like the World Bank. The vast 
priority areas of FDI opportunities are directed, firstly, to the hydroelectric power, mining 
sector (primary aluminum) and agriculture development, especially, deep processing of 
cotton fibers and, secondly, to the banking sector, service industry, tourism and 
manufacture of construction materials. But, the lack of a national strategy for FDI 
promotion and transparent investment policies hinders the capacity of Tajik government to 
attract foreign investment (EDB, 2013; FAO, 2014; UNCDAT, 2014; State Statistical 
Agency of Tajikistan and Investment Committee of Tajikistan). According to the Bureau 
of economic and business affairs (2012), Tajikistan looks mostly after state-led investment 
and external loans from the country’s perceived geopolitical friends rather than making 
conditions favorable to private investors from abroad. 
Thus, Tajikistan, in line with most of the EurAsEC countries, showed a faster GDP 
growth averagely 7-8% between 1995 and 2013. However, despite the relatively stable 
macroeconomic indicators, Tajikistan's economy remains dependent on external factors 
which are a major source of vulnerability (World Bank, 2011). Two external factors 
deserve particular attention: the contribution of remittances (mainly from Russia) to 
Tajikistan’s growth since 2004 (50% of GDP in 2013) and the fact that economic growth 
was mostly supported by development assistance from multilateral and bilateral 
development partners. 
The economic growth of Tajikistan is very similar to EurAsEC countries, but 
country’s GDP per capita is still significantly below all the EurAsEC members (GDP per 
capita in Tajikistan was only 7.2% of that of Russia in 2013) and nearly 35 percent 
population still lives under the absolute poverty line. 
In spite of weak static and dynamic traditional effects, as a developing country, 
there are several economic and political determinants which can give rationality to the 
decision of Tajikistan join EurAsEC. 
Among the economic determinants to integration, beyond the traditional static and 
dynamic effects, one of the most relevant for developing countries is the economic 
development objective. Poverty reduction was one of the fundamental and primary 
development objectives of Tajik government. After a period of political imbalance and 
gradually recuperation, the economy of Tajikistan has showed rapid growth that helped to 
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significantly decline the level of poverty that fell from over 80 percent to about 32 percent 
during the period 1999-2014. Remittances played a crucial role on poverty reduction, 
especially in rural areas (Azevedo et al, 2014). Nevertheless, despite high poverty 
alleviation, Tajikistan is still one of the poorest countries in the region in terms of per 
capita income.   
The situation was similar in terms of other development indicators. In the beginning 
of the 90s, Tajikistan along with most of the post-Soviet countries had relatively high 
Human Development Index, reflecting the heritage of economic and social development 
achieved during the Soviet empire. However, with the disintegration result and civil war, 
its HDI has fallen sharply from 0.629 in 1991 to 0.535 in 2000. The decline in the HDI 
during this time indicates that the relative position of life expectancy, education and GDP 
per capita in Tajikistan has been deteriorated. Although recent dates show that Tajikistan’s 
HDI value again increased up 0.624, putting the country in the medium category ranking 
(129 out of 188 countries), country’s HDI is still behind the other EurAsEC countries, 
(UNDP, 2015). 
 Among the market-related determinants, of particular importance are the potential 
effects on employment and productivity and the industry development induced by 
integration. Tajikistan was unable to create enough jobs for a growing population and the 
unemployment rate remains the highest in the region. The jobs created are mainly in 
agriculture, which accounts for over 66% of total employment. Although productivity in 
the agricultural sector has increased in recent years, it remains far below that of other 
countries in the region. The answer to unemployment and poverty, especially in rural areas 
and by young people, has been migration. Tajik migrants abroad (mainly in Russia) are 
equivalent to 18% of country population. Consequently, remittances from migrant grown 
enormously since 2000, amounted to 45% country's GDP in 2013. Migrant remittances 
were a main driver of economic growth and development, with a positive effect on poverty 
alleviation and unemployment reduction, but the high dependence of Tajikistan on 
remittances from migrants (90% of them in Russia) and the effect of remittances on 
exchange rate are also a source of macroeconomic vulnerability.  
Regarding the development of the industrial sector, the success of the integration 
process is highly doubtful, it is an outdated and deteriorated sector with low productivity. 
The participation of the industry has fallen from 39.3% to 21.8% of total GDP and from 
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9.9% to 4.1% of total employment, mainly due to the recent fall in cotton and aluminum 
prices (World Bank, 2011).  
After showing the evolution of the trade trends and the trade structure (by sectors 
and partners) of Tajikistan, we present the evidence found on several trade-related 
determinants which are relevant in the case of developing countries, namely, trade as a 
percentage of GDP, trade pattern with developed countries, intra-regional trade and total 
regional trade and  competitive versus complementarity countries. 
The foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan has generally increased in the period 1995-
2013. According to UNCTAD data, over the period exports have increased 1.5 times, 
while imports grew 5.1 times. From 2000 to 2013 imports boom (mainly after 2002) while 
exports show a very poor dynamic and negative trade balance becomes higher and higher. 
The percentage of GDP that is exported decrease dramatically after 2000 and the export 
coefficient falls from 91% to 13% over the period. Imports as a percentage of GDP 
accounted by 75% in 2000 and, in spite of the high GDP growth rates over the period, they 
accounted by 49% of GDP in 2013. Remittances (accounting by above 50% of GDP in 
2013) explain this huge increase in imports.  
In the context of EurAsEC, Tajikistan exports and imports represents a very small 
proportion, showing both variables a different evolution from 2000 to 2013. Imports 
evolution was in line with the rest of the countries keeping its participation in total 
EurAsEC imports by around 1.1%. By contrary, exports evolution was much less dynamic 
than for the rest of the countries so that its participation falls from 0.64% in 2000 to 0.18% 
in 2013.  
The high concentration of Tajikistan exports in unwrought aluminum and cotton, 
which accounts for two-thirds of total exports, makes the Republic largely dependent on 
shocks like world prices. Imports are less concentrated than exports and, by contrary to 
exports, the concentration decreases over the period, showing a concentration index in 
2013 very similar to Russia or Kazakhstan. The main partners of Tajikistan in recent years 
are China, Turkey and EurAsEC members (with which the dynamics of foreign trade 
turnover of Tajikistan with in the recent years had a positive trend); and EU and the CIS 
countries which are not members in EurAsEC (with which trade decreased with). 
The increase of the share of intra-regional trade to total trade and the increase of 
total trade are common accepted indicators of integration agreement successful, although 
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Inotai (1991) shows that these indicators should not be the only ones considered in 
analyzing integration successful when integration takes place between developing 
countries. In the case of Tajikistan, the share of intra-EurAsEC trade in total foreign trade 
is higher than for the total area but the increase in trade with EurAsEC after joining the 
agreement was not greater than for total trade, so that the share of intra-regional trade 
decreases from 27% in 2001 to 25.5% in 2013 
Trade as a percentage of GDP and trade pattern with developed countries are 
not relevant integration determinants in the case of Tajikistan explaining its desirability to 
enjoy EurAsEC beyond traditional static and dynamic effects. On the one hand, by 2000 
Tajikistan was a highly open economy and the openness degree decrease from 2000 to 
2013. On the other hand, trade flows of Tajikistan with the developed European countries 
has not increased over the period and the greater proportion of imported goods, consisting 
in consumer goods, are imported mainly from China.  
Trade complementarity indexes show that the increasingly diversified basket of 
imports of Tajikistan increasingly fits the export structure of its partners. By the contrary, 
the export structure of the country fits less with the import structure of all the main 
partners, since exports basket of Tajikistan includes very few goods. Taking into account 
the qualitative information given by the TC index, by 2000 could reasonably be expected 
an expansion of trade after a preferential agreement with EurAsEC countries since the 
highest TC index values were shown for EurAsEC countries. However, from the index 
values in 2013, the relevance of a deeper integration agreement with EurAsEC countries is 
not as clear, especially in regarding TC index for imports.  
After the introduction, the rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two 
will give an overview of Tajikistan. Section three focuses on the dynamic effects for the 
economic growth rate of Tajikistan into the context of EurAsEC. Section four analyses the 
potential dynamic effects of EurAsEC to Tajikistan and several economic integration 
economic integration determinants as a developing country, in an attempt to determine the 
rationality of Tajikistan joining EurAsEC beyond the traditional static and dynamic effects. 
Finally, section five will draw some conclusions.  
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1.2. Brief overview of Tajikistan 
Located in Central Asia, the Republic of Tajikistan, with 8,2 million population, 
covers 142,600 square Km. The country is bordered on the west and north with the 
Republics of Uzbekistan (1.161km) and Kyrgyzstan (870 km); on the south with 
Afghanistan (1.206km) and on the east with China (414 km), (Map 4.1). By the surface 
nature, the country is a typical mountainous, 93 percent of its territory is covered by 
mountains that are known such as highest mountain systems of Central Asia (the Tien Shan 
and Pamir), with absolute heights from 300 to 7.495 meters.  
In the scope of the EurAsEC region, Tajikistan is the smallest country and it is a 
double-landlocked country as, from one side, the country is cut off from China due to the 
highest mountain ranges and deserts; from another side, security concerns in Afghanistan 
present an insuperable transit barrier to the south (Coulibaly, 2012). Therefore, in 
comparison to other EurAsEC landlocked countries, Tajikistan suffers from several more 
disadvantages75.  
 Map 4.1: The Political Map of Tajikistan  
  
Source: adopted from www.lahistoriaconmapas.com  
                                                          
75 
Moreover, Tajikistan has to contend with the obstructionist policies and actions and the prevalence of 
informal payments at the border-crossing points with Uzbekistan. This is relevant since most traffic to 
major markets, like Western Europe and the Russian Federation, will need to transit through Uzbekistan 
(Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
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After gaining independence, the country’s economy was in a grave recession 
because of the strongly dependence on Soviet Union that was unable to carry out transition 
system (unskillfully implemented economic reforms). As a result, this ended in a civil war 
situation which was worse than those problems. Although the country faced profound 
backwardness and the post-independence challenges, Tajik government made significant 
progress in macroeconomic stabilization through numerous economic reforms. However, 
in spite of several programs and reforms, Tajikistan still has a significant unfinished reform 
plans. 
This mountainous country has one of the great potential opportunities of 
hydropower in the region (EDB, 2013). While in the frame of EurAsEC, Russia and 
Kazakhstan possess significant reserved of hydrocarbons (oil, natural gas, etc.) and various 
metals, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan economies are determined by their large possessions of 
water resources (Kuzmina, 2012). In particular, on the territory of Tajikistan about 64 km3 
of water resource or approximately 55,4 percent of surface flow of the Aral Sea basin are 
found.  
Therefore, the capacities of Tajik Hydropower from its glaciers are vital for this 
country and also for the region. Then, the hydropower is an important branch of country's 
economy, accumulating a significant share of FDI in some years (as we will see later). 
According to EDB (2013), hydropower potential is about 527 billion kWh per year, and the 
amount that is commercially available and economically viable for development is 
estimated around 317 billion kWh, of which today are used only 17 billion kWh. In 
general, the potential hydropower resource of Tajikistan ranks eighth in the world after 
China, Russia, USA, Brazil, Zaire, India and Canada. It is remarkable the fact that one of 
the main targets of EurAsEC is the creation of common energy space for the long term 
among member countries. 
The economy of Tajikistan is agro-industrial, since its basis is agriculture: cotton, 
crops, livestock and industry, mechanical engineering, production of aluminum, fertilizer, 
textile and light industry, energy and consumer goods. The relative remoteness and 
isolation from the current world transport infrastructure,76 the mountainous terrain and lack 
                                                          
76 
Tajikistan logistics performance is one of the poorest of the world: for instance, according to Doing 
Business 2012, eleven documents are required to export in compared to only six in Moldova which is 
another landlocked ECA country; eighty-two days are required to export a standard container compared 
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of access to the sea are determining the disadvantageous economic and geographical 
position.  
1.3. Potential dynamic effects of EurAsEC 
Dynamic effects are those that influence the accumulation of factors, broadly 
defined, and consequently, affect the growth in per-capita income (Baldwin, 1993). So, 
dynamic effects, which transform productive structure to a more competitive and 
specialized one, will be long lasting or anything that affects the country’s rate of economic 
growth over the medium term (Balassa, 1961, 1975; Schiff and Winters, 1998).  
Then, we focus in this section in the evolution of the economic growth of 
Tajikistan, measured by GDP growth, into the context of EurAsEC. Since one of the most 
important dynamic effects of integration influencing economic growth are its effects on 
investment activity and, in particular, on foreign direct investment (FDI), we will also 
analyze the FDI performance of Tajikistan.  
1.3.1. Growth effects 
In early 1997, immediately after the signing of Tajik peace, the economy of the 
country recovered from the severe transition related from one side to the Soviet Union 
recession and from another side to the civil conflict of the 1990s. Macroeconomic 
performance improved in overall and the strong growth averaged in 2000 around 8.3 
percent after -29 percent in 1991 was accompanied by other positive outcomes.77  
                                                                                                                                                                                
to only 32 in Moldova; and exporting a standard container to the US costs on average $3,850 compared to 
$1.545 in Moldova (Coulibaly, 2012) 
77 
For instance, a drop of the inflation rate from 32-38 percent in 2000-2001 to 6-7 percent in 2005-2009; an 
increase of imports from 810 mln $ in 1995 to 3272.6 mln $ in 2007 and of exports from 748.9mln $ to 
1440.9mln$. In addition, the external debt moved to more manageable levels from 53.6 percent to 34.6 
percent of GDP (Demidenko, 2013) which was largely attributable to this growth performance. 
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 Graph 4.1:  GDP growth rate of Tajikistan, 1991-2013 
 Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank Development Indicators Data 
From 2000 to 2013 in the Republic of Tajikistan the positive trend of real GDP 
growth is observed almost in all years, except in 2009, when the decline in GDP growth is 
largely associated with the financial global crisis and economic growth slowed down to 3.4 
percent from an average of around 9 percent between 2000 and 2008 (Graph 4.1). In 
general, macroeconomic stabilization has been driven by some notable developments: first, 
but the least important, the export performance, namely in previous years when the world 
price of cotton and aluminum were high. In a second term, economic growth was 
supported by development assistance from multilateral and bilateral development partners 
in the context of integration with the global community. Thanks to such financial 
assistance and the external borrowing, the country has managed to maintain high economic 
growth over the prolonged period of time, (Akramov and Shreedhar, 2012; Vinokurov et 
al, 2013). Third, remittances (mainly from Russia) had significantly contributed to 
Tajikistan’s growth since 2004, to the point of the remittances inflows (50% of GDP in 
2013) were the key drivers of poverty reduction and of contribution to the growth of 
domestic demand for goods (food and agriculture products), as well as of inducing 
construction and manufacturing services.  
The dependence of Tajikistan' economic growth on those mentioned factors is a 
major source of macroeconomic vulnerability. As the World Bank (2011) stated, despite 
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on external factors. The country is highly dependent on imports of fuel and food since the 
main source of financing of imports and foreign exchange inflows into the country are 
export revenues (very low) and significant inflows of remittance transfers from Russia, the 
most vulnerability source. As long as remittance inflows are stable, Tajikistan can continue 
enjoying higher growth rates on the account of strong domestic consumption. But the 
experience of developing countries that have grown sustainably over decade shows that 
higher investments and export expansion aiming to call for global demand are essential 
ingredients, although in Tajikistan there isn’t much evidence that remittances have fueled 
private investment (Coulibaly, 2012).78 Gross Fixed capital formation undertaken by 
private sector is low compared with the other EurAsEc members (Graph 4.2).  
 Graph 4.2: Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank Development Indicators Data 
Related with the country's vulnerability, one can suggest that the decline of the 
Russian economy79, where more than 90% of migrants from Tajikistan are employed, leads 
to a drop in demand and economic growth, and also has an unfavorable effect on 
                                                          
78 
Indeed, Tajikistan statistics agency data indicates that the share of private investment in agriculture, trade and 
light industry (sectors reportedly receiving investment from migrants) has decreased from 2 to less than 1 
percent between 2007 and 2008, when remittance inflows were reaching record levels. This situation makes an 
export-led growth strategy more difficult to achieve, particularly given that the country cannot rely on domestic 
demand from its eight million people to grow sustainably (Coulibaly, 2012). 
79 
Recent slowdowns in the Russian and Chinese economies, low commodity prices, and currency 
fluctuations are hampering economic growth in Tajikistan. By some estimates, the dollar value of 
remittances from Russia to Tajikistan dropped by more than 40% in 2014. The government faces 
challenges financing the public debt, which is equivalent to 35% of GDP, and the National Bank of 
Tajikistan has aggressively spent down reserves to bolster the weakening somoni, leaving little space for 
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government revenue that, consequently, increase the budget deficit. Another issue that 
Tajikistan is dependent on is the interruptions in transit through Uzbekistan and high 
transportation costs that have adverse economic and fiscal effects (Vinokurov et al, 2013).  
Economic growth has been noticed not only in Tajikistan, but almost in all 
EurAsEC countries by promoting the period of transition and stabilization. The average 
GDP growth rates in majority of these countries were higher than those in other developing 
countries (Tai and Lee, 2009).  Particularly, during the period from 2001 to 2006, the 
average annual GDP growth rate was 8.9 percent in the most of these countries compared 
with 6.5 percent in other developing countries. The majority of EurAsEC countries showed 
a faster GDP growth in this period as the result of the high oil and gas world prices 
(Kazakhstan and Russia) or to a fewer extent, growth of production in the manufacturing 
sector (Russia and Belarus). Some years ago, the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2009) 
predicted that the growth of these countries would continue by expanding their capacities 
to meet the larger demand from growing Asian economies, particularly from that of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Foreign direct investments (FDI) in hydrocarbon 
industries are expected to grow, especially in Kazakhstan. Today one can observe such 
proper prediction, also in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, in terms of good 
relationship with China. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between GDP per capita and contributions of faster 
economic growth during the past decade reflecting rising of remittances inflows as well as 
imports, resulting sharp reduction in poverty rate remain uncertain. The considerable 
economic growth of Tajikistan is very similar to EurAsEC countries, but country’s GDP 
per capita is still significantly below all the EurAsEC members and nearly 35 percent 
population still lives under the absolute poverty line.    
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Graph 4.3: GDP per capita of EurAsEC members ($ current Dollars) 
 
 Source: Own elaboration from World Bank data 
Although the increase in country’s GDP per capita is considerable, from 212 (U.S. 
Dollar) in 1991 to 1.036,6 (U.S. dollar) in 2013, in comparing with most of the EurAsEC 
countries it is negligible (Graph 4. 3). In terms of GDP per capita we observe two country 
groups in the frame of the EurAsEC: one group formed by Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus, and the other one by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that are less advanced in terms of 
transition to the market economy. GDP per capita of Tajikistan is in the lowest position in 
the context of EurAsEC member countries. One fundamental reason is that while 
Tajikistan was striving against its post war poverty other EurAsEC countries almost have 
successfully finished their economic transition reforms.  
However, by looking at this issue from the beginning, we can say that Tajikistan as 
the typical economy which dependent on agriculture, with a quite remote and a mostly 
mountainous landscape, having a lower income per capita in the Soviet period within 
USSR Republics still has the lowest income per capita among the CIS and EurAsEC 
countries. So, the low income with the large agrarian share should induce to efforts for 
agricultural and overall efficient economic reforms80 for improving the population’s well-
being (Amir and Berry, 2012). 
                                                          
80 
More generally, the importance of reforming the agricultural sector is fundamental to achieving food security 
and equitable growth in the country (an important first step is to generate pro-poor growth, which means strong 
employment). Then, freedom to decide which crops to sow, access to secure and transferable land use rights 
and investments in rural infrastructure are all central to this goal. Currently, too many young Tajiks are 
deciding that it is pointless to apply for land ownership and that the best option is to leave farming and migrate 
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In relation with this, Coulibaly (2012) has identified production capacity binding 
constraints to export diversification and poor market accessibility as the major constraints 
to growth in Tajikistan. Moreover, he has found that poor business environment81 seems to 
be the most binding constraint to growth in Tajikistan, both in agribusiness and urban 
services. If the government anchors its growth strategy on improving labor productivity 
through general-purpose training, leaving the prospect to expand hydropower capacity to 
the private sector, not only the productivity of migrants but also workers involved in 
agribusiness and industrial production will improve and in turn improve the country’s 
growth prospect. In addition, International Institutions as World Bank Group (2013) and 
IMF (2012)  gave some policy recommendation sustaining inclusive growth that will 
require Tajikistan to address the following challenges; (i) high vulnerability to 
macroeconomic shocks and climate change, (ii) poor quality of public services and unequal 
access to them, (iii) lack of well-functioning and easily accessible markets. 
As a result, maximizing the return from migration through general purpose training 
allowing diversifying destination countries and better channeling of remittances through an 
improved financial sector seems the first-step of a successful growth strategy. Finally, from 
the point behind the investment effects, there is FDI that is induced by regional integration 
as a catalyst to greater growth; hereafter we provide FDI performance of Tajikistan. 
1.1.1 1.3.2. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Since an important share of investment in developing countries is foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the increase of FDI induced by regional integration is seen as a catalyst 
to efficiency gains, increases of overall factor productivity and greater growth rates 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). So, attracting FDI is a major incentive for integration for 
developing countries. FDI not only provides capital investment but also technology (know-
how) transfer and diffusion, mainly due to the spillovers to local firms (Egger and 
Pfaffermays, 2002; Uttama and Peridy, 2009). As several works show, these spillovers of 
technology transfer from FDI are especially relevant for developing countries where most 
of the inward FDIs come from the developed ones (Peiris et al, 2015).  
                                                          
81 
Main obstacles of poor business environment are: government regulation and measures that weaken the 
business climate; weak anti-corruption as a result of informal taxation which increases the cost of doing 
business, expensive and unreliable communication system; increase in the cost of trade and restricted access to 
markets and technology; inefficient customs administration, as well as shortcomings in the provision of 
transport services in Tajikistan (Coulibaly, 2012).   
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In the early years of independence, pursuing undecided reforms and privatizations, 
Tajik government has shown interest in broader foreign investment. Consequently, 
Tajikistan’s State Committee on Investments and State Property was created in 2006 to 
assist investors. The agency has contributed to the development of the investment climate, 
including limited reforms in business legislation that increased Tajikistan’s ranking in the 
World Bank’s “Doing Business” index from 152 in 2011 to 147 (out of 183 countries) in 
2012. Moreover, some improvements have been made such as enforcing contracts, 
protecting investors, starting a business and registering property. The most significant 
reform was the grand opening of a “single-window”82 business registration system in July 
2009, which applies to both foreign and domestic applicants, and reduces red tape 
associated with the process of opening a business. After all that, investment, measured by 
the Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as a percentage of GDP has increased in Tajikistan 
from 7.4% in 2000 to 14.1% in 2013, but rates over the period are lower than for other 
members of EurAsEC (Graph 4.4).  
 Graph 4.4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation as percentage of GDP 
 
    Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank Development Indicators Data 
After all mentioned changes, the poor business climate remains as an obstacle to 
attract investment; as a result, this Committee has done little to fulfill its mission (Bureau 
                                                          
82 
Applicants now pay a fixed fee at the Tax Committee and are supposed to receive permission to begin 
operating within five working days. In 2011other targeted reforms were enacted, including a law 
improving the rights of minority shareholders. Given Tajikistan’s paucity of corporations, with or without 
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of economic and business affairs, 2012). In other words, the lack of a national FDI 
promotion strategy and transparent investment policies hinder its capacity to attract foreign 
investment.  
What is more, in order to further promote foreign direct investment and develop a 
real sector of the economy, the Government has drafted a new law on free economic zones 
(FEZ)83 in the RT, which is currently being reviewed by the Parliament. Two of 
Tajikistan’s four FEZs are currently active: Sughd and Panj. The other two, Dangara and 
Ishkashim, are still under development. Companies operating in the FEZs are exempt from 
taxes for the first seven years. The FEZs are regulated by the Law on Free Economic 
Zone84. Sughd Free Economic Zone is the most developed zone in the country, located less 
than 15 kilometres from Khujand City with access to an international airport and railways. 
The zone has attracted foreign investment of $130 million in mining, aluminum alloy 
processing, solar panel manufacturing and agricultural product processing (UNCDAT, 
2014). 
According to the available literature (Vinokurov et al.,2013; FAO, 2014; 
UNCDAT, 2014; State Statistical Agency of Tajikistan and Investment Committee of 
Tajikistan), FDI in Tajikistan has been dominated by investors such as Russia, China, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, and International financial organizations like WTO. These principal investors 
in recent years are governments with geopolitical interests in the region (UNCDAT, 2014).  
According to the Bureau of economic and business affairs (2012), Tajikistan mostly looks 
after state-led investment and external loans from the country’s perceived geopolitical 
friends rather than making conditions favorable to private investors from abroad.  
Through non-transparent practices and barriers to competition, the government 
burdens the private sector85 with unnecessary costs and creates substantial uncertainty and 
                                                          
83 Draft law provides for legal and economic basis of organization and functioning of FEZ as separate areas with special 
customs and tax regimes within their boundaries, including full or partial relief from customs tariff when importing 
goods to FEZ; simplified procedure for transportation of goods and vehicles across FEZ boundaries; and cancellation 
of non-tariff restrictions. It is also proposed that legal and physical persons Residence and non-residents duly 
registered on the territory of FEZ will receive full or partial exemption from taxes and other contributions during their 
operating in FEZ, if they are directed into production on the territory of the RT It is expected that this law will come 
into force soon. See:  http://www.investin.info/country/tajikistan/facts-and-figures/?country=tajikistan). 
84 
See: .(http://www.tajinvest.tj/?q=en/node/147) 
85 Tajikistan’s biggest challenge in the coming years will be lifting its low rates of private investment, and 
this requires a better investment climate. Existing regulations for starting a business are still too restrictive 
and past arbitrary government actions have discouraged investors. In addition, poor reliability of 
electricity supply, difficult tax administration processes, and insufficient storage facilities, among other 
hindrances, reduce private investment profitability even in the cities (World Bank, 2011) 
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risk. The vast priority areas of FDI opportunities are directed to the hydroelectric power, 
mining sector (primary aluminum) and agriculture development, especially, deep 
processing of cotton fibers. Banking sector, service industry, tourism and manufacture of 
construction materials are the sectors receiving the second greater investment support. 
More than 210 joint ventures are established in Tajikistan with these main activities 
(Vinokurov et al., 2013).  
Some examples: the construction of the Sangtuda-1, in the frame of hydropower 
branch and in the light industry, the cotton processing and export of textile products by the 
company of "Eurasia-Textile" were held by Russia. Most of the investment projects in the 
agricultural sector including food industry were fulfilled by Kazakhstan, projects such as 
the increasing facilities in grain storage and infrastructure development for export grain by 
"Ivolga-Holding" company, as well as obtaining agricultural machinery project by JSC 
"Holding Kazexportastyk". The project of “Supply of wheat” by TNK "Agricultural", also 
was invested by Kazakhstan.  China and Iran as other major investors have been active in 
recent years. China held the joint venture gold mining project with its Zijing Mining 
Company; and Iran (Eximbank) was a financing source (256 million U.S dollars) for the 
Construction of Sangtuda HPP-2 (220 MW) project in 2011. Additionally, in the field of 
nonferrous metallurgy, Iranian Alumina Company invests in alumina supply project. The 
United Kingdom was another active investor in 2011 with $27.7 million in FDI of 
Tajikistan for the processing of fruits and vegetables through Geha-Food Company. Other 
large foreign investors in Tajikistan include the "CASA 1000" project that was a financing 
source (700 million U.S dollar) in 2015 for the Commissioning the first phase of the Rogun 
HPP (800 MW) and the World Bank with the project for the development of the silver and 
zinc deposit "Konimansurikalon".  In spite of the several investor projects that were 
mentioned above, in comparison of other EurAsEC members, Tajikistan lags with much 
smaller investors behind its neighbors. It is also essential to emphasize that in the context 
of integration agreements, there is no active regional investment arrangement in the case of 
Tajikistan, except the CJSC "Olim-Textile" by Eurasian Development Bank (Vinokurov et 
al., 2013).  In 2009, this project was an investor for the construction of a modern spinning 
factory, for an upcoming export to Russia. The size of the EDB's participation in the 
project amounted to $ 22.57 million at total investment of $ 29.75 million. At the same 
time, at the bilateral level, each EurAsEC country has concluded multiple bilateral 
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investment treaties (BITs) with key investment partners. Last years, foreign direct 
investment remains at a low percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), lower 
than that for other EurAsEC countries having much higher GFCF as percentage of GDP 
and GDP levels (Graph 4.5). 
Graph 4.5: Inward FDI as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation  
 
  Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank Development Indicators Data 
The hydropower as an important branch of country's economy accumulated a 
significant share of FDI (165.4 million U.S dollar) in 2007 and (243.6 million U.S dollar) 
in 2008. This can be one of the explanations for the increasing FDI in these particular years 
as shown in the Graph 4.  However, in 2009 the share of FDI in hydropower sharply 
decreased (10 million U.S dollar) due to the certain difficulties concerning both political 
and economic nature86.  
In a different aspect, corruption might be the most highlighted reason for the low 
level of FDI in Tajikistan, as Tajikistan ranked very low in the 2014 in the Corruption 
Perceptions Index.  In Transparency International data, it scored 23 out of 100, placing it 
152 on a list of 174 countries87. As the Bureau of economic and business affairs (2012) has 
mentioned, Tajikistan presents selected opportunities for investors who are willing to put 
significant research and effort into market development and who have local experience or 
                                                          
86 
Explanation of increasing and decreasing FDI in hydropower is related with the construction of the 
Sangtuda-1, which held with the participation of Russia, ended quite successfully, but the construction of 
the Rogun hydroelectric power station has not been completed. Since the project required reassessment 
and revision in connection with the current requirements for such large-scale construction projects that 
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contacts to help navigate the maze of bureaucracy and corruption. According to this 
Bureau, the government’s policies have dramatically worsened the investment climate88. 
As have been mentioned above, another explanation for the poor FDI in the country is the 
lack of favorable investment conditions and poor business environment. Gaps still exist in 
the legislation and the interpretation of laws and regulations, which may cause 
uncertainties for foreign investors. In fact, the Bureau of economic and business affairs 
(2012) properly stressed that until Tajikistan successfully struggles with such basic 
problems, it will not attract significant growth in foreign direct investment.  
1.4. The rationality of Tajikistan joining EurAsEC beyond traditional 
effects of integration 
As it was discussed in chapter one, the traditional welfare effects of economic 
integration, not just of the static ones (in terms of trade creation and trade diversion) but 
also in some extent of the dynamic ones (influencing growth rates), are not fully applicable 
to integration agreements involving developing countries (Meier, 1960; Balassa, 1965; 
Mackay, 1984;  De Melo, 2011). The literature of economic integration theory was 
concentrated on the rationality of a customs union relying exclusively upon industrialized 
countries which are interested in tariff issues and production/consumption shifts (Balassa, 
1965). The environment and difficulties of the developing countries are completely 
different; they are firstly interested in economic development. So, the welfare effects of 
economic integration involving developing and less developed countries should also 
encompass the positive effects of employment, productivity and income effects, production 
specialization, competitiveness, etc. (Abdel Jaber, 1971).    
From a developing country point of view, the answers for questions about (1) the 
welfare effects of economic integration and (2) the factors that affect the desirability of 
economic integration given for developed countries present limitations (Hosny, 2013). So, 
the determinants that influence the motivation of developing countries to participate in 
integration agreements must be addressed separately. Following Marinov (2014), the 
potential effects and factors which are relevant for developing countries, constituting the 
                                                          
88 
For instance through the coercive campaign to force businesses to contribute to the construction of the 
Roghun dam and projects celebrating 20 years of Tajik independence. Tajikistan’s tax code remains 
byzantine, its legislation is confusing, and, more than anything else, its officials remain mired in a culture 
of corruption. 
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economic determinants of integration beyond the traditional static and dynamic effects, are 
organized into three categories: general economic perspective, market-related, and trade-
related determinants. In addition to economic determinants, there are also several political 
incentives of economic integration that are of special importance to developing countries. 
In what follows we present outcomes for some of these economic and political 
determinants, which can give rationality to the decision of Tajikistan join EurAsEC, in 
spite of weak static and dynamic traditional effects. 
1.4.1. General economic perspective 
1.4.1.1. Objective of Economic Development 
Since the ultimate objective of economic integration is the welfare effect (Balassa, 
1975), many countries, especially the less developed ones, sign integration agreements 
considering firstly the objective of economic development. For these countries integration 
should be regarded as a development instrument rather than a trade policy (Abdel Jaber, 
1971). The main objective is not a better resource allocation but the benefits from faster 
growth and full utilization of resources and production factors, (Marinov, 2014).  At this 
regard, Tajikistan along with other less developed countries participates into integration 
agreements and other international organizations89 first of all considering the importance of 
the economic and political development under the common projects such as poverty 
alleviation, education and health challenges, infrastructure development as well as the 
promotion of peace and security within the country.  
In fact, poverty alleviation is one of the fundamental objectives of Tajikistan 
economic development policy. Tajik poverty issue is not new, since it was widely 
recognized as one of the poorest republics of the Soviet Union. In 1989, just prior to 
‘transition’, 51 percent of the population had a per capita monthly income below 75 rubles, 
compared with 33 percent of the population in Kyrgyzstan, 16 percent in Kazakhstan and 5 
percent in Russia (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).  
                                                          
89 
Participation of the Republic of Tajikistan in the WTO activities is one of the priority issues of the economic 
development of the country. This program is aimed at reducing unemployment through the creation of 
appropriate conditions for the new jobs, reducing poverty and raising living standards of the population United 
Nations, (2015). Economic and Social Council. Tajikistan: World Trade Organization post accession plan. 
Original: Russian. pp. 1-27. 
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Along with transition challenges, the civil war was other factor seriously affecting 
both economic and social spheres of the country that finally led to profound economic 
crisis and to a shortage of necessary products. Consequently, immediately after the war 
(1997), around 95% of Tajikistan’s population was living below the minimum 
consumption basket (Falkingham, 2000; World Bank, 2004; IMF, 2011). Falkingham 
(2000) has classified the country’s  poverty such as  four out of five are ‘poor’, a third are 
‘very poor’ and nearly 20 percent ‘extremely poor’ (below $1 PPP a day).  
The situation started changing only after 1997, when a peace agreement was signed 
between the United Tajik Opposition and the government. Rapid growth helped to 
significantly decline the poverty rates, measured by the national poverty line90 that fell 
from over 80 percent to about 32 percent during the period 1999-2014 (Graph 4.6). The 
main drivers of poverty reduction were the labor earnings and remittances.  Between 2003 
and 2009 income poverty reduction was about 36 percentage points, of this total (labor 
earnings accounted by 21 percentage points and remittances by 8 percentage points; new 
employment opportunities contributed minimally), Azevedo et al., (2014). The role of 
remittances in poverty reduction was even more important after 2009, since the share of 
remittances in GDP grew from 35% in 2009 to 52% in 2012. 
It should be noted that drivers of poverty alleviation differ slightly across urban and 
rural areas. If labor market gains were more beneficial for urban area, remittances played a 
more important role for rural residents, since they were responsible for 24 percent of total 
income poverty reduction in rural areas and only for 18 percent in urban areas between 
2003 and 2009. Moreover, remittances and labor earnings are more important for the 
welfare improvement of the middle class, while employment opportunities and pensions 
are more important for the poor/vulnerable population.  
                                                          
90 
Poverty line is taken as 2.50US$/PPP per day. 
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Graph 4. 6: Poverty reduction trends in Tajikistan, measured by the national poverty lines,91 
(1998 -2014) 
 
 Source: own elaboration based on data of Taj Stat, TLSS 1999-2009 and HBS 2010- 2014 
Compared with other Central Asian countries, inequality in consumption per capita, 
measured by the Gini coefficient, was not high in Tajikistan and was falling from 0.33 in 
2003 to 0.31 in 2009. The main contribution to inequality reduction was played by 
employment. Although remittances could positively contribute to poverty reduction it 
could increase inequality, since international migration option is not necessarily accessible 
to the poorest population.   
The National Development Strategy in 2015 was initiated to regulate the 
development process of the country, taking into account the long-term perspective within 
the “Millennium Development Goals”, which currently was implemented through medium-
term Poverty Reduction Strategies. In addition, as we mentioned above, since Tajikistan 
takes part into integration agreements and International organizations with the fundamental 
special objectives as poverty alleviation, the social assistance through such organizations 
helped also to reduce the extreme poverty rate, particularly in rural areas; extreme poverty 
                                                          
91 
The poverty line in Tajikistan was estimated based on the international poverty measurement ($2.50 PPP 
per capital per day). Between 1999 and 2009 this approach relied on the Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) to measure poverty, primarily prepared and financed by the World Bank (WB). Since 
2010, the poverty rate of Tajikistan is estimated using a national Household Budget Survey (HBS) from 
the Agency on Statistics (TajStat). This approach is an internationally-recognized poverty-measurement 
methodology: the absolute poverty line for the HBS survey is defined by the cost-of-basic-needs method 
(CBN). In estimating the food poverty line, the average kilocalorie requirement (AKR) is set at 2,250 
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rates, based on the food poverty line, declined from 42% in 2003 to 18% in 2009 (Acevedo 
et al 2014).  
Moreover, agricultural production by private household plots and collective 
household farmers has become a vital solution for the household’s welfare development, 
influencing positively in decreasing poverty. At the same time, Tajikistan is one of the 
most vulnerable countries in terms of climate change92, one of the reasons making poverty 
reduction so difficult.  
The Tajikistan’s pace of poverty reduction over the past 15 years has been among 
the top 10 in the world. Thus, to date, in Tajikistan more than a million people have moved 
out of the poor zone.93 However, the country did not do so well in reducing non-monetary 
poverty. According to World Bank Group (2013), recently available micro-data suggest 
that limited or no access to education (secondary and tertiary), heating, and sanitation are 
the main contributors to non-monetary poverty. These three are the most unequally 
distributed services, with access to education varying by income level and heating and 
sanitation according to location. Consequently, despite high poverty alleviation, Tajikistan 
is still considered as one of the poorest country in the region (Table 4.1).  
The economic growth rate, a necessary condition, was quite high during this period, 
but not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction, due to the inefficiency and 
vulnerability of economic circumstances. Although economic growth was observed in all 
sectors of the economy in Tajikistan, it was not accompanied by comparable employment 
growth. About the relationship between growth and poverty, World Bank Group, (2013) 
and IMF (2011) suggested that the most effective way to translate growth into higher 
incomes is through the generation of more and better jobs based on private sector 
investment. We will present later on the document the performance of the labor market.    
  
                                                          
92 
The country is often affected by droughts, floods and soil erosion and the problem is exacerbated by a 
limited technical capacity of the country to forecast and react to natural disasters (World Bank Group, 
2013).This type of shocks are particularly devastating to the agricultural sector and households depending 
on them. According to DCC (2012), a 10 percent decrease in agricultural income would result in a 7 
percent increase in poverty. 
93 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview  
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 2000 2014 2000 2014 
Belarus 41.9% 4.8% 0.683 0.798 
Kazakhstan 46.7% 2.8% 0.679 0.788 
Kyrgyzstan 62.0%** 30.6% 0.593 0.655 
Russia 24.6% 11.0% 0.717 0.798 
Tajikistan 79.8%*** 32.0% 0.535 0.624 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the World Bank Indicator 
Notes: 
*
 Percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines. 
** From  UNDP http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo.html 
*** From the Taj Stat data 
 
Since development is the main objective from integration for developing countries, 
along with the poverty alleviation, other important issues regarding the improving of 
standards and quality of life are promoting healthcare and education. Therefore, here we 
turn to this issue in the context of the Human Development Index (HDI) evolution in the 
case of Tajikistan. 
On the eve of the Soviet Union collapse and in the early morning of Independence, 
Tajikistan along with most of the post-Soviet countries had relatively high human 
development indicators, reflecting the heritage of economic and social development 
achieved during the Soviet empire. However, with the disintegration result and civil war 
HDI has fallen sharply from 0.629 in 1991 to 0.535 in 2000. It is clear that the decline in 
the HD Index during this time indicates that the relative position of life expectancy, 
education and GDP in Tajikistan has been deteriorated. Although recent dates show that 
Tajikistan’s HDI value increased, country’s HDI is still behind most of other post-Soviet 
countries, especially to EurAsEC countries or its Central Asian neighbors (Table 4.1). 
A review of Tajikistan’s progress in each of the HDI indicators is provided in Table 
2. To allow assessment of Tajikistan progress in HDIs, Table 2 includes recalculated HDIs 
from 1990 to 2014 using consistent series of data (UNDP, 2015).94   
                                                          
94 
Calculations are based on international data from the United Nations Population Division (the life 
expectancy data), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for 
Statistics and the World Bank (the GNI per capita data). 
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Table 4.2: Trends in Tajikistan’s HDI component indices 1990-2014  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
HDI value 0.616 0.539 0.535 0.579 0.608 0.624 
Life expectancy 62.9 62.3 63.5 65.9 68.4 69.4 
Expected years of schooling 12.0 10.3 9.7 10.7 11.2 11.2 
Mean years of schooling 9.6 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.4 
GNI per capita (2011 PPP$) 3630 1211 1134 1663 2083 2517 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from  UNDP report (2015) 
Despite a low level of GNI per capita, the Tajikistan’s HDI value in 2014, which is 
about 0.624, put the country in the medium human development category, ranking 129 out 
of 188 countries. Between 1990 and 2014, Tajikistan’s life expectancy at birth increased 
by nearly seven years, mean years of schooling increased by nearly one years, but 
Tajikistan’s GNI per capita (in constant 2011 PPP$) decreased by about 30.7 percent 
between 1990 and 2014. 
1.4.2. Market-related determinants 
1.4.2.1. Employment and Productivity   
In general, the market structure of the less developed countries determines that 
comparative advantage concentrates in the production and trade on a limited range of 
usually low technology goods (Mackay, 1984). Moreover, unemployment and under-
employment of factors of production, together with a situation of low productivity, are 
major problems in developing countries (Hosny, 2013). So, a country can get gains from 
integration, even under trade diversion, if in that country there are labor shifts from low 
efficient to high-efficient sectors or activities, and a decreasing unemployment.  
In Tajikistan labor market, 51% of employees do not have a permanent job, most of 
the employees are working on very small businesses or they are self-employed and almost 
two-thirds do not have employment contracts, i.e., they are informal employees95. 
                                                          
95 
Despite some progress, informal employment is still prevailing in Tajikistan. There is a high level of 
informal employment both in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the total domestic employment. 
Other increasingly important challenge for Tajikistan is the youth unemployment (ILO, 2015). 
http://www.ilo.org/moscow/news/WCMS_378192/lang--en/index.htm 
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Agriculture is the only sector where a significant growth in the number of jobs is observed. 
Employment in non-agricultural sectors is growing very slowly or it is even stagnated.  
After disintegration of the Soviet Union with resulting sectoral collapse and broken 
of linkage between all sectors of the national economy, labor market of Tajikistan was in a 
critical situation. Other main reasons for insufficient job places and lack of employment 
opportunities are inability functioning of domestic labor market and a rapid population 
growth (2.2% in 2013), Tajstat (2014). Rapid population growth resulted in a number of 
young people being four times more than the number of older working citizens (Vinokurov 
et al., 2013). Consequently, young workers face considerable difficulties in finding work 
and workers approaching retirement age are forced to retire early.96 
According to TajStat (2014), the number of economically active population that 
includes employed and officially registered unemployed, in November 2013, stood at 2.26 
million, of which 97.5% are employed and 2.5% have the official status of unemployed. 
While 2.5% reflects the situation for the registered unemployment, it is far from the real 
situation of unemployment (Avezedo et al, 2014). Since an important size of the economy 
is informal or shadow economy (41% in 2007, according to Schneider, 2012), the official 
figures show not the real situation of employment and unemployment as well as their 
response to economic changes. According to ILO estimations, the total unemployment rate 
goes from 11.4 in 1991 to 10.7 in 2013, while the employment rate 
(employment/population 15+) goes from 58.5 to 62.6 (Graph 4.7).  
                                                          
96 
It is somewhat unclear how much future demographic developments will accentuate the employment 
challenge from the labour supply side, where there is currently a major surplus. Tajikistan was in the 
midst of a bout of very fast population growth (around 3 percent per year) when the crises of the 1990s 
hit. Such a rate would be a serious barrier to the developmental hopes of most countries, but especially 
one with the limited options of this country. Since then, however, population growth has fallen 
considerably, to an estimated 1.5–1.9 percent by 2010. 
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 Graph 4.7: Unemployment and Employment rates in Tajikistan 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from ILO Estimates and Projections of the Labor Market and WBI data 
In spite of the positive evolution of the labor market, the relative position of 
Tajikistan into the region was not as positive. The unemployment rate in Tajikistan 
remains as the highest one of the EurAsEC countries (Graph 4.8). Moreover, vulnerable 
employment, defined by the ILO as the unpaid family workers and own-account workers 
as a percentage of total employment, accounted by 47% in Tajikistan in 2009, while in 
Russia and Belarus accounted by 6% and 2% respectively (ILO, Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market database).  
       Graph 4.8: Unemployment rates in EurAsEC countries 
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As a characteristic feature of transition economy, the share of state employers fell 
down from 19.8% in 2009 to 18.8% in 2013. Similarly, the share of collective employers 
also decreased from 24.9% in 2009 to 16.8% in 2013. At the same time there is a steady 
trend of growth in the share of employed in the private sector from 54% in 2009 to 63.3% 
in 2013  (TajStat, 2014). 
While economic growth was observed in all sectors of the economy, it was not 
accompanied by comparable employment growth. All economic sectors grew at around 7 
percent during the decade of 2000s; however, employment growth was not observed in 
industry and was modest in the large sectors, services and agriculture, being higher in the 
small construction sector (World Bank Group, 2013). A sectoral collapse during Soviet 
dissolution and ineffective functioning transition period remained the main reasons behind 
cease of industry for creation jobs in the domestic market; in industry workplace numbers 
decreased from 256 thousand in 1991 to 114 thousand in 2007, Kudusov (2010). So, the 
sectorial structure of employment remained unchanged since 1995, with a gradual decline 
in the share of industrial employment and a slowly increase in the proportion of people 
employed in the agricultural sector (Graph 4.9). 
Graph 4.9: Sectorial structure of employment  
 
Source:  own elaboration based on data of Taj Stat, (2014) 
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Although in Tajikistan the importance of agriculture has declined during the recent 
years, facing many problems,97 it still remains one of the most important sectors (mainly, 
cotton fiber) by its contribution to GDP (27,4% in 2013)98, export earnings and 
employment (66.1% of total employment), (Graph 4.7).99 In fact, most of the jobs created 
during the period 2009-2012 (73,000), were created in the agricultural sector (Avezedo et 
al, 2014). From 1998 to 2007, jobs in agriculture increased from 1.090.000 to 1.430.000 
(Kuddusov, 2010). Jobs were also created in other much better paid sectors, such as 
services and construction, but comparing with agriculture only in significantly low level, 
especially for the later one. Although industrial goods generate about three-fourths of the 
country’s export earnings (due to a large contribution from the aluminum industry), the 
industrial employment decreased from 13% in 1991 to 4.1% of the total number of 
employed in the economy in 2013. 
Although the value added per worker in agriculture has doubled in the period 1992-
2013 in Tajikistan, it remains much lower than in the other EurAsEC countries (Graph 4.10). 
Graph 4. 10 Agriculture productivity (value added per worker, constant 2005 US$) 
 
    Source: Own elaboration based on World Development Bank Indicators  
                                                          
97 
The main reasons for the reduction in agricultural output in the post-reform period were the discontinuation of 
state support, the collapse of the system providing agricultural inputs and its replacement by unscrupulous 
intermediaries like ‘futures’ companies (their total number today in the country is 46). As a result of their not 
honest activities, about 30,000 dehkan farms are now in a catastrophic state. The total debt of dehkan farms to 
‘futures’ companies22 is about USD 488 million as of the beginning of 2008 (Kudusov, 2010) 
98 
The contribution of agriculture to GDP in 2013 is lower in the other EurAsEC countries: 8% in Belarus, 4% in 
Russia, 5% in Kazakhstan and 17% in Kyrgyzstan. 
99 
After the migration of male labor, feminization of agricultural households and poverty is an emerging 
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We share the conclusion of Kudusov (2010)  saying that given the 73% of total 
population living in rural areas and 67% of total employment in agricultural sector, there is 
a pressing need for a comprehensive ‘rural development strategy’ and specific 
programmers for improving the labour productivity in agriculture. No national 
development strategy can ignore this substantial rural part which is also main source of 
labour emigration. As poverty is observed most acutely in rural areas, mostly deprived 
from basic education and health facilities, special measures targeting girls’ education and 
women’s employment should be foreseen and implemented rigorously in rural Tajikistan. 
The answer to unemployment and poverty, especially in rural areas and by young 
people, has been migration. We next focus on labor migration and remittances.  
1.4.2.2. Labor integration or Migrant Chaos 
The key factors affecting the probability of migration are, in general, 
unemployment and household poverty (Brown et al, 2008). That is the case in Tajikistan, 
where the unfavorable situation in the domestic labor market (unemployment and low-
paying jobs) encourages citizens to migrate and migration has a massive character.100 
Together with poor employment opportunities in Tajikistan and betters perspectives in 
Russia, Akramov and Shreedhar, (2014) suggested that significant wage differential 
between Russian and Tajik labor markets are also an important determinant of labor 
migration. Average earnings of migrants in Russia are about 370 US$ what are 4 times 
higher than their expected income in Tajikistan (for a prime age male average wage in 
2009 was equal to 90 US$), Chernina and Lokshin, (2012).   
Tajik migrants have begun from hundred to thousand and rose up to millions, 
which now are equivalent to 18 percent of country’s population. In Russia there are up to 
one million Tajik labor migrants (Brown et all, 2008). If the first migration outflow was 
occurred mainly by security concerns and political instability during the civil war, Being 
most of them skilled workers or so called "brain drain", the following years gave evidence 
that a large outflow of migrants from both rural and urban areas are unqualified workers. 
Migrants from Tajikistan usually work in sectors requiring a low-skilled labor force, such 
as construction, trade, utilities, therefore, in order to be a migrant worker a high level of 
                                                          
100 
In 2011 more than 60% of migrants were unemployed, comprising some 33 percent of workforce in 
overseas occupations and 27 percent working unofficially at home. Another smaller group (10.8%) was 
engaged in unpaid work in the household (Vinokurov et al, 2013). 
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education is not required. In some way, Tajikistan has a comparative advantage in the 
export of labor services, since the country is able to offer part of employable workers 
which can meet the demand for labor in Russia, (Vinokurov et al, 2013). 
Accordingly, Tajikistan is one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the 
world. Labor migration and corresponding remittances from Tajikistan started in 2001 after 
signing EurAsEC agreement and from 2010 they grew so large that in 2013 remittances 
from migrant amounted to 45% country's GDP (Graph 4.11).  
            Graph 4.11. Migrant remittances, volume and as percentage of GDP 
 
                 Source: Own elaboration from World Bank Database. 
According to Vinokurov et al (2013), remittances from Tajik migrants play an 
essential role in the current stability of Tajikistan’s external position not only in poverty 
alleviation but also in the conduct of GDP and unemployment, in trade flows, monetary 
policy and eventually in welfare. But, the dependence of Tajikistan on remittances from 
migrants working in Russia is a major source of macroeconomic vulnerability. The decline 
of the Russian economy, which employs more than 90% of migrants from Tajikistan, will 
have an adverse effect on revenues of migrant workers and will lead to a drop in demand 
and economic growth. 
According to World Bank data, in 2011 the remittances amounted to $ 2.96 billion.  
Certainty, such growing remittances have significant relations with the increasing of trade 
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in which a large proportion of private consumption accounts for imported goods, including 
food, as well as it does induce the construction and manufacturing services. 
Despite some noticeable Tajik governmental efforts towards migration movements 
were made such as opening up trade, establishing numerous commercial banking system, 
negotiating visa-free access for Tajik workers going to Russia, and removing taxes on 
remittance inflows, (World Bank, 2011), the migrant process still have many outstanding 
issues such as shortages of skilled labor and illegal migration that seems to be a major 
constraint to migrants law and remittances growth.  
Estimates of the Eurasian Development Bank (2013) suggested that Tajikistan 
accession to the Eurasian Union and opening labor market will have a significant positive 
effect on the economy. Their policy recommendations include, on the first place, 
strengthening the existing system of professional training to improve the skills of migrants 
in the frame of legal migration. Secondly, there is the need to implement comprehensive 
measures to facilitate the flow of remittances at a higher level. Thirdly, the government 
policy of export labor resources should support the temporary labor migration, not the 
permanent one along with the attractive conditions for the return of migrants to their 
homeland. Moreover, active policies in the labor market of Tajikistan must be 
implemented in order to enhance the attractiveness of employment in the national 
economy, especially skilled workers within an extensive migration that will have a short-
term positive effect on GDP growth and poverty reduction, but does not increase the 
potential for a long-term perspective.  
A number of studies (Amir and Berry, 2012; Vinokurov et all, 2013) have argued 
that, on one hand, remittances are positively impacting home and host countries by 
providing large source of foreign currency, financing imports and promoting the balance of 
payment, resulting in the increased income but, on the other hand, this process has also a 
harmful side effect, which is an unhealthy and unstable growth of the economy with huge 
vulnerability results and severe social issues. In the case of Tajikistan, as was seen, 
remittances were important source of earnings, foreign exchange and imports growth 
(Graph 4.12). According to Khakimov (2014), the economic development of Tajikistan 
after 2004 was stimulated mainly by domestic demand growth, due to the large volume of 
labor migrant remittances. 
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Graph 4.12: Exports, Imports and Remittances of Tajikistan (US$ at current prices and current 










Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD data 
As is well-known, sustainable development implies ensuring stability for not only 
economic growth but also social development and ecological security. Rapidly growing 
remittances from hundreds of thousands of migrants to Russia has propped up the Tajik 
economy in recent years, but now the economic stresses are becoming increasingly 
apparent, (Amir and Berry, 2012). There are some specific issues about 
emigration/remittances related to their joint impacts on education, health and on child 
welfare in a more general sense. According to an estimation of Amir and Berry (2012), 
more than 9000 children whose parents have migrated are left without supervision, 
exposed to child labor and are deprived of being in school, although non-governmental and 
international organizations have made efforts to address this problem. 
Of particular relevance, from an economic point of view, is the potential effect of 
income remittances on the exchange appreciation. In this sense, the IMF (2006) claims that 
remittances present important challenges for macroeconomic management because they 
impedes monetary management, raises inflation pressure, create a disincentive to domestic 
savings and contribute to the expansion of trade deficit. IMF (2008) shows for a group of 
27 countries including Tajikistan that for the period 1990-2006, a 10% real depreciation is 
associated with a 1.2% of GDP trade balance improvement. After a calculation of a set of 
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the last years due to the steady inflow of remittances, which was an obstacle for the 
development of manufacturing and agriculture sectors. 
 Inflows of remittances lead to an increase of the demand for tradable and no-
tradable goods. But, since prices of tradable goods are determined by the international 
market, only the prices of non-tradable goods (and services) rice. Then there is a shift of 
resources from tradable to non-tradable sectors and exports will be negatively affected 
because domestically produced goods become less competitive in domestic and 
international markets.  
1.4.2.3. Protection for Industrial development 
As mentioned previously, for developing countries, economic integration may be a 
form of industrialization policy and a tool for development (equivalent to other policies 
like import substitution and export expansion) (Sakamoto, 1969; Lizano and Willmore, 
1975). So, Cooper and Massell, (1965b), have concluded that in evaluating the customs 
union effects on each member country not only the national income changes, but also the 
level and changes in size of industrial production must be taken into account. However, the 
positive benefits on industrial production from integration are unequally distributed 
between member countries: the greater gains are focused only in one or few member 
countries and for the economically weaker and geographically remote participating 
countries (like Tajikistan in the context of EurAsEC) this effect will be lower (Elkan, 
1975). 
Since the Soviet Union time, Tajikistan has been an agricultural-industrial country. 
Favorable climate conditions, important water resource and cheap rural labor are incentives 
to agricultural activities, including cotton growing, the cultivation of crops, fruits, livestock 
products etc. In comparison with other transition economies, today Tajikistan is a highly 
agrarian country with nearly 74% of the population living in rural areas and about 66% 
occupied in this sector, agricultural activities account for 27.4% of the GDP in 2013 
(World Bank, 2011). In addition, the agriculture branch is one of the potential spheres in 
terms of investment which can expect huge effects in the context of economic integration 
(Vinokurov et al, 2013).  
The sectorial structure of Tajikistan's GDP has changed significantly over the 
period 1995-2013 (Graph 4.9). If in 1995 the share of agriculture in country's GDP 
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accounted for almost 40%, in 2013 this sector considerably decreased to 27,4%; however, 
the share in employment increase by seven percentage point (from 59.1% to 66.1%). In the 
case of the services sector, despite the low increase in the share of employment from 1995 
to 2013 (Graph 7), the share of this sector in GDP increased from 22.3% to 50.8% in that 
period. By contrast, the participation of industry falls from 9.9% to 4.1% of total 
employment and from 39.3% to 21.8% in GDP.  
All EurAsEC members shifted their sectoral patterns from agriculture to industry 
and service sectors. Tajikistan also did it in part, but it remains as an especial case: 
agriculture, although decreases, continues to have an important weight and the increased 
participation of the services sector in total output is at the expense of a decreased weight of 
the industry (Graph 11). While the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan are 
relatively industrial economies, where industry accounts by 37%, 42%, 36% of GDP 
respectively, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with 26% and 21% respectively, the industrial 
sector is very weak (Graph 4.13). 
Graph 4.13: GDP sector contribution in EurAsEC countries, 1995-2013 
 
        Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank- WDI 
The main reason behind the industrial downturn is the recent fall in cotton and 
aluminum prices (World Bank, 2011), which are products having an important role in 
industrial sphere (cotton fiber in the light industry and aluminum production in the heavy 
industry). The decrease in cotton prices on world markets was also a main responsible of 
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demand for horticulture products in regional markets and an increasing productivity in that 
sub-sector. The contribution of livestock has also been increasing, although at a slower 
pace than non-cotton crops. 
Although cotton remains important to the national economy, (accounts for 15 
percent of Tajikistan’s export revenues and 39 percent of total state tax revenue, providing 
to the government an incentive to ensure that it continues growing as a major crop), the 
structure of the cotton sector has been one of the biggest barriers to local investment in 
Tajikistan and has thereby contributed to migration in search of better opportunities in 
Russia (Amir and Berry, 2012).101  
It is clear that the EurAsEC countries differ in terms of national sectorial structure. 
The existing structure, among which only Russia and Belarus can boast substantial 
manufacturing sectors, is an obstacle rather than an asset to integration of the EurAsEC 
countries. At this regard, (Golovnin, 2008) argued the main economic problem that 
EurAsEC must resolve is the structure of its member countries’ economies. It has to be 
improved in order to increase the competitiveness of these individual countries 
(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in a larger extent, compete in low-value-added sectors) and 
that of the whole Community within the global economy. 
These shared problems relate not just to the deterioration of the inherited structure 
of the economy but also to the need to create new and efficient sectors, for example, the 
financial sector. Banking systems and financial markets in EurAsEC countries, except for 
Russia and Kazakhstan, remain underdeveloped. Russia and Kazakhstan face large- scale 
outflow of capital, which is preventing their domestic financial markets from developing 
properly. The joint resolution of these problems may inform the new “agenda” of 
integration, actions like the implementation of a coordinated industrial policy and a system 
of compensation from the EurAsEC budget to mitigate the losses of member states and 
certain producers in the cases when shifting customs duties affect industries which are 
strategically important to a country’s economy could work in that direction (Golovnin, 
2008).   
                                                          
101 
Most migrant workers come from poor rural cotton-growing areas like Khatlon, which is the nation’s 
largest cotton-growing province (with 60 percent of the total) and has far the highest level of extreme 
poverty (defined as per capita income of under US$1.05 per day). So, the reform of the cotton market in 
Tajikistan is critical to maximizing the developmental payoff to land reform (Amir and Berry, 2012). 
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Thus, taking into account the agricultural position of Tajikistan in the frame of 
EurAsEC, it seems that if the country develops its agriculture sector and specializes in its 
potential branch (namely cotton and fruits), it can get potential benefits from integration in 
terms of intensification of inter-industry trade with other EurAsEC members. However, 
from another angle, in such position, until Tajikistan successfully solve such problems as 
low productivity and industrial deterioration, it cannot protect its outdated industrial sector 
and it would be no competitive in external markets, especially in relation with most of the 
EurAsEC members. In addition, there is a huge gap concerning deterioration of the labor 
force quality due to an outflow of the most qualified staff from the country.  
1.5. Trade-related determinants 
The static effects and most of the dynamic effects of economic integration on 
welfare come from the changes that the integration processes cause in the trade flows and 
in the trade pattern in the participating countries.  In the case of developing countries, there 
is determinants of the participation of these countries in integration processes which are 
related to trade but going beyond those traditional static and dynamic effects. 
We start by showing the evolution of the trade trends and the trade structure (by 
sectors and partners) of Tajikistan and then we will focus on the found evidence on the 
considered trade-related determinants, namely, trade as a percentage of GDP, trade pattern 
with developed countries, intra-regional trade and total regional trade and  competitive 
versus complementarity countries. 
1.5.1. Trade trends and trade structure of Tajikistan 
1.5.1.1. Trade trends  
Since trade leads to a reduction in consumer prices, allows for the budget revenues 
necessary to maintain social infrastructure, increasing employment opportunities for key 
social groups, including women, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and social 
development in the country, according with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan, 
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102 the foreign trade, including regional trade, must play a central role in any realistic long-
term strategies of the country’s development. In fact, in the last two decades the foreign 
trade had a great importance for economic and social development of Tajikistan.  
Tajikistan has been a member of WTO since March 2013 but the economy of 
Tajikistan was a fairly open economy before that. According to WTI data, the weighted 
mean applied tariff rate103 decrease from 6.8% in 2002 to 5.6% in 2014 (for primary 
products the decrease was from 5.8% to 1.6%). As a consequence of this commercial 
policy, we observe a high openness index, increasingly explained by a high ratio of imports 
to GDP. Although total trade as a percentage of GDP (openness index) significantly 
decrease after 2000 is still over 60% (Graph 4.14b). 
Between 1995 and 2000, exports and imports were almost at the same amount, 
being the trade balance nearly zero (Graph 4.14a). The growth rate of exports and imports 
in that period follow the path of GDP growth and export and import coefficients were 




  Source: World Bank Indicators Data 2014 and UNCTAD 
The situation starts changing after 2000. Although GDP shows high growth rates 
since 2000, imports as a percentage of GDP remains at high rates, going from 75% in 2000 




It is the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product import shares corresponding to each 
partner country. 
Graph 4.14 (a).  Exports, imports and trade 
balance,  1995-2013 (Thousand US$) 
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to 49% in 2013. After 2000 (mainly after 2002) imports boom while exports show a very 
poor dynamic (Graph 4.15) and negative balance becomes higher and higher (Graph 
4.14a). The percentage of GDP that is exported decreases dramatically after 2000 and the 
export coefficient falls from 91% to 13% over the period. Imports as a percentage of GDP 
were 66% in 1995 and, in spite of the high GDP growth rates over the period, were 49% of 
GDP in 2013 (graph 4.14b). As mentioned above, remittances (accounting by above 50% 
of GDP in 2013) explain this huge increase in imports. In general, remittances income 
imply an injection of resources into the economy, contributing to GDP, but imports being 
and increasing function of income become leakage (Raheem et al., 2014). This is 
especially relevant when, as it is the case of Tajikistan, imports consist essentially in 
consumption goods. 
 Graph 4.15: Exports, Imports and GDP of Tajikistan (index, 1995=100) 
  
 Source: Own elaboration base on UNCTAD Statistics data. 
          The foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan has generally increased in the period 1995-
2013. According to UNCTAD data, in that period the export has increased 1.5 times, while 
imports grew 5.1 times (the official statistical agency of Tajikistan presents very similar 
figures, 1.8 and 4.8 respectively). However, it is noteworthy that these statistics do not take 
into account the volume of informal trade, which is really widespread in Tajikistan 
(Vinokurov et al, 2013).104  
                                                          
104 
Related with the special rules of transportation of goods across the border with a number of neighboring 
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In the context of EurAsEC, Tajikistan exports and imports represents a very small 
proportion, but both variables had a very different evolution during the considered period. 
Imports evolution it was in line with the rest of the countries (Graph 4.16a) and its 
participation in total EurAsEC imports has been stable during the period, accounting for 
around 1.1%. By contrary, exports evolution was much less dynamic than for the rest of 
the countries so that its participation went from 0.64% in 2000 to 0.18% in 2013. So, the 
trade deficit almost tripled between 2007 and 2013.  
 Graph 4.16 (a): Imports of EurAsEC countries (index, 2000=100) 
 
   Source: Own elaboration base on UNCTAD Statistics data. 
There are several reasons behind the export downturn. First of all, the lack of 
efficient domestically policy complicates trade management and economic development 
(World Bank, 2011). Second, since Tajikistan is heavily relying on exports of a few 
primary commodities, the recent fall in world cotton and aluminum prices explain part of 
the export reduction. Certainly, such situation makes the country vulnerable to the sharp 
price swings of these commodities in a time of volatile world market, resulting in the world 
crisis105 that also had a relation with the rapid export decline. Thus, the trade deficit is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
China, that is not reflected in official statistics. However, is a major source of cheap consumer goods for 
households of the republic and a source of income from re-exporting. In 2010 the volume of non-formal 
re-exports of Tajikistan amounted to about 70% of official exports. This external trade component is 
highly sensitive to policy changes and external shocks (Mogilevskii, 2012). 
105 
Tajikistan’s terms of trade severely worsened when world prices of cotton and aluminum (in 2007, cotton 
fiber and other cotton products accounted for 17 percent, and aluminum for 63 percent of total export) 
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really a reflection of the imbalance between domestic investment and domestic saving 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010). Although economy literature shows that deficit is not 
necessarily harmful, that is not the case for Tajikistan when we consider not just the 
volume of import but the composition of import (as we will see later); the Tajikistan 
imports are essentially for domestic consumption and not for investment and real growth. 
There is a strong positive relationship between export performance and economic growth 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1999), mainly when, as the result of exports, resources shift 
from low-productivity activities to the higher-productivity export products (Hausmann et al 
(2006). So, in the case of Tajikistan, during the considered period the contribution of 
exports to economic growth is very week.    
 Graph 4.16 (b) : Exports of EurAsEC countries (index, 2000=100) 
 
Source: Own elaboration base on UNCTAD Statistics data. 
1.5.1.2. Trade by sector 
The structure of trade by products106 shows that Tajikistan exports are dominated by 
raw materials such as non-precious metals, cotton, other agricultural products (vegetables, 
fruits) 107 and in the first half of the period also by energy products.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Tajikistan’s trade partners in late 2008, aluminum export revenue fell by 46 percent and the value of 
cotton sales declined by 28 percent during the two years through end-2009 (World Bank, 2011). 
106 
Data on trade by products are based on three digit level SITC Revision 3 commodity classification, 
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Among all of products, the main export product is unwrought aluminum (Graph 
4.17) whose share from 2000 to 2013 in total exports decreased from 47.7% to 43.9% due 
to the fall in world price of aluminum as well as a high export concentration in this 
product. Cotton is the second major export product and, similarly, a decline in cotton share 
can be observed if we look into the whole period, but in comparison to 2006, the share of 
cotton exports has increased from 14.3% to 18.4% in 2013. 
The high specialization of Tajikistan in cotton and aluminum production, which 
accounts for two-thirds of total exports, makes the Republic largely dependent on shocks 
like world prices for these export items. Electricity export had a significant stance in 
country's export profiles in some years (14.6% in 1999), but by 2013 it almost disappeared. 
The export market for this product is geographically very concentrated. Tajikistan exported 
electricity in those years just to Uzbekistan, due to the available infrastructure and good 
trade relation, but since one decade ago, Uzbekistan is no longer a main trade partner of 
Tajikistan neither for exports nor for imports. 
Graph 4.17: Export of Tajikistan by group of products in the period 1995-2013 
 
        Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD Statistics www.unctad.org 
                                                                                                                                                                                
107 
In agriculture, cotton is likely to remain an important source of exports, despite the recent decline in 
cultivated areas and exports. Gardening and related products may also have export potential. The main 
export markets for these products are likely to be China (which is quickly becoming an important export 
market for Tajik goods), other neighboring countries and Russia (Vinokurov et al, 2013). In addition, the 
World Bank (2011) suggested that Tajikistan will be able to develop the livestock sector, if will improve 
the process of feed storage and marketing of products of animal origin. Still the prospects of potential 
agricultural export sectors remain unimplemented due to excessive regulation and unpredictable 
intervention of the local authorities. 
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The high export concentration is not a new phenomenon for Tajikistan. Since the 
Soviet period, cotton and aluminum have been the leader products and in the last two 
decades they continue as the main products in the export profile of the country. One 
possible solution to this high export concentration would be to diversify the export basket 
through the development of another export potential as hydroelectric power or non-
traditional export products.108 
According to the World Bank report (World Bank, 2011), one of the most 
important comparative advantages in Tajikistan is hydropower, and it supposed that if 
appropriate conditions for implementing hydropower projects can be created, hydropower 
exports could be a new medium-term growth driver. The country has the potential to 
generate much higher hydropower than the domestic needs, which can be sold to the 
neighboring energy-deficient economies, particularly in South Asia and China. Tajikistan 
also has substantial reserves of coal that can be used as fuel for the production of thermal 
energy. It would be the most economical way to reduce the seasonal imbalance in the 
supply of energy as hydropower production is carried out in the summer months. It is also 
possible that the production of electricity in Tajikistan and in neighboring countries may be 
combined in order to export through the air line in the country with a deficit of energy. 
Two obstacles to the implementation of Tajikistan's hydropower potential: high capital 
costs for the construction of hydropower plants and associated transmission system 
(Vinokurov et al, 2013).  
As far as import is concerned, the most noticeable products are minerals, especially 
alumina109, consumer durables, food, machinery and petroleum and oil products (Graph 
4.18). Imports of Tajikistan are much less concentrated than exports. The evidence shown 
in Graph 18 (in line with other studies like Mogilevsky, 2012; Coulibaly, 2012; Vinokurov 
et al, 2013) suggests that in Tajikistan, unlike other EurAsEC countries, there were huge 
changes in the structure of imports between 1995 and 2013. First, the share of alumina fell 
dramatically because of the low growth rate of aluminum exports, of which alumina is a 
                                                          
108 
It will be useful if this became essential agenda of the Tajikistan export policy. The non-traditional 
exports mean a shift of the export profile from the primary raw material to manufactured goods. This shift 
could be materialized for the Tajikistan economy largely due to an external trade and investment event in 
the context of an effective integration process. 
109 
Alumina is used by the "Tajik Aluminum Company» (TALCO) as a raw material for the production of 
the most important strategic product (aluminum), almost 100% of which is directed for export 
(Vinokurov et al, 2013). 
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
222 
raw material. Second, there was a substantial decline in the imports of electricity and gas 
from Uzbekistan. Third, imports of machinery, metals, timber and oil products increased 
considerably reflecting an increase in public and private investments in the country in such 
areas as road rehabilitation, hydropower plant construction and housing construction. 
Petroleum and oil products, capital goods and intermediate products for these investment 
activities came primarily from Russia, China and Iran, which explains the increase in these 
countries’ shares in total imports. 
Graph 4.18: Imports of Tajikistan by group of products in the period 1995-2013 
 
 
              Source: UNCTAD Statistics – www.unctad.org 
According to UNCTAD data (see Appendix 1), imports are less concentrated than 
exports and the concentration decreases over the period, showing a concentration index in 
2013 very similar to Russia or Kazakhstan. The number of imported products has increased 
over the period and in 2013 it is also similar to that of the other countries of EurAsEC 
(228).110 By contrary, the concentration index of exports has increased from 1995 to 2013, 
being in 2013 well above of that of other countries except Kazakhstan who focuses its 
exports on oil and gas.  The number of exported products was virtually unchanged since 
the beginning of the period and is much lower than that for imported products and that for 
                                                          
110 
The product concentration index shows how exports and imports of a country are concentrated on a few 
products or otherwise distributed in a more homogeneous manner among a series of products. The 
diversification index indicates whether the structure of exports or imports by product of a given country differs 
from the world pattern. Number of products exported (or imported) at the three-digit SITC, Rev. 3 level. 
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other countries.  In addition, the structure of exports by product of Tajikistan differs from 
the pattern world more than for the other EurAsEC countries, while imports show a less 
dissimilar structure. 
1.5.1.3. Trade by Partner 
Currently the Republic of Tajikistan has trade relations with more than 100 
countries and these relations have been enhanced from year to year. Recently, is quite 
observing that in Tajikistan the trend of interest to trade relation significantly has increased 
not only with developing countries like most of the Eurasian members (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), but also with “semi” developed (or middle income) countries 
such as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, etc.111 or developed countries from the European 
Union. 
Graph 19 shows the dynamic of the relative position of Tajikistan and its main 
trading partners: EU, China, Iran, Turkey, EurAsEC countries, CIS countries (other than 
EurAsEC) and the rest of the World. The dynamics of foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan 
with China, Turkey, and EurAsEC members in the recent years had a positive trend, while 
sharply decreased with EU and the CIS countries which are not members in EurAsEC. 
      Graph 4.19: The main foreign trade partners of Tajikistan in the period 1995-2013 
 
              Source: UNCTAD, 2014 – www.unctad.org 
                                                          
111 
Although Russia, China, Turkey and Iran are not developed countries, they are neither a typical developing 
country. So in the view of Tajikistan as small undeveloped economy, in explaining trade with developed and 
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In regard to exports (Graph 4.20), although Tajik commodity export pattern has not 
change significantly over the period 1995-2013, it showed substantial changes in partner 
structure. Perhaps the most interesting data from this figure is the decreasing of the export 
flow of Tajikistan with the EU and at the same time with CIS countries as well as with 
EurAsEC members.   
     Graph 4.20: Tajikistan’s main foreign trade partner by export in the period 1995-2013 
 
                 Source: UNCTAD, 2014 – www.unctad.org 
The geographic dynamic of import inflows in the Tajikistan trade over the period 
1995-2013 are shown in (Graph 4.21). From 1996 to 2007 Tajikistan had considerable 
import flows with the other CIS countries, which are not member of EurAsEC. If we 
exclude Russia and Kazakhstan it is quite clear that the majority of this import flow was 
only from Uzbekistan. The import decline with CIS countries was steeply from around 
55% to around 11%. From one side, surely, it is an economic damage that the neighboring 
Uzbekistan has significantly reduced trade with Tajikistan. However, from another side, 
this sharp reduction caused geographical changing orientation and promoted the increase 
of import flows from China based on private consumption and capital goods. Thereby, the 
growing role of China can be the second notable feature of the Tajik imports performance 
by partners. The next feature is that among trade partners, after China the EurAsEC 
countries hold the largest share in the import structure. In fact, the two major members 
Russia and Kazakhstan (and in some extent Belarus and Kyrgyzstan) as the traditional and 
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regard to this, if we take into consideration the period before and after signing the 
agreement in 2000, the picture shows that the EurAsEC agreement has a positive effect on 
imports of Tajikistan, what was not the case for exports.  
      Graph 4.21: Tajikistan’s main foreign trade partner by import in the period 1995-2013 
 
           Source: UNCTAD, 2014 – www.unctad.org 
The first geographical origin of import flows of Tajikistan are China, EurAsEC and 
other neighbor countries. By products, mainly Tajikistan imports: petroleum products and 
foods, sugar (Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran); pharmaceuticals products, garments, 
machinery and equipment, building materials (Ukraine); clothing (China); flour and wheat 
(Kazakhstan). Uzbekistan being a member of the CIS and a main neighbor of Tajikistan is 
no longer a principal trade partner of the country neither in export nor in import. The 
difficult geographical location of Tajikistan favors trade with traditional post-Soviet 
partner and in parallel with regional powers such as the EU and China (Vinokurov et al, 
2013). 
1.5.2. Integration determinants  
1.5.2.1. Trade as a percentage of GDP 
Countries are most likely to benefit from economic integration if they are closed 
economies, that is, if their volume of foreign trade as a percentage of their GDP is lower 
(Lipsey, 1960). In general, this factor is quite relevant for developing countries since the 
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income countries.112 However, (Hosny, 2013) has stressed that such observation does not 
apply to middle-income countries and least developed countries, both groups having higher 
trade openness level than that of the high-income group. This is the case of Tajikistan 
(Graph 4.20). 
Graph 4.22: Openness index, selected countries, 1995-2013 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on World Development Bank Indicators  
So, the benefits associated to a more open economy is not working as a relevant 
integration determinant in the case of Tajikistan, explaining its desirability to enjoy 
EurAsEC beyond traditional static and dynamic effects. By 2000 Tajikistan was a highly 
open economy and the openness degree decreased from 2000 to 2013.  
1.5.2.2. Change of the trade structure with developed countries 
Since the major part of the import of developing countries from developed 
countries is capital goods (in the form of investment) and integration among these 
countries requires higher investments, the volume of imports of less integrating developed 
countries is likely to increase (Mikesell, 1965). So, the long-run target of integration 
among developing countries should not be decreasing trade with the rest of the world but 
                                                          
112 
The large countries in terms of GDP and/or population tend to trade less, as there is larger scope for trade 
within the country.  Similarly, it has been argued that countries with high level of GDP per capita may 
also be biased toward having a lower level of trade to GDP ratio. The reason is that as countries develop, 
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rather making changes in their trade structure. Also, taking into account the availability of 
foreign exchange as a determinant of imports in developing countries, Sakamoto (1969), 
claims that if a result of integration between developing countries a trade diversion in 
consumer goods takes place, this will release the larger foreign currency targeting at more 
imports of capital goods from third (developed) countries. Eventually, the volume of trade 
flows with the non-member countries may not change or may actually increase, but the 
most important thing is the changing of the trade structure. 
In the case of Tajikistan integration in EurAsEC, part of these conditions are not 
met. There was not a trade diversion in consumer goods from the rest of the world to the 
integrated area, the consumer goods, consisting in the highest proportion of the imported 
goods, are imported mainly from China. Trade with the developed European countries has 
not increased over the period.  
1.5.2.3. Intra-regional trade and total regional trade 
Although Inotai (1991) shows that intra-regional trade and total regional trade 
indicators should not be the only ones considered in analyzing integration success when 
integration takes place between developing countries,113 the increase of the share of intra-
regional trade to total trade of the member countries remains as a relevant indicator. This is 
a useful indicator in determining not just the ex-post effects of a current step of an 
integration agreement, but the potential ex-ante effects derived from a deeper integration 
degree, as is the case of Tajikistan deciding to join new integration initiatives in the context 
of EurAsEC. 
Since the collapse of the great Soviet Empire, resulting from the recession and the 
economic disintegration of an earlier common production system, trade and economic 
cooperation between EurAsEC countries dramatically shrank. One interpretation of the 
intra-regional relations reduction is given by disappearance of the majority of the 
enterprises and sectors in the transition period, especially manufacturing. Fortunately, this 
trend is not constant, by 2000-2005 after the transition period that was mostly over, the 
situation had started to change; in result, intra-trade between integrating members slightly 
increased once again (12%). However, historically, the republics of the former USSR were 
                                                          
113 
The joint industrial development, adequate infrastructure, and growing level of technology are also 
important targets and the growth of total regional trade can be assumed as positive only when it is 
combined with improvements in competitiveness in world markets. 
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much more integrated. In 1991 (the last year of the Soviet Union) intra-regional trade 
turnover was at 20% of their total trade turnover (Mogilevskii, 2012).  
Although Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was the first and unique 
integration project in the scope of the post-Soviet Union supporting intra-regional trade 
initiatives that have applied zero tariffs for the majority of goods between countries, intra-
regional trade is still a low proportion (Graph 21). In this integration group, progress in 
achieving the planned trade integration was limited because although there were elements 
of free trade between EurAsEC member states, exemptions and quotas were maintained 
and special trade measures were applied on a unilateral basis (Dragneva, 2012).114 
Total foreign trade of the integrating trade partners has an increasing annual 
tendency, except for 2009 which was characterized by a reduction in the volume of trade 
due to the financial crisis in most parts of the world. The coincidence of the creation of 
Customs Union in 2010 with the period of post-crisis recovery, largely complicates the 
analysis of the impact of the integration process. From 2001 to 2013 total intra-region 
turnover increased by 4.3 times (from 21.52 billion U.S dollars to 129.11 billion U.S 
dollars) but total trade of the region with the rest of the world increased by 5.7 times. Then, 
intra-regional trade share which was a small proportion in 2001 (13.7% of total trade) 
decreased over the period to 10.8% (Graph 4.23). 
The lack of dynamic intra-regional trade in EurAsEC is largely defined by the 
nature of the goods traded within the region compared to those traded goods with third 
countries. Regarding to this, Golovnin (2008) brought a good example: machinery makes 
up a substantial share of trade within the bloc and price increases of these products are 
below the price of the fuel and energy sector. The low intra-regional trade in this area can 
be explained by different aspects. While the language is not a problem between these 
countries since they have a common one (Russian), logistic and bureaucracy issues make 
remarkable restrictions. Another interpretation is given by a drop in the global 
competitiveness of goods made in the EurAsEC compared to goods from third countries 
and the absence of significant changes in the structure of comparative advantage. In 
addition, the similarities in the structure of their economies and specifically the dominance 
of low-value added sectors (mining, agriculture and metallurgy) making the producers of 
                                                          
114 
Regarding with this  Cooper (2013) notes, the expansion of the EU and WTO provided an impetus for 
Russia to engage in a ‘competitive multilateralism’, yet it ultimately continued to rely on bilateral 
relations, even within the common framework. 
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EurAsEC economies not complementary is another reason for the low level of 
intraregional trade (Golovnin, 2008).  
Graph 4.23. Extra-regional and intra-regional trade turnover (billion USdollars) and share of intra-
regional trade in total trade of EurAzEC 
 
 
        Source: UNCTAD DATA, 2014 
The insignificant trade within EurAsEC is characterized by the high reliance on one 
country market (Russia115 and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan) (Graph 4.24), which makes 
the members of the regional association so vulnerable to the economic situation prevailing 
in Russia. It is also characterized by a lack of political commitment, for its high export 
commodity concentration, especially in primary raw trade, and for reduction of intra-
industry trade (Tochitskaya et al 2008), as well as the intensity and the low 
complementarity index among member countries. 
Another fundamental challenges related to the low share of intra-regional trade is 
transport costs (Kuzmina, 2012). The transportation component is so high for these states’ 
exports to EurAsEC countries that even the duty free exports in many instances 
(agricultural products and mineral raw materials) cannot compensate heavy transportation 
                                                          
115 
This results in movements to raise barriers to intra-bloc trade and can lead to trade wars. Despite 
declarations that such barriers do not exist, in practice EurAsEC members (in particular, Russia and 
Belarus) have been waging trade wars more often, which have had a negative impact on trade and 
economic cooperation. Protracted debates between Russia and Belarus over conditions imposed on 
Belarusian sugar supplied to Russia and Kazakhstan’s imposition of sugar import quotas are immediate 
examples to this matter. Protective measures do not only reduce trade but also undermine the basis of 





























Intra-region Extra-region % Intraregional trade
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
230 
and transit expenses. Infrastructure barriers impede railing and shipping by internal 
waterways in communication with third countries having different rail gauge and 
navigation pass dimensions. Therefore, one of the main keys for successful and effective 
trade integration within EurAsEC is the modernization of their transport infrastructure that 
is now an "open agenda" of this regional project
116
.  Certainly, such developments hold 
back the growth of intra-regional trade in this integration group compared to total foreign 
trade with the non-members.  
       Graph 4.24: Share in EurAsEC intra-regional trade by country, 1995-2013 
 
        Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD DATA 
Russia has a much higher weight than the other EurAsEC countries in intra-regional 
(Graph 4.24) although from 2001 its share had decreased while the share of Kazakhstan 
and Kirghizstan increase. The participation of Belarus remains practically unchanged as 
well as that for Tajikistan, which represents only a negligible 1.1%. So, despite the trade 
orientation of the EurAsEC countries on the market of the rest of the world, Russia remains 
as an important trading partner for almost all members of the Community.  
The high share of Russia in trade turnover of EurAsEC is just in comparison with 
the rest of members, but not in comparison with the total Russian foreign trade. Since 
                                                          
116 
A concept of Single Transport Space (STS) was approved early in 2008, which is correlated with the Customs 
Union becoming fully operational and is planned to be put in place by 2020. One of the major transportation 
system problems of these member states is high level (up to 70%) of deterioration of physical assets, as well as 
moral ageing of hauling stock of all types of transport.  EurAsEC Interstate Council has approved an 
investment program aimed at renovation of roads and hauling stock. The Concept provides for implementation 
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Russia is the engine of trade in the EurAsEC, the low share of EurAsEC trade in Russia’s 
total foreign trade has also reduced intra-bloc trade in the area (Golovnin, 2008). 
Moreover, in the context of bilateral trade, although together with Russia, the role of 
Belarus and Kazakhstan was noticeable, the highest degree of bilateral trade can be 
observed only among some pair-countries headed by Russia - Belarus, followed by Russia 
– Kazakhstan, Tajikistan -Russia or Tajikistan- Kazakhstan. 
In the case of Tajikistan, the share of intra-EurAsEC trade in total foreign trade is 
higher than for the total area but the increase in trade with EurAsEC after joining the 
agreement was not greater than for total trade, so that the share of intra-regional trade 
decreases from 27% in 2001 to 25.5% in 2013 (being much lower for exports than for 
imports, as we saw above). Further, after the project obtained “fast track” authority in 
2006, intra-trade increased slightly more than total trade (186% and 171% respectively 
from 2006 to 2013). 
Essentially, the poor development of intra-EurAsEC trade in the case of Tajikistan 
can be explained first by the high concentration index of the country’s export in a few 
primary products (see Appendix 1); second, low complementarity indexes of the country’s 
trade with the EurAsEC partners, mainly for exports, (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below) and 
finally, lack of political responsibilities. Despite these limits and the poor dynamic shown, 
intra-regional trade for Tajikistan remained important, chiefly with Russia in the context of 
oil and petrol products and Kazakhstan relating to wheat flour import, since these products 
are essential for Tajikistan economy. Moreover, while intra-regional trade is not significant 
for Tajikistan, it is quite important in some sector of its trade. For instance, a comparison 
of the commodity structure of imports indicates that trade in energy products (oil or 
petroleum), in agricultural products (other than cotton fiber), foodstuffs, manufactured 
products (“Machinery and equipment” and construction materials, fertilizers and other 
chemicals included into “Other products” category) occupies significant share in intra-
regional trade. 
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Graph 4.25: Intra-regional trade of Tajikistan within EurAsEC and total foreign trade turnover 
(Million Dollars), 1995-2013 
 
         Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD DATA 
1.5.2.4. Competitive Vs complementarity countries 
The trade complementarity (TC) index, proposed by Michaely (1996), indicates to 
what extent countries are "natural trading partners", i.e., it measures at what extent the 
export (import) profile of a country j matches the import (export) profile of a country k. 
Then, this index of trade compatibility can give useful information on perspectives for 
trading partners that can motivate countries for participation into integration groups. 
In general, two countries with a high TC index may gain from trade expansion 
following a preferential trade agreement more than two countries with a low TC index. So, 
the index can be particularly useful in an ex ante evaluation of the potential gains from 
bilateral or regional trade agreements, being an indicator of the relevance of a 
contemplated preferential agreement (Michaely, 1996).  
The index matches only the demand of partners and does not include other trade 
determining factors such as distance of partners, the possibility of transport or trade 
barriers (Castro, 2010). At this regard, the WITS (2013) point that when countries are 
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difference of two economies is large117, a high complementarity index may not imply a 
gain from increased trade. The index may also suffer from aggregation bias. 
The UNCTAD statistics present data for this index calculated as the sum of the 
absolute value of the difference between the import shares and the export shares (at 3-digit 














Where, 𝑻𝑪m𝒊x𝒋 is the index of trade complementarity of importer country i with exporter 
country j; 𝑻𝑪x𝒊m𝒋 is the index of trade complementarity of exporter i and exporter j; 𝒌 is 
goods in 3 digit SITC Revision 3; 𝒎𝒌𝒊 is the share of goods 𝒌 in country i’s total imports 
from the world; 𝒙𝒌𝒊 is the share of goods 𝒌 in country j’s total exports to the world.  
The index value ranges between 0 and 1 (or 100 percent). Where 0 indicates that 
there is no matches at all between country j and country k export/import pattern (there is no 
god imported by one country which is exported by the other) and 1 indicates a perfect 
correlation in the export/import pattern (one country exports precisely what the other 
import).  
The values of the index for Tajikistan as importer country and its main partners for 
the period 1995-2013 are shown in table 3. As partner countries, we take the EurAsEC as a 
whole, the EurAsEC countries (Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan), Armenia, 
China, Iran Turkey and the European Union. 
In 2000, when Tajikistan joint EurAsEC, the three exporting countries with which 
Tajikistan had highest TC index values were Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Russia, all of them 
members of EurAsEC. In the three cases, values were higher in 2000 than in 1995. The 
EU, being a large economy, also shows a high and increasing index value in the different 
years. Taking Tajikistan as exporter country (table 4), TC index for of all main partners 
took very low levels in 2000, even lower than they were in 1995. The three countries 
showing highest index were Russia and Kazakhstan (from EurAsEC) and Turkey. 
                                                          
117 
A match in percentage terms does not imply a match in levels. 
118 
Exports and imports are measured by commodity but they are relative to the world, not to each other.                                    
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Table 4.3:  Trade complementarity index for Tajikistan (importer) with main trade partners,  
1995-2013 























2000 TJK 0.16 0.27 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.22 
2013 TJK 0.16 0.40 0.41 0.16 0.17 0.33 0.24 0.51 0.48 0.26 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD, 2013 
Note:  TJK-Tajikistan,     ARM-Armenia, BLR-Belarus, CHN-China,  IRN-Iran, KAZ-Kazakhstan, 
           KRG-Kyrgyzstan,  RUS-Russia,       TUR-Turkey,  EU- European Union 28 countries. 
Then, taking into account the qualitative information given by the TC index, by 
2000 could reasonably be expected an expansion of trade after a preferential agreement 
with EurAsEC countries. We can see as the more and more diversified basket of imports of 
Tajikistan increasingly fits the export structure of its partners. By the contrary, the export 
structure of the country fits less with the import structure of all the main partners, since 
basket of exports of Tajikistan includes very few goods. 
Table 4.4: Trade complementarity index for Tajikistan (exporter) with main trade partner, 1995-2013 























2000 TJK 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 
2013 TJK 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD, 2013 
Note: TJK-Tajikistan, ARM-Armenia, BLR-Belarus, CHN-China,  IRN-Iran, KAZ-Kazakhstan, 
           KRG-Kyrgyzstan, RUS-Russia, TUR-Turkey, EU- European Union 28 countries. 
By 2013 the situation had changed, especially in relating with TC index for 
Tajikistan imports. In general, index values are higher for all partner countries, also for 
EurAsEC countries with the exception of Russia. But the highest values are showed by 
Turkey and China, two non EurAsEC members (table 3). The huge increase in volume and 
diversity of Tajikistan imports from these main partner countries explain the change in 
index values. Regarding to TC index for Tajikistan exports, values remain low, much 
lower than those for imports, but they have increased for some countries, in particular for 
Iran, Armenia and Russia, the latter two being the countries showing highest values 
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followed by Belarus and Turkey. The index tends to be higher when the country is large (in 
terms of GDP), rich (in terms of per capita income); having a production pattern in which 
manufacturing is predominant and having diversified exports (Michaely, 1996). All these 
factors explain the low values of the index for Tajikistan. 
From the index values in 2013, the recommendation in terms of the relevance of a 
deeper integration agreement with EurAsEC countries is not as clear as it could be in 2000, 
especially in regarding TC index for imports. According to Michaely (1996), a high 
coefficient would mean that a preferential agreement between an “importing” country and 
an “exporting” one would have a high likelihood of diverting imports of the former from 
the rest of the world to the exporting country. So, seen the coefficients for Tajikistan as a 
“exporting”, is not expected that a preferential agreement with any of the considered 
partners diverts trade from the rest of the world to Tajikistan.       
In relation with the low intra-regional trade of EurAsEC, Golovnin (2008), claims 
that one of the obstacles is the low and similar development level among a majority of 
them resulting in not having the option neither for inter-industry nor for intra-industry 
specialization.  
1.6. Political determinants  
As previously mentioned in the first and second chapters, in addition to economic 
factors there are a number of political determinants explaining the gains from integration 
and the desirability to enter into integration processes which are particularly relevant in the 
case of developing countries. So, Tajikistan looks at integration as the main engine of 
development not just for economic issues but also for political reasons and for the 
promotion of peace and security. Among the fundamental reasons of Tajikistan being 
member of EurAsEC are political and security reasons, since the most important military 
potency possesses only this project.  
This partially explains the different integration initiatives followed. Indeed, given 
the geo-strategic position of Tajikistan, one of the main reasons of following several 
integration options is the political factor, since security issues have been predominant 
issues of economic development especially after the terrible civil war. While the interest of 
Tajikistan in joining international global organizations was a signal of nationhood (as a 
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member of UN) and potential financial support and assistance (as a member of the IMF 
and the World Bank), entering the WTO platform was aiming at searching a haven from 
the worst external events and strengthening its reputation in the world as well as creating 
favorable conditions for the attraction of foreign investment. The integration of Tajikistan 
with other group like the Islamic world and the regional integration with China are more in 
terms of security issues, in a generic sense, rather than economic goals. The principal 
objectives of these integration groups are the protection of the vital interests of the 
Muslims, the resolution of conflicts and disputes between Member States or even 
strengthening the mutual confidence, friendship and neighborship between member states, 
developing multi-profile of co-operation in order to maintain peace, security and stability 
in the region. 
Moreover, sometimes, due to the lack of political will and the absence of consensus 
on who should lead the integration initiatives, the regional integration groups would be 
weakened making impossible any common action, allowing them to speak on more 
favorable conditions with outside factors. A good example can be the Central Asian 
integration concerning competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for the leadership 
in which no one could be the leader, resulting in the entry of Russia and China (Linn, 
2012). 
The reduction of illegal border migration is one of the desired political goals of 
many integration agreements between neighbor countries, especially when one of them is a 
developing country. Even if nowadays the right to visa-free for citizens of Tajikistan 
allows freely traveling to Russia, some of the migrants go through legal ways (registration, 
work permit or a patent) but others, for several reasons, do not abide by migration laws and 
they resort to illegal way. According to estimates of Vinokurov et al (2013), the share of 
illegal migrants is around 50-70% of the total number of migrants, which have many 
challenges that the accession of Tajikistan into the Customs Union can eliminate. 
1.7. Conclusions  
This chapter examined, firstly, the dynamic regional integration effects of EurAsEC 
for the economic growth of Tajikistan. Also in the context of the New Regionalism 
approach, the chapter analyzed some of the welfare effects of integration for developing 
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countries,  which the traditional approach have not dealt with, as well as, some of the 
factors motivating developing countries to participate in an integration area, beyond 
traditional static and dynamic effects, that together with several political factors, could give 
rationality to the integration of Tajikistan into EurAsEC at two-stage, the current degree 
and possibly a deeper degree in the future.           
          Attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as an essential component of the long-
run dynamic effects on economic growth, is a major incentive for integration of developing 
countries. The increasingly interest of the Tajik government  in development of the foreign 
investment climate, and growing importance of China, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and 
International financial organizations as main investors in the several investment projects, 
suggest that Tajikistan has a very favorable potential investment conditions. Unfortunately, 
with the lack of transparent investment policies, poor business climate and a high level of 
corruption, Tajikistan lags with much smaller FDI, in relative terms, behind all the 
EurAsEC countries (EDB, 2013; FAO, 2014; UNCDAT, 2014; State Statistical Agency of 
Tajikistan and Investment Committee of Tajikistan).  It is not surprising that corruption be 
the most highlighted reason for the low level of FDI in Tajikistan, since the country ranked 
very low in the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2014. In fact, the Bureau of economic and 
business affairs (2012) stated that until Tajikistan successfully struggles with such 
fundamental problems, it would not attract considerable foreign direct investment (FDI). 
In spite of the poor performance of FDI, Tajikistan together with the other 
EurAsEC members enjoyed a faster GDP growth (averagely 7-8%) after 2000. In the case 
of Tajikistan, economic growth is explained in a large extent by high and increasing 
remittances (above 50% of GDP in 2013) and financial assistance from multilateral and 
bilateral development partners. Under those external environment factors, highly uncertain 
and domestic pressures growing, the authorities are confronted with the need to undertake 
a transition to a more sustainable and inclusive growth model (World Bank Group, 2015).  
Economic growth in Tajikistan, although  unstable, is  in the same line with the most 
EurAsEC countries in recent years, but GDP per capita of Tajikistan is negligible in 
comparison with these countries.            
In the case of developing and less developed countries such as Tajikistan, the 
potential positive welfare effects of an integration process, explaining the desirability to 
these countries in participating in integration agreements go beyond the static effects and 
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dynamic. There are several economic and political integration determinants that could give 
rationality to the Tajik decision about join EurAsEC in spite of low or ambiguous static 
and dynamic effects. Following Marinov (2014), we have considered in this chapter three 
categories of integration determinants: general economic (development objective), market-
related, and trade-related determinants. 
Among the stated objectives for an integration agreement, the economic 
development objective is the most important one for developing countries. In this regard, 
poverty alleviation was identified as one of the major development objectives standing in 
the way of Tajik government. Poverty rate fell from 79.8 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 
2014 of people living under poverty line (Taj Stat, 2015). The main determinants of that 
reduction are: the participation of Tajikistan in International organizations with the special 
aim of poverty alleviation, the growing volume of international remittances, agricultural 
production by private household plots and collective household farmers and the social 
assistance through organizations helping people in an extreme poverty situation are the 
main. Certainly, Tajikistan has done a remarkable job in reducing poverty with more than a 
million people moving out of the poor zone. However, with a poverty rate of 32% in 2013, 
the country is still recognized as a poorest country in the scope of EurAsEC. 
           Starting from a relatively high Human Development Index (HDI) from the Soviet 
era, after the collapse of the USSR Tajikistan HDI fallen  sharply from 0.629 in 1991 to 
0.535 in 2000 and only the country could catch up the previous rate in 2014. Currently, 
Tajikistan still has a lower HDI than the other EurAsEC countries, (UNDP, 2015). 
           In regard the market-related determinants, we have focused on the potential effects 
of integration on employment and productivity and the industry development. Despite of 
the high economic growth in the country, employment growth was not observed, neither 
in the large sectors such as services and industry nor in the small construction sector. Only 
the agricultural sector provided new jobs, accounting by 66% of total employment in 2013. 
In a context of increasing population, the unemployment rate increased. Although 
according to the Taj Stat, the registered unemployment rate in the country is around 2.5 
percent over the period, the official number of unemployed is far from reality (Avezedo et 
al, 2014). ILO estimates an unemployment rate four times larger (11.5% in 2009), which is 
the highest of the EurAsEC area. Thus, it seems that the positive effects of integration on 
the labor market were not observed in terms of employment.   
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Given the increase in the share of employment in the agricultural sector, the 
increase of the economy’s productivity depends on the increase in productivity in 
agriculture. Despite some increase in the valued added by worker in sector in recent years, 
the agriculture productivity in Tajikistan is still in the lowest position within the region.  
In a context of unemployment and household poverty, migration is the solution for 
many people in Tajikistan. In fact, around 15% of total population has migrated, mainly to 
Russia. Consequently, Tajikistan with a volume of remittances accounting by 50% of GDP 
in 2013 is one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world (Vinokurov et al, 
2013). The huge amount of remittances, which contributed positively to the poverty 
alleviation and labor market pressure, is also a source of macroeconomic instability by its 
contribution to, among other aspects, the exchange rate appreciation and the increase in the 
trade deficit. 
      After present the evolution of the Tajikistan trade trends and trade structure (by sectors 
and partners) in  the chapter we considered the followed  trade-related determinants:  trade 
as a percentage of GDP, trade pattern with developed countries, intra-regional trade and 
total regional trade and  competitive versus complementarity countries. 
After the war-time recession, the foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan came out 
with a positive dynamics, increasing between 1995 and 2013. From 1995 to 2000, exports 
and imports were almost at the same amount, being the trade balance nearly zero.  
However, in the last decade Tajik export and import significantly differs by size. Over that 
period, the export has increased 1.5 times whereas imports rose 5.1 times. In the early 
2000, import as a percentage of GDP amounted to 75%, a decade after, the level of import 
remains high, around 49% of GDP in 2013, despite a substantial GDP growth observed. By 
contrary, in 2013 the share of export in country's GDP was significantly smaller, around 
13%, which dramatically fell from 91% in 2000 following the decline in the world price of 
cotton and aluminum as main export products.  
           Regard to trade by partners, Tajikistan export and import are increasing not only 
with EurAsEC members but also and a larger extent with non-EurAsEC countries such as 
China, Iran, and Turkey. However, trade flows with other non-member countries like the 
EU and CIS countries shows a negative trend. Thus, in spite of substantial extra-regional 
trade turnover (1.064 billion U.S dollars), the intra-regional trade remains highly 
insignificant (129 billion U. S dollars) representing only 10% of total EurAzEC trade in 
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2013. In the case of Tajikistan, the proportion of intra-EurAsEC trade in total foreign trade 
is higher than for the area as a whole. However, the intra-regional proportion in total 
foreign trade decreases from 27% in 2001 to 25.5% in 2013. 
We cannot conclude that the effects of integration on trade openness or trade 
pattern with developed countries are determinant of the desirability of Tajikistan to join 
EurAsEC. By 2000, Tajikistan was a highly open economy and the openness degree fell 
from 2000 to 2013. Moreover, the trade flows of Tajikistan with the developed European 
countries have not increased over the period. The higher import share consisting of 
consumer goods come namely from China. 
        The trade complementarity (TC) index that indicates to what extent the export 
(import) profile of a country j matches the import (export) profile of a country k, shows 
much lower values for Tajikistan as an exporter than as an importer. In both of the cases, 
the index increased from 2000 to 2013 not just with EurAsEC members but also and in a 
larger extent with some other countries like Turkey and China. Thus, while by 2000 could 
reasonably be expected an expansion of trade after a preferential agreement with EurAsEC 
countries, from the index values in 2013 the recommendation in terms of the relevance of a 
deeper integration agreement with EurAsEC countries is not as clear, especially in 
regarding TC index for imports.  
Among the several integration options followed by Tajikistan over the past two 
decades (as it was showed in chapter two), it seems that in recent years it is giving priority 
to integration in EurAsEC, which has recently moved towards a greater degree of 
integration by forming an Economic Union three member countries (Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan). In the eve of Tajikistan' accession into the EurAsEC-Customs Union, the 
relevance of potential effects from integration for Tajikistan became a more decisive issue, 
especially in view of the existing political and economic backwardness. 
Tajikistan, a small landlocked country with a geostrategic mountainous terrain, 
relative remoteness and communication isolation from the existing global transport 
infrastructure as well as numerous other transition challenges,  confronted immediately 
after independence in 1991 a terrible civil war. This brought to the poorest country of the 
Former Soviet-Union to a deeper level of poverty, vandalism, and low pace of 
development in human capital and, of course, damaged infrastructure. Ensuring that 
regional economic integration succeeds in Tajikistan is vital, not only because of the 
CHAPTER 4.  DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF EURASEC INTEGRATION AGREEMENT FOR TAJIKISTAN 
241 
previously mentioned challenges but also because of the policies that could ensure 
successful integration for a country that together with its neighbors has many elements of 
transboundary nature (water and energy, transport and the potential of Islamic Resistance) 
which inevitably require an "integrated" answer. 
Chapter three has shown that the welfare effects of the EurAsEC agreement through 
static trade creation and trade diversion effects (in the context of the Traditional Theory of 
Economic Integration) are positive for Tajikistan although of a moderate amount. As it was 
seen in chapter one, the New Theory Economic Integration claims that the most important 
effects of integration processes are dynamic effects in terms of large-scale economies, 
technological change, effects on marker structure and competition, productivity growth and 
investment activity. In essence, dynamic effects of economic integration are defined as 
anything that affects the country's rate of economic growth over the medium term, (Schiff 
and Winters, 1998, p. 179). Although the dynamic effects are the most relevant, mainly for 
developing countries, the literature of economic integration dealing with developing and 
least developed countries, as it is the case for Tajikistan, has generally recognized that for 
such type of countries neither the “New” nor, mainly, the “traditional" economic 
integration theory are adequate. So, in the frame of the new economic integration theory, 
an extensive literature focus on the potential effects of integration to developing countries 
and the motivation of these countries to participate in integration processes beyond the 
static and dynamic effects, (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper and Massell, 
1965b; Kahnert et al, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Robson, 1980; Mackay, 1984; De Melo, 
2011; Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014). 
At this regard, regional integration in Tajikistan is essential, expecting that it will 
help in enhancing development of not only because the static effects of resource allocation 
(as the traditional theory claims) but also enhanced economic growth and development 
objectives through creation of common projects such as poverty alleviation, improving 
standard and quality of life by promoting health and education issues, productive 
employment, services and coordination of foreign policy aiming at peace and security 
within and between the regions. 
Thus, this chapter analyzes, on the one hand, the dynamic effects of EurAsEC for 
economic growth of Tajikistan and, on the other hand, also in the context of the New 
Regionalism, some of the welfare effects of integration for developing countries that are 
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not covered by traditional analysis for developed countries, as well as some of the factors 
motivating developing countries to participate in an integration area that could give 
rationality to integration of Tajikistan into EurAsEC at both the current degree and perhaps 
a deeper degree in the future. Following Marinov (2014), the potential effects and factors 
which are relevant for developing countries, constituting the economic determinants of 
integration that influence the motivation of these countries to participate in integration 
agreements are organized into three categories: general economic (development objective), 
market-related, and trade-related determinants. In addition to economic determinants, there 
are also several political incentives of economic integration that are of special importance 
to developing countries. 
In the context of dynamic effects, economic integration by attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) may affects aggregate productivity in the economy through technology 
transfer and increased competition and, then, positively affects the economic growth rate. 
In Tajikistan, FDI has been dominated by investors such as Russia, China, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, and International financial organizations like the World Bank. The vast 
priority areas of FDI opportunities are directed, firstly, to the hydroelectric power, mining 
sector (primary aluminum) and agriculture development, especially, deep processing of 
cotton fibers and, secondly, to the banking sector, service industry, tourism and 
manufacture of construction materials. But, the lack of a national strategy for FDI 
promotion and transparent investment policies hinders the capacity of Tajik government to 
attract foreign investment (EDB, 2013; FAO, 2014; UNCDAT, 2014; State Statistical 
Agency of Tajikistan and Investment Committee of Tajikistan). According to the Bureau 
of economic and business affairs (2012), Tajikistan looks mostly after state-led investment 
and external loans from the country’s perceived geopolitical friends rather than making 
conditions favorable to private investors from abroad. 
Thus, Tajikistan, in line with most of the EurAsEC countries, showed a faster GDP 
growth averagely 7-8% between 1995 and 2013. However, despite the relatively stable 
macroeconomic indicators, Tajikistan's economy remains dependent on external factors 
which are a major source of vulnerability (World Bank, 2011). Two external factors 
deserve particular attention: the contribution of remittances (mainly from Russia) to 
Tajikistan’s growth since 2004 (50% of GDP in 2013) and the fact that economic growth 
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was mostly supported by development assistance from multilateral and bilateral 
development partners. 
The economic growth of Tajikistan is very similar to EurAsEC countries, but 
country’s GDP per capita is still significantly below all the EurAsEC members (GDP per 
capita in Tajikistan was only 7.2% of that of Russia in 2013) and nearly 35 percent 
population still lives under the absolute poverty line. In spite of weak static and dynamic 
traditional effects, as a developing country, there are several economic and political 
determinants which can give rationality to the decision of Tajikistan join EurAsEC. 
Among the economic determinants to integration, beyond the traditional static and 
dynamic effects, one of the most relevant for developing countries is the economic 
development objective. Poverty reduction was one of the fundamental and primary 
development objectives of Tajik government. After a period of political imbalance and 
gradually recuperation, the economy of Tajikistan has showed rapid growth that helped to 
significantly decline the level of poverty that fell from over 80 percent to about 32 percent 
during the period 1999-2014. Remittances played a crucial role on poverty reduction, 
especially in rural areas (Azevedo et all, 2014). Nevertheless, despite high poverty 
alleviation, Tajikistan is still one of the poorest countries in the region in terms of per 
capita income.   
The situation was similar in terms of other development indicators. In the beginning 
of the 90s, Tajikistan along with most of the post-Soviet countries had relatively high 
Human Development Index, reflecting the heritage of economic and social development 
achieved during the Soviet empire. However, with the disintegration result and civil war, 
its HDI has fallen sharply from 0.629 in 1991 to 0.535 in 2000. The decline in the HDI 
during this time indicates that the relative position of life expectancy, education and GDP 
per capita in Tajikistan has been deteriorated. Although recent dates show that Tajikistan’s 
HDI value again increased up 0.624, putting the country in the medium category ranking 
(129 out of 188 countries), country’s HDI is still behind the other EurAsEC countries, 
(UNDP, 2015). 
 Among the market-related determinants, of particular importance are the potential 
effects on employment and productivity and the industry development induced by 
integration. Tajikistan was unable to create enough jobs for a growing population and the 
unemployment rate remains the highest in the region. The jobs created are mainly in 
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agriculture, which accounts for over 66% of total employment. Although productivity in 
the agricultural sector has increased in recent years, it remains far below that of other 
countries in the region. The answer to unemployment and poverty, especially in rural areas 
and by young people, has been migration. Tajik migrants abroad (mainly in Russia) are 
equivalent to 18% of country population. Consequently, remittances from migrant grown 
enormously since 2000, amounted to 45% country's GDP in 2013. Migrant remittances 
were a main driver of economic growth and development, with a positive effect on poverty 
alleviation and unemployment reduction, but the high dependence of Tajikistan on 
remittances from migrants (90% of them in Russia) and the effect of remittances on 
exchange rate are also a source of macroeconomic vulnerability.  
Regarding the development of the industrial sector, the success of the integration 
process is highly doubtful, it is an outdated and deteriorated sector with low productivity. 
The participation of the industry has fall from 39.3% to 21.8% of total GDP and from 9.9% 
to 4.1% of total employment, mainly due to the recent fall in cotton and aluminum prices 
(World Bank, 2011).  
After show the evolution of the trade trends and the trade structure (by sectors and 
partners) of Tajikistan, we present the found evidence on several trade-related 
determinants which are relevant in the case of developing countries, namely, trade as a 
percentage of GDP, trade pattern with developed countries, intra-regional trade and total 
regional trade and  competitive versus complementarity countries. 
The foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan has generally increased in the period 1995-
2013. According to UNCTAD data, over the period the export has increased 1.5 times, 
while imports grew 5.1 times. From 2000 to 2013 imports boom (mainly after 2002) while 
exports show a very poor dynamic and negative trade balance becomes higher and higher. 
The percentage of GDP that is exported decrease dramatically after 2000 and the export 
coefficient falls from 91% to 13% over the period. Imports as a percentage of GDP 
accounted by 75% in 2000 and, in spite of the high GDP growth rates over the period, they 
accounted by 49% of GDP in 2013. Remittances (accounting by above 50% of GDP in 
2013) explain this huge increase in imports.  
In the context of EurAsEC, Tajikistan exports and imports represents a very small 
proportion, showing both variables a different evolution from 2000 to 2013. Imports 
evolution it was in line with the rest of the countries remaining its participation in total 
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EurAsEC imports by around 1.1%. By contrary, exports evolution was much less dynamic 
than for the rest of the countries so that its participation falls from 0.64% in 2000 to 0.18% 
in 2013.  
The high concentration of Tajikistan exports in unwrought aluminum and cotton, 
which accounts for two-thirds of total exports, makes the Republic largely dependent on 
shocks like world prices. Imports are less concentrated than exports and, by contrary to 
exports, the concentration decreases over the period, showing a concentration index in 
2013 very similar to Russia or Kazakhstan. The main partners of Tajikistan in recent years 
are China, Turkey and EurAsEC members (with which the dynamics of foreign trade 
turnover of Tajikistan with in the recent years had a positive trend); and EU and the CIS 
countries which are not members in EurAsEC (with which trade decreased with).  
The increase of the share of intra-regional trade to total trade and the increase of 
total trade are common accepted indicators of integration agreement successful, although 
Inotai (1991) shows that these indicators should not be the only ones considered in 
analyzing integration successful when integration takes place between developing 
countries. In the case of Tajikistan, the share of intra-EurAsEC trade in total foreign trade 
is higher than for the total area but the increase in trade with EurAsEC after join the 
agreement was not greater than for total trade, so that the share of intra-regional trade 
decreases from 27% in 2001 to 25.5% in 2013. 
Trade as a percentage of GDP and trade pattern with developed countries are 
not relevant integration determinants in the case of Tajikistan explaining its desirability to 
enjoy EurAsEC beyond traditional static and dynamic effects. On the one hand, by 2000 
Tajikistan was a highly open economy and the openness degree decrease from 2000 to 
2013. On the other hand, trade flows of Tajikistan with the developed European countries 
has not increased over the period and the greater proportion of imported goods, consisting 
in consumer goods, are imported mainly from China.  
Trade complementarity indexes show that the increasingly diversified basket of 
imports of Tajikistan increasingly fits the export structure of its partners. By the contrary, 
the export structure of the country fits less with the import structure of all the main 
partners, since exports basket of Tajikistan includes very few goods. Taking into account 
the qualitative information given by the TC index, by 2000 could reasonably be expected 
an expansion of trade after a preferential agreement with EurAsEC countries since the 
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highest TC index values were shown for EurAsEC countries. However, from the index 
values in 2013, the relevance of a deeper integration agreement with EurAsEC countries is 
not as clear, especially in regarding TC index for imports.  
After the introduction, the rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two 
will gives an overview of Tajikistan. Section three focuses on the dynamic effects for the 
economic growth rate of Tajikistan into the context of EurAsEC. Section four analyses the 
potential dynamic effects of EurAsEC to Tajikistan and several economic integration 
economic integration determinants as a developing country, in an attempt to determine the 
rationality of Tajikistan joining EurAsEC beyond the traditional static and dynamic effects. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































         The main research objective of the thesis was the evaluation of the integration 
process followed by Tajikistan after independence and the expected effects of the 
EurAsEC regional agreement on Tajikistan. 
Once URSS was disintegrated, after several years of civil war and with a seriously 
weakened economy, Tajikistan tries to inset itself into de regional and the global economy 
being the main objective the economic growth and development. Chapter two has shown 
that the integration process followed by Tajikistan basically followed three strategies: 
regional agreements with ex-soviet countries, regional agreements with other 
neighborhood countries (in particular with Islamic countries and with China), and 
agreements with international institutions and organizations (looking for financial support 
and assistance). According to several studies, the most significant regional agreement 
involving Tajikistan, having better prospects for the future, is the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC), formed in 2000 (Pomfret, 2004; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012; 
Kuzmina, 2012;  Libman and  Vinokurov,  2012;  Cooper,  2013;  Kembayev,  2014;  
Galiakberov  and  Abdullin,  2014; Yesdauletova, 2014). It seem clear that in recent years 
this agreement is the most active one, in particular after  moving  towards  a  greater  
degree  of  integration  by  forming  an  Economic  Union  three  member countries  
(Russia,  Belarus  and Kazakhstan)120 and that Tajikistan is giving priority to this initiative.   
 Before analyzing the effects of the EurAsEC economic integration agreement on 
Tajikistan, we have reviewed in chapter one the literature on economic integration. After 
show the meaning of economic integration and the ways how economic integration takes 
place, we reviewed the literature on the potential welfare effects of economic integration, 
in particular for developing countries. These effects rationally explain the desire of 
countries in participate in integration agreements.                         
The conclusion is that the "orthodox theory of Viner-Meade-Lipsey" with their 
traditional restrictive approach is not appropriate to the case of developing countries, since 
it may not always correspond with their economic development objectives (Meier, 1960; 
                                                          
120 
Eurasian Economic Integration has arrived at just the right time. The Asia-Europe economic region is 
undergoing major changes. With the strengthening of the Chinese economy and the crisis with the euro, 
the economic balance is shifting. Meanwhile, question about the future of the economies in the post -
Soviet region are arising. The new order now being attempted under Russians leadership could take on 
considerably more significance (Henning Schröder, 2013).   
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Balassa, 1965; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Mackay, 1984). In the context of the "New 
Regionalism", we reached the outcome that special accent should be put on potential 
dynamic effects in analyzing the effects of economic integration of developing countries 
and the motivation of these countries to participate in integration processes (Mikesell, 
1965; Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Rueda-Junquera, 2006). We have found an 
extensive literature addressing on the potential effects of integration to developing 
countries claiming that the rationale behind economic integration cannot be defined in 
terms of static or “traditional" effects, but also the dynamic effects or “New” analysis has 
to be carried out carefully, concluding that the motivation of these countries to participate 
in integration processes go beyond the static and dynamic effects and other integration 
determinants should be taken into account (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; 
Cooper and Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Robson, 1980; 
Mackay, 1984; De Melo, 2011; Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014). 
    Once the theoretical review was addressed, our interest turned to the empirical 
identification of economic integration effects of the EurAsEC agreement for Tajikistan. In 
chapter three, in the context of the traditional static economic integration effects, we 
analyzed the trade creation and trade diversion effects of EurAsEC as a whole and, in 
particular, for Tajikistan. We can conclude that EurAsEC had a positive net trade creation 
effect and, therefore, a positive welfare effect.  
Results show that the gravity model explains well intra-regional trade in the case of 
EurAsEC. In general, the traditional variables of the gravity model explaining the “normal” 
trade are significant and have the expected signs: intra-regional trade flows between 
EurAsEC members are positively related to GDP of the reporter country (as importer or as 
exporter) and variables representing aspects facilitating trade like share a common border 
or a language, and negatively related to distance. Partner’s country GDP has a positive 
effect on intra-regional exports but a negative effect on intra-regional imports. Real 
exchange rate has the expected negative effect on intra-EurAsEC imports and for intra-
regional exports the sign of the coefficient is positive but this variable is not significant.  
With regard to the effects of the preferential agreement, the coefficients of the 
regional dummy variables show unambiguously that EurAsEC generated a net trade 
creation effect. Membership in EurAsEC had significant effects on bilateral trade within 
the area, mainly in terms of imports, without generate trade diversion from the rest of the 
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world. Imports from and exports to the no-EurAsEC partners also were positively affected 
but to a lesser extent than intra-regional flows.   
Results for Tajikistan trade flows show that imports are positively related to 
Tajikistan’s GDP and exports are positively related to partner countries GDP. Sharing a 
language positively affects both imports and exports. Moreover, exports are positively 
affected by sharing a border and negatively affected by distance; however, both variables 
are not significant in explaining imports. Membership of EurAsEC positively affects 
Tajikistan trade flows, to a much larger extent on imports than on exports but in both cases 
to a larger extent than on total EurAsEC trade flows.  
In the case of Tajikistan, imports greatly increased after join EurAsEC, both from 
the area and from other partners outside the area. However, exports have showed a very 
poor performance, generating a huge trade deficit. Nevertheless, the export performance 
has not been so bad with EurAsEC partners than with some of the non-member which was 
traditionally important partners, namely the European Union. Therefore, in the context of 
EurAsEC, intensifying relations with member countries and reducing costs of transporting 
goods to these countries seem to be good recommendations. But Tajikistan should not 
concentrate its commercial policy efforts only on these partners. There are more dynamic 
neighboring economies outside EurAsEC, namely Turkey and China, which also should be 
stated objectives for the Tajikistan exports.  
Since “New” economic integration theory claims that in the case of developing 
countries, special accent should be put on potential dynamic effects, in chapter four our 
research interests turn to the analysis of the dynamic effects of EurAsEC on Tajikistan. 
Firstly, we have analyzed the growth effects which are mainly influenced by investment 
and especially by FDI. We also show evidence on several integration factors influencing 
the desirability of developing countries to participate in regional integration agreements.   
Although substantial work has been done for fulfilling investment programs and 
attracting FDI projects were observed in some years, the investment development has not 
made notable progress in Tajikistan. In spite of the poor performance of FDI, Tajikistan 
together with the other EurAsEC members enjoyed a faster GDP growth (averagely 7-8%) 
after 2000. In the case of Tajikistan, economic growth is explained in a large extent by 
high and increasing remittances and financial assistance from multilateral and bilateral 
development partners. Under those external environment factors, highly uncertain and 
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domestic pressures growing, the authorities are confronted with the need to undertake a 
transition to a more sustainable and inclusive growth model (World Bank Group, 2015). 
Economic growth in Tajikistan, although unstable, is in the same line with the most 
EurAsEC countries in recent years, but GDP per capita of Tajikistan is negligible in 
comparison with these countries. So, it seems that dynamic effects appear weak in the case 
of Tajikistan. 
As a developing country, there are several economic and political integration 
determinants that could give rationality to the Tajik decision about join EurAsEC in spite 
of low or ambiguous static and dynamic effects.  
The economic development objective is the most important of the integration 
objectives for developing countries. Poverty alleviation was identified as one of the major 
development objectives standing in the way of Tajik government. Poverty rate fell from 
79.8 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 2014 of people living under poverty line (Taj Stat, 
2015). Certainly, Tajikistan has done a remarkable job in reducing poverty with more than 
a million people moving out of the poor zone. However, with a poverty rate of 32% in 
2013, the country is still recognized as a poorest country in the scope of EurAsEC. 
           Starting from a relatively high Human Development Index (HDI) from the Soviet 
era, after the collapse of the USSR Tajikistan HDI fallen  sharply from 0.629 in 1991 to 
0.535 in 2000 and only the country could catch up the previous rate in 2014. Currently, 
Tajikistan still has a lower HDI than the other EurAsEC countries, (UNDP, 2015). 
           In regard the market-related determinants, we have focused on the potential effects 
of integration on employment and productivity and the industry development.       Despite 
of the high economic growth in the country, employment growth was not observed, 
neither in the large sectors such as services and industry nor in the small construction 
sector. Only the agricultural sector provided new jobs, accounting by 66% of total 
employment in 2013. In a context of increasing population, the unemployment rate 
increased. ILO estimates unemployment rate of 11.5% in 2009, which is the highest of the 
EurAsEC area. Thus, it seems that the positive effects of integration on the labor market 
were not observed in terms of employment.   
Given the increase in the share of employment in the agricultural sector, the 
increase of the economy’s productivity depends on the increase in productivity in 
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agriculture. Despite some increase in the valued added by worker in sector in recent years, 
the agriculture productivity in Tajikistan is still in the lowest position within the region.  
In a context of unemployment and household poverty, migration is the solution for 
many people in Tajikistan. In fact, around 15% of total population has migrated, mainly to 
Russia. Consequently, Tajikistan with a volume of remittances accounting by 50% of GDP 
in 2013 is one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world (Vinokurov et al, 
2013). The huge amount of remittances, which contributed positively to the poverty 
alleviation and labor market pressure, is also a source of macroeconomic instability by its 
contribution to, among other aspects, the exchange rate appreciation and the increase in the 
trade deficit. 
      In regard trade-related determinants, we have analyzed trade as a percentage of GDP, 
trade pattern with developed countries, intra-regional trade and total regional trade and  
competitive versus complementarity countries. 
After the war-time recession, the foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan came out 
with a positive dynamics, increasing between 1995 and 2013. From 1995 to 2000 the trade 
balance was nearly zero.  However, in the last decade Tajik export has increased 1.5 times 
whereas imports rose 5.1 times. In the early 2000, import as a percentage of GDP 
amounted to 75%, a decade after, the level of import remains high, around 49% of GDP in 
2013, despite a substantial GDP growth observed. By contrary, in 2013 the share of export 
in country's GDP was significantly smaller, around 13%, which dramatically fell from 91% 
in 2000 following the decline in the world price of cotton and aluminum as main export 
products.  
           Regard to trade by partners, Tajikistan export and import increase not only with 
EurAsEC members but also and a larger extent with non-EurAsEC countries such as 
China, Iran, and Turkey. However, trade flows with other non-member countries like the 
EU and CIS countries shows a negative trend. Thus, in spite of substantial extra-regional 
trade turnover, the intra-regional trade remains highly insignificant, representing only 10% 
of total EurAzEC trade in 2013. In the case of Tajikistan, the proportion of intra-EurAsEC 
trade in total foreign trade is higher than for the area as a whole. However, the intra-
regional proportion in total foreign trade decreases from 27% in 2001 to 25.5% in 2013. 
The effects of integration on trade openness or trade pattern with developed 
countries are not determinants of the desirability of Tajikistan to join EurAsEC. By 2000, 
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Tajikistan was a highly open economy and the openness degree fell from 2000 to 2013. 
Moreover, the trade flows of Tajikistan with the developed European countries have not 
increased over the period. The higher import share consisting of consumer goods come 
namely from China. 
        The trade complementarity (TC) index that indicates to what extent the export 
(import) profile of a country j matches the import (export) profile of a country k, shows 
much lower values for Tajikistan as an exporter than as an importer. In both of the cases, 
the index increased from 2000 to 2013 not just with EurAsEC members but also and in a 
larger extent with some other countries like Turkey and China. Thus, while by 2000 could 
reasonably be expected an expansion of trade after a preferential agreement with EurAsEC 
countries, from the index values in 2013 the relevance of a deeper integration with 
EurAsEC is not as clear, especially in regarding TC index for imports.  
 The main objective of this work was to analyze the effects of EurAsEC on 
Tajikistan, trying to justify the rationality for the participation of Tajikistan in this project 
at the current stage and to potentially continue in the future with a greater integration 
degree. The overall conclusion is that while the results, although most of them positive, are 
of small size, EurAsEC under the leadership of Russia, is surely the most interesting 
alternative among the possible regional integration options. 
While, from the point of view of potential economic relations, it would be of 
interest a closer integration with countries outside the ex-soviética orbit, in particular 
China and Turkey, the interest from a general socio-economic perspective and the viability 
of those initiatives in the medium and long terms are doubtful.  
First, Tajikistan remains heavily dependent on Russia, which although it is a source 
of instability is not waivable in the short and medium terms. Russia, that explicitly tries by 
all means to keep leadership in the region and has a final objective of recomposing 
somehow what was the Soviet space, will not support any initiative that excludes it or in 
what his leadership is questioned. 
In the current geopolitical context, deepen integration with the Islamic world 
through agreements involving Turkey but also Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, although in 
principle appear to meet security objectives, it is not the best way to ensure the economic 
and social stability of the country. On the other hand, enhance integration with China 
through the Shanghai agreement, it seems clearly interesting, but surely Russia, which is 
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also a member of this organization, will not support the development of this agreement, 












El objetivo principal de la tesis es el análisis del proceso de integración seguido por 
Tayikistán después de la independencia y los efectos esperados del acuerdo de integración 
regional  EurAsEC sobre Tayikistán. 
Tras la desintegración de la URSS, después de varios años de guerra civil y con una 
economía seriamente debilitada, Tayikistán trata de integrarse en la economía regional y 
mundial, teniendo como principal objetivo el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo. El 
capítulo dos muestra que el proceso de integración seguido por Tayikistán se basó 
fundamentalmente en tres estrategias: acuerdos regionales con los países ex-soviéticos, 
acuerdos regionales con otros países vecinos (en particular con países islámicos y con 
China), y acuerdos con instituciones y organizaciones internacionales (buscando asistencia 
y apoyo financiero).  
Según varios estudios, el acuerdo regional más importante en el que está implicado 
Tayikistán, y el que tiene mejores perspectivas para el futuro, es la Comunidad Económica 
Euroasiática (EurAsEC), formada en el año 2000 (Pomfret, 2004; Dragneva y Wolczuk, 
2012; Kuzmina, 2012; Libman y Vinokurov 2012; Cooper, 2013; Kembayev, 2014; 
Galiakberov y Abdullin, 2014; Yesdauletova, 2014). Parece claro que en los últimos años 
este acuerdo es el más activo, en particular después de avanzar hacia un mayor grado de 
integración tras la formación de una unión económica por parte de tres países miembros 
(Rusia, Bielorrusia y Kazajstán), y que Tayikistán está dando prioridad a esta iniciativa. 
 Antes de analizar empíricamente los efectos del acuerdo de integración económica 
EurAsEC sobre Tayikistán, en el capítulo uno se revisa la literatura sobre integración 
económica. Después de mostrar el significado de la integración económica y las formas en 
las que un proceso de integración económica se lleva a cabo, tanto con una integración 
negativa (eliminando barreras) como con una positiva (creando nuevas instituciones y 
coordinando políticas), se abordan los posibles efectos de la integración para el bienestar, 
en particular para los países en desarrollo. Estos efectos son los que dan racionalidad a la 
decisión de los países de participar en acuerdos de integración regional. 
En cuanto al análisis de los efectos de la integración para el bienestar, nos 
centramos tanto en los efectos estáticos contemplados por la Teoría Tradicional de la 
integración como en los efectos dinámicos en los que se centra la Nueva Teoría de la 
integración. La conclusión es que la "teoría ortodoxa de Viner-Meade-Lipsey" con su 
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tradicional enfoque restrictivo no es apropiado para el caso de los países en desarrollo, ya 
que no siempre sus objetivos con los de desarrollo económico (Meier, 1960; Balassa, 1965; 
Abdel Jaber, 1971; Mackay, 1984). En el contexto del "nuevo regionalismo", llegamos al 
resultado de que cuando se trata de analizar los efectos de la integración para países en 
desarrollo y de entender la motivación de estos países para participar en procesos de 
integración, el acento se debe poner en los posibles efectos dinámicos que influencian el 
crecimiento económico a medio y largo plazo (Mikesell, 1965; Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel 
Jaber, 1971; Rueda-Junquera, 2006). Además, hemos encontrado una extensa literatura que 
trata sobre los efectos potenciales de la integración para los países en desarrollo, afirmando 
que la motivación de estos países para participar en los procesos de integración va más allá 
de los efectos estáticos y dinámicos, siendo necesario considerar otros factores 
determinantes de la integración (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; Brown, 1961; Cooper y 
Massell, 1965b; Kahnert et al, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971; Robson, 1980; Mackay, 1984; De 
Melo, 2011; Hosny, 2013; Marinov, 2014). 
 Una vez llevada a cabo la revisión de la literatura sobre integración económica y 
mostrada la pauta de integración seguida por Tayikistán, concluyendo que el acuerdo más 
relevante en el que participa el país es EurAsEC, nuestro interés se dirige a la 
identificación empírica de los efectos de la integración en EurAsEC para Tayikistán. En el 
capítulo tres, en el contexto de los tradicionales efectos estáticos de la integración 
económica, analizamos los efectos de creación y desvío de comercio, tanto para EurAsEC 
en su conjunto como, en particular, para Tayikistán, estimando, con datos de panel, un 
Modelo Gravitacional aumentado, en el que además de las variables habituales se 
incluyeron variables dummy regionales que permiten concluir la existencia de creación y 
desvío de comercio. El modelo fue testado para una muestra de 26 países para el periodo 
1995-2013. La conclusión general es que EurAsEC tuvo un efecto neto positivo de 
creación de comercio y, por tanto, un efecto positivo sobre el bienestar. 
Los resultados muestran que el modelo gavitacional explica bien el comercio intra-
regional en el caso de EurAsEC. En general, las variables tradicionales del modelo que 
explican el comercio "normal" son significativas y tienen los signos esperados: los flujos 
de comercio intra-regional entre los miembros de EurAsEC están positivamente 
relacionados con el PIB del país cuyos flujos comerciales se analizan (como importador o 
como exportador) y con las variables que representan los aspectos que facilitan el 
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comercio, como tener una frontera o una lengua comunes, y están negativamente 
relacionados con la distancia. El PIB de los países con los que se comercia tiene un efecto 
positivo sobre las exportaciones intrarregionales, pero un efecto negativo en las 
importaciones intrarregionales. El tipo de cambio real tiene el efecto negativo esperado 
sobre las importaciones intra-EurAsEC, y para las exportaciones intrarregionales el signo 
del coeficiente es positivo, pero esta variable no es significativa. 
Con respecto a los efectos del acuerdo preferencial, los coeficientes de las variables 
dummy regionales muestran sin ambigüedad que EurAsEC genera un efecto neto de 
creación de comercio. La pertenencia a la Comunidad Económica Euroasiática tuvo efectos 
significativos en el comercio bilateral en el área, principalmente en cuanto a las 
importaciones, sin generar desviación de comercio del resto del mundo. Las importaciones 
y exportaciones a los países no socios de EurAsEC (al resto del mundo)  también se vieron 
afectadas positivamente, pero en menor medida que los flujos intra-regionales. 
Los resultados para los flujos comerciales de Tayikistán muestran que las 
importaciones se relacionan positivamente con el PIB de Tayikistán y las exportaciones se 
relacionan positivamente con el PIB de los socios comerciales. Compartir una lengua 
afecta positivamente a las importaciones y exportaciones. Por otra parte, las exportaciones 
se ven afectadas positivamente por el hecho de compartir una frontera y negativamente por 
la distancia; sin embargo, ambas variables no son significativas en la explicación de las 
importaciones. Ser miembro de EurAsEC afecta positivamente a los flujos de comercio de 
Tayikistán, en un grado mucho mayor para las importaciones que para las exportaciones, 
pero en ambos casos en un grado mayor que para el total de los flujos comerciales de 
EurAsEC.  
En el caso de Tayikistán, las importaciones aumentaron considerablemente después 
de unirse a EurAsEC, tanto las que provienen del área regional como las que provienen del 
resto del mundo. Sin embargo, las exportaciones han mostrado un desempeño muy pobre, 
lo que ha generado un enorme déficit comercial. Con todo, el comportamiento de las 
exportaciones no ha sido tan malo con los socios de EurAsEC como con algunos de los no 
miembros que eran tradicionalmente socios importantes, sobre todo, la Unión Europea.  
Por lo tanto, en el contexto de EurAsEC, la intensificación de las relaciones con los 
países miembros y reducir los costes del transporte de mercancías hacia estos países 
parecen ser buenas recomendaciones. Pero Tayikistán no debe concentrar sus esfuerzos de 
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política comercial sólo en estos socios. Hay economías vecinas más dinámicas fuera de 
EurAsEC, en particular Turquía y China, las cuales deben ser consideradas como objetivo 
de las exportaciones de Tayikistán. 
Dado que la “Nueva” teoría de la integración económica afirma que en el caso de 
los países en desarrollo el acento se debe poner en los potenciales efectos dinámicos, en el 
capítulo cuatro nos centramos en el análisis de los efectos dinámicos de EurAsEC para 
Tayikistán. En primer lugar, se analizan los efectos para el crecimiento económico, los 
cuales están muy influenciados por la inversión y, sobre todo, por la Inversión Extranjera 
Directa (IED). También mostramos evidencia de varios factores que influyen en el deseo 
de los  países en desarrollo por participar en acuerdos de integración regional más allá de 
los tradicionales efectos estáticos y dinámicos. 
Aunque Tayikistan ha hecho un trabajo sustancial para cumplir con los programas 
de inversión y ha conseguido atraer proyectos de IED en algunos años, el desarrollo de la 
inversión no ha progresado notablemente en Tayikistán. Pero, a pesar de los malos 
resultados de la IED, Tayikistán, junto con los otros miembros de EurAsEC, disfrutó de un 
rápido crecimiento del PIB a partir del año 2000 (con una media de 7-8%). En el caso de 
Tayikistán, el crecimiento económico se explica en gran medida por las elevadas y 
crecientes remesas de emigrantes, y por la asistencia financiera para el desarrollo por parte 
de los socios multilaterales y bilaterales. En virtud de esos factores externos, de las 
presiones internas y la incertidumbre, las autoridades se enfrentan a la necesidad de 
efectuar una transición a un modelo de crecimiento más sostenible e integrador (Grupo del 
Banco Mundial, 2015). Si bien el crecimiento económico en Tayikistán, aunque inestable, 
está en línea con el de la mayoría de los países de EurAsEC en los últimos años, el PIB 
per cápita de Tayikistán es insignificante en comparación con estos países. Por lo tanto, 
podemos concluir que los efectos dinámicos son débiles en el caso de Tayikistán. 
Por otra parte, como país en desarrollo, hay varios factores económicos y políticos 
determinantes de la integración que podrían dar racionalidad a la decisión de Tayikistán 
de unirse a EurAsEC a pesar de que los efectos estáticos y dinámicos sean ambiguos o de 
una magnitud baja. Los determinantes que hemos considerado se agrupan en tres 
categorías: perspectiva económica general (objetivo de desarrollo económico), factores 
relacionados con el mercado y factores relacionados con el comercio. 
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El objetivo de desarrollo económico es el más importante de los objetivos de la 
integración para los países en desarrollo. En este sentido, el alivio de la pobreza fue 
identificado como uno de los principales objetivos de desarrollo del gobierno de 
Tayikistán. La tasa de pobreza se redujo de 79,8% en el año 2000 a 32% de personas que 
viven bajo la línea de pobreza en el año 2014 (Taj Stat, 2015). Ciertamente, Tayikistán ha 
hecho un trabajo notable en la reducción de la pobreza, con más de un millón de personas 
que salieron de la zona de pobreza. Sin embargo, con una tasa del 32% en 2013, el país 
sigue siendo reconocido como el más pobre en el ámbito de EurAsEC.  
Partiendo de un índice de desarrollo humano (IDH) relativamente alto en la era 
soviética, después del colapso de la URSS el IDH de Tayikistán cayó fuertemente desde 
0,629 en 1991 a 0,535 en 2000 y el país sólo consiguió alcanzar la tasa anterior en 2014. 
En la actualidad, Tayikistán todavía tiene un IDH inferior al de los demás países de 
EurAsEC (UNDP, 2015). 
En lo que se refiere a los determinantes relacionados con el mercado, nos hemos 
centrado en los efectos potenciales de la integración para el empleo y la productividad, así 
como para el desarrollo de la industria. A pesar del gran crecimiento económico en el país, 
no se observó crecimiento del empleo, ni en los grandes sectores como los servicios y la 
industria ni en el pequeño sector de la construcción. Sólo el sector agrícola fue capaz d 
crear nuevos puestos de trabajo, representando este sector el 66% del empleo total en 2013. 
Como consecuencia, en un contexto de aumento de la población, la tasa de desempleo 
aumentó. La OIT estima una tasa de desempleo del 11,5% en 2009, que es la más alta de 
EurAsEC. Por lo tanto, parece que los efectos positivos de la integración en el mercado 
laboral no se observaron en términos de empleo. 
Dado el aumento de la proporción del empleo en el sector agrícola, el aumento de la 
productividad de la economía depende del aumento de la productividad en la agricultura. 
Pues bien, a pesar de un cierto aumento en el valor añadido por trabajador en el sector en 
los últimos años, la productividad agrícola en Tayikistán se encuentra todavía en la 
posición más baja dentro de la región. 
En un contexto de desempleo y pobreza de los hogares, la emigración es la solución 
para muchas personas en Tayikistán. De hecho, alrededor del 15% de la población total ha 
emigrado, principalmente a Rusia. En consecuencia, Tayikistán, con un volumen de 
remesas que representan más del 50% del PIB en 2013, es una de las economías más 
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dependientes de las remesas de emigrantes en el mundo (Vinokurov et al, 2013). La 
enorme cantidad de remesas, que han contribuido positivamente a la mitigación de la 
pobreza y a reducir la presión del mercado de trabajo, también son una fuente de 
inestabilidad macroeconómica por su contribución a, entre otros aspectos, la apreciación 
del tipo de cambio y el aumento del déficit comercial. 
En relación con los determinantes relacionados con el comercio, se analiza el 
comercio como porcentaje del PIB, el patrón de comercio con los países desarrollados, el 
comercio intra-regional y el comercio total de la región, y países competitivos versus 
países complementarios. 
Después de la recesión en tiempos de guerra, el volumen del comercio exterior de 
Tayikistán tuvo una dinámica positiva, aumentando entre 1995 y 2013. De 1995 a 2000, 
exportaciones e importaciones evolucionan a la par siendo la balanza comercial casi nula. 
Sin embargo, en la última década las exportaciones de Tayikistán se han multiplicado por 
1,5, mientras que las importaciones se multiplicaron por 5,1. Así, a principios de 2000 las 
importaciones como porcentaje del PIB eran del 75%, una década después el nivel de 
importaciones sigue siendo alto, alrededor del 49% del PIB en 2013, a pesar del 
crecimiento sustancial del PIB. Por el contrario, en 2013 la proporción de las exportaciones 
en el PIB del país fue significativamente menor, alrededor del 13%, que se redujo 
drásticamente desde el 91% en 2000 a raíz de la disminución en el precio mundial del 
algodón y el aluminio, que son los principales productos de exportación. 
         En cuanto al análisis geográfico, las exportaciones y las importaciones de Tayikistán 
aumentaron no sólo con los miembros de EurAsEC sino también, y en mayor medida, con 
otros países no miembros de EurAsEC como China, Irán y Turquía. Sin embargo, los 
flujos comerciales con otros países no miembros como la UE y los países del CIS muestran 
una tendencia negativa. Por lo tanto, a pesar del incremento sustancial del comercio extra-
regional, el comercio intrarregional sigue siendo insignificante, representando sólo el 10% 
del comercio total de EurAzEC en 2013. En el caso de Tayikistán, la proporción del 
comercio intra-EurAsEc en el comercio exterior total es mayor que el del áresa en su 
conjunto. Sin embargo, la proporción intrarregional en el comercio exterior total 
disminuyó del 27% en 2001 al 25,5% en 2013. 
No podemos decir que los efectos de la integración sobre el grado de apertura 
comercial e el patrón de comercio con los países desarrollados sean determinantes de la 
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conveniencia para Tayikistán de unirse a EurAsEC. En el año 2000, Tayikistán era una 
economía muy abierta y el grado de apertura se redujo entre 2000 y 2013. Por otra parte, 
los flujos comerciales de Tayikistán con los países europeos desarrollados no han 
aumentado durante el período. La mayor parte de las importaciones, que consisten en 
bienes de consumo,  vienen de China.  
El índice de complementariedad comercial (TC) que indica en qué medida el 
perfil de exportación (importación) de un país j coincide con el perfil de importación 
(exportación) de un país k, muestra valores mucho más bajos para Tayikistán como 
exportador que como importador. En los dos casos, el índice aumentó entre 2000 y 2013, 
no sólo con los miembros de EurAsEC sino también, y en mayor medida, con algunos 
otros países como Turquía y China. Por lo tanto, mientras que en el 2000 se podría 
razonablemente esperar una expansión del comercio después de un acuerdo preferencial 
con países de EurAsEC, a partir de los valores del índice en 2013 la relevancia de una 
integración más profunda con este área no es tan clara, especialmente en relación con el 
índice TC para las importaciones. 
En resumen, el principal objetivo de este trabajo fue analizar empíricamente los 
efectos de EurAsEc en Tayikistán, tratando de justificar la racionalidad de este país para 
participar en este proyecto no solo en la etapa actual, sino potencialmente en el futuro y 
con un mayor grado de integración. La conclusión general es que, si bien los resultados, 
aunque positivos en su mayoría, son de pequeña magnitud, EurAsEC, bajo el liderazgo de 
Rusia, es sin duda la alternativa más interesante y plausible entre las posibles opciones de 
integración regional que se le presentan a Tayikistán. 
Si bien, desde el punto de vista de las posibles relaciones económicas, sería 
interesante una mayor integración con los países de fuera de la órbita exsoviética, en 
particular, China y Turquía, el interés desde una perspectiva socio-económica general y la 
viabilidad de las iniciativas a medio y largo plazo son dudosos. 
En primer lugar, Tayikistán sigue siendo muy dependiente de Rusia, que aun siendo 
una fuente de inestabilidad su apoyo no es renunciable a corto y medio plazo. Rusia, que 
trata explícitamente por todos los medios de mantener el liderazgo en la región y no oculta 
el objetivo último de recomponer de alguna manera lo que fue el espacio soviético, no va a 
apoyar ninguna iniciativa en la que se le excluya o en la que se ponga en duda su liderazgo. 
TRADE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN TAJIKISTAN: THE CASE OF EURASEC 
268 
En el actual contexto geopolítico, profundizar en la integración con el mundo 
islámico a través de acuerdos que involucran a Turquía, pero también a Irán, Pakistán y 
Afganistán, aunque en principio parezcan responder a objetivos de seguridad, no es la 
mejor manera de asegurar la estabilidad económica y social del país. Por otra parte, 
mejorar la integración con China a través del acuerdo de Shanghái, parece claramente 
interesante, pero seguramente Rusia, que también es miembro de esta organización, no va a 
apoyar el desarrollo de este acuerdo, que en realidad lidera China, frente al desarrollo de 
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